Lay-led campaigns for Armenian Churches: Why so rare?

Religion in Communist Lands, 1989

Gorbachev's emphasis on 'the human factor', 'universal human values' and the 'law-governed state' has led to a breakdown of the Marxist-Leninist certainties which have dominated public life in the Soviet Union since the 1930s. This 'de-ideologisation' of Soviet life, although far from complete, has had major repercussions for the churches. It has led to an open reassessment of the ethical and spiritual values offered by, in particular, the Christian religion. Secondly, many of the bureaucratic and legal obstacles to the activity of the churches are, with some notable exceptions, 1 being eased. This is reflected by the growth in the registration of congregations (1,610 in 1988), the annulment of unpublished and discriminatory legislation introduced by the Council for Religious Affairs (CRA) or its predecessors,2 the involvement of churches in charitable activity, the establishment of Sunday schools (still technically illegal), and the return to the church of churches and monasteries. Thirdly, almost all former religious dissidents have been released from prison or labour camp and have' re-entered church life. Fourthly, the present improvements in religious freedom are being supplemented by legal reform. A new draft USSR Law on Freedom of Conscience, which should significantly improve the rights of believers, is presently under itliscussion. 3 *Some sections of this article are based on materials used by the author in previous writings on the Georgian Church.. I For example, the Ukrainian Orthodox and Greek Catholic churches,. banned under Lenin and Stalin respectively, are still officially proscribed, despite dialogue between the Vatican and the Russian Orthodox Church since June 1988 and numerous petitions, hunger strikes and open protests by members of these Ukrainian churches. See Keston

Вчені записки ТНУ імені В.І. Вернадського., 2021

After the division of the historical lands of Azerbaijan between Russia and Qajar Iran, the mass resettlement of Armenians to North Azerbaijan began. The Armenians who resettled here, being an ethno-confessional support for Russia, protected the interests of the empire in the Caucasus and played a role in expanding its sphere of influence. At the same time, the Armenians who joined to Russian society gradually exposed the myth of the "Armenian state" they had invented and succeeded in suppressing the Muslim community, the indigenous population of North Azerbaijan. Of course, this also coincided with the interests of the imperialist forces. During the said period, to unite under a social organization in the South Caucasus, especially in Azerbaijan, was controversial. Unlike the local Muslims, the foreign Armenians were provided by necessary conditions by the ruling forces of the empire. Since the church itself is directly involved in philanthropy in Russia, the main reason for the lag of Muslims in this area is clear. However, charity is one of the important conditions in the cultural and social life of every nation. The Armenians, who were gradually gaining ground in the lands of North Azerbaijan, used even the ugliest means to achieve their goals. Nationalist, chauvinist Armenian parties such as Dashnaktsutyun and Hnchag were planning to strengthen their position here, as well as to usurp Eastern Anatolia, organize raids, uprisings, raise funds, and train terrorist groups. Propaganda was one of the main tools for the implementation of these heinous and ulterior plans. The main source of funding for the separatist movement was non-profit organizations that spread enlightenment and worked for the national awakening of the Armenians: the necessary funds were collected from fairs, literary gatherings, lotteries, membership fees, donations organized for charitable purposes. Armenian non-profit organizations operating in Baku closely cooperated with nationalist parties and were closely involved in their ulterior goals under the guise of enlightenment and charitable activities. The aims of charity organizations such as the Baku Armenian Humanitarian Organization and the Baku Armenian Cultural Union were in fact to secretly assist the activities of the Dashnaks.

The Wheel Journal, 2015

What began in Russia in the late 1980s is usually called a time of “Church Revival.” Millions were baptized, tens of thousands of churches opened, thousands of new ones built. If the numbers were all that mattered, then indeed those metrics are simply astonishing. However, it is no less interesting to consider some other aspects: lay movements and hierarchy, Church and state, Church and civil society relations.

Current History, 2017

Religion in Communist Lands, 1975

In the summer of 1974 Keston College received some long and detailed documents which described a state of deep corruption in the Georgian Orthodox Church,and also the beginnings of a movement for purification and renewal. The charges against the Church's highest officers were so serious that it was felt at