Is the philosophy of K.Popper anti-foundationalist ?

CENTRAL ASIAN JOURNAL OF LITERATURE, PHILOSOPHY AND CULTURE, 2022

This paper situates us within the context of an internal conflict in the Philosophy of Karl Popper. On the one hand, Popper is an ardent proponent of scientific realism-the view that science seeks to formulate true theories that depict the structure of the universe; and on the other hand, the very Karl Popper propounds Non-Justificationism in science-a negativist methodology which asserts that the logic of science seeks not the justification but the refutation of theories. This non-justificationism seems asymmetric to the realist optimistic ambition of justifying the reliability of scientific knowledge. To resolve this tension between realism and nonjustificationism in Popper's epistemology some philosophers have proceeded by revising his method of falsification (Imre Lakatos,), others have opted for a reinterpretation of his realism (Evandro Agazzi, Mario Alai,) while some have given an instrumentalist status to popper's rationality of science (Peter Godfrey-Smith, Anthony O'Hear). Our argument in this Paper is that to resolve the contradiction within Popper's rationality of science we have to situate the two conflicting theses (Realism and non-justicationism) within the general problem of Popper's epistemology. That is, the problem of the conditions necessary for the growth of scientific knowledge. Thus, after examining the basic tenets of Popper's realism and illustrating the levels of the opposition between realism and non-justificationism, we have gone beyond other solutions to defend the conflation of realism and non-justificationism as the condition for the growth of knowledge. Popper thus emerges out of our analysis as a 'critical realist' who rejects 'dogmatic optimism' and creates 'critical optimism' in his evolutionary epistemology.

Presented at 'Technology, Knowledge, Truth' Conference held by the Melbourne Society for Continental Philosophy, Dec. 13-15th 2017

Karl Popper's falsificationist demarcation of science from non-science rests on a specific ontological commitment to what he calls his 'naive realism'. The self-conscious 'naivete' here lies in the undefined - and for Popper largely undefinable - nature of this reality. All that his falsificationist protocol requires of it is that it be objective - that is to say, that neither our thoughts, nor beliefs or justifications bear on it or its ‘contents’. It is what it is, and nothing we have to say on the matter can alter it one jot. He doesn't, I think, seek to claim that this objective reality exhausts the possibilities of the real - he does not, for example, deny the existence of subjective states. But he does claim an independence of objective reality from those states (though the reverse does not hold true). However, I think it is possible, on the basis of Popper's own arguments, to say more about the character of this objective reality in ways that neither invalidate nor contradict Popper's arguments, but do enrich them in useful ways - philosophically at least. The paper will argue that the terms of what Popper calls his 'evolutionary epistemology' require us to understand the objectivity of this external reality to consist not of actual or material terms', but rather of relations that are external to the terms they relate. More precisely, it consists of relations between relations, which is to say, differential relations. In this light, Popper's external reality, the guarantor of his falisificationist demarcation, appears as not as a realm of actual things, but of virtual problems. What I would like to do, then, is to read Popper in and on his own terms, but 'behind his back' as a philosopher of difference in a Deleuzian mode. In doing so, I seek to follow through on Bergson's (and perhaps Deleuze's) aim of adding to science the metaphysics that it lacks (and does not want) in terms derived from (Popperian) sciences own methodological assumptions in ways that both complicate and shed light on the very demarcation those assumptions seek to defend.

The very title of my paper may cause many eyebrows to be raised. For anyone who is familiar with Popper's philosophy of science knows well that he distinguished clearly between two types of historical processes, namely, the process of conceiving a new scientific theory or idea and the methods of examining it logically, and asserted that the task of the philosophers is not to ponder on these actual thinking processes whereby a new scientific theory comes into being. The logical analysis of scientific knowledge, instead, is restricted to an examination of contents of linguistically formulated scientific theories and of the post-generational evaluative procedures of scientists. One might naturally ask what then the point behind an inquiry like this is since Popper himself was mainly concerned with post-generational justification and bequeathed the detailed study of theory creation to the psychologists and the historians. There are two principal reasons which motivated this examination. Firstly, what is generally found as the Popperian notion of creativity and scientific discovery in the literature of philosophy of science is reasonably different from what closer readings of his earlier and later works reveal. Secondly, an analysis like this can illuminate problems of theory change and scientific progress, which undoubtedly are important to philosophy of science in general and Popper in particular. This implies a crucial point, namely, that progress of scientific knowledge, contrary to what philosophers of science generally used to believe, is not the subject matter of a single discipline. In this paper I attempt to make apparent the shortcomings that the disciplinary splitting of the topic of advancement of knowledge (in science) entails.

2013

Abstract: The very title of my paper may cause many eyebrows to be raised. For anyone who is familiar with Popper’s philosophy of science knows well that he distinguished clearly between two types of historical processes, namely, the process of conceiving a new scientific theory or idea and the methods of examining it logically, and asserted that the task of the philosophers is not to ponder on these actual thinking processes whereby a new scientific theory comes into being. The logical analysis of scientific knowledge, instead, is restricted to an examination of contents of linguistically formulated scientific theories and of the post-generational evaluative procedures of scientists. One might naturally ask what then the point behind an inquiry like this is since Popper himself was mainly concerned with post-generational justification and bequeathed the detailed study of theory creation to the psychologists and the historians. There are two principal reasons which motivated this ex...

It is an irony to attack a more sceptical epistemology than one’s own in the name of scepticism and defend, instead, an epistemology that is positively illogical. And yet that is what Martin Gardner has done in his “A Skeptical Look at Karl Popper.”

Karl Popper: Critical Appraisals

As the title of this article indicates, its aim is to investigate in the origins of Karl Popper’s philosophy of science. In particular, find out the roots of what for him were at the time the two fundamental problems of the theory of knowledge. Thus, the fundamental questions in this work are: 1. What did Popper know of European philosophers of science that he mentions and criticizes? 2. Where does Popper's anti-inductivism and falsificationism come from? 3. Were Popper's basic positions original? 4. To what extent was Popper in his beginnings a realist philosopher? 5. How contributed Popper to the theory of scientific explanation? 6. What does contemporary scientific instrumentalism owe to Popper? Even if reading this article may cast some doubts on the solidity of Popper's basic approaches, what is indubitable is that Popper is an indispensable figure in the contemporary philosophy of science.

Unlike almost all other philosophers of science, Karl Popper sought to contribute to natural philosophy or cosmology – a synthesis of science and philosophy. I consider his contributions to the philosophy of science and quantum theory in this light. There is, however, a paradox. Popper’s most famous contribution – his principle of demarcation – in driving a wedge between science and metaphysics, serves to undermine the very thing he professes to love: natural philosophy or cosmology. I argue that Popper’s philosophy of science is, in this respect, defective. Science cannot proceed without making highly problematic metaphysical assumptions concerning the comprehensibility and knowability of the universe. Precisely because these assumptions are problematic, rigour requires that they be subjected to sustained critical scrutiny, as an integral part of science itself. Popper’s principle of demarcation must be rejected. Metaphysics and philosophy of science become a vital part of science. Natural philosophy is reborn.

Philosophy Research Archives, 1976

E-3 'ordinary-language analysis*. Popper argues against such methods in the English-edition preface to The Logic of Scientific Piscovery.-3 To be fair, he is here explicit in his expressed conc e m not to exclude any method philosophers may find helpful in handling their problems. But he does argue that ordinarylanguage analysis investigates common-sense knowledge. If our interest is in such problems as the growth of knowledge, he suggests, our concern should more properly be a study of the sophisticated form of knowledge of the sciences. The im plication that common-sense knowledge is relatively stagnantthat it would tend, much more so than scientific knowledge, to be seen as the final word-would in Popper's view Incline a study of it toward essentialism, i.e. the doctrine that it is possible to arrive at final explanations. I have little doubt that Popper would in general regard conceptual analysis and its cognate methods as forms of essentialism, and therefore to be avoided. He has emphasized that ordinary language is full of theories.** But when these theories are treated as concepts to be analyzed, he would argue, essentialism is the almost inescapable result. Being in this way at the same time attracted and repelled, I attempted to shift the conflict onto Popper, i.e. to see these opposing tendencies as a reflection of a confusion in Popper's position. This paper is the result of that attempt. It is thus a form of internal criticism, within the bounds set by Popper's thought itself. What is the confusion? It is, broadly speaking, that Popper has a well developed set of assumptions concerning the nature of human agents, when his general methodological approach is that no assumptions with the a priori status he grants these should be allowed. These assumptions are contained in his 3 The Logic of Scientific Discovery (New Yorks Harper, 1968), pp. 15-23. Il e.g. Conjectures and Refutations, p. 130. 486

Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews, 2017

The cover of this volume features a smiling visage of Popper, an image that belies the reality of the man, a harsh and unrelenting critic of all and sundry. Perhaps unsurprisingly then, Popper's philosophical heritage also proves elusive and ambiguous. For while certain signature doctrines remain firmly associated with him --falsifiability, critical rationalism, his particular notions of an open society and historicism --their heritage remains unclear and uncertain. Assessing these views in a larger context one would hope to be a central task of the volume under review. But such an appraisal would require negotiating between at least two relatively closed societies: that (ironically) of contemporary Popperians, and that of contemporary mainstream analytic philosophy. The essays in this volume all struggle with limited success to overcome one or the other of these obstacles, depending on whether the author is a Popperian or not.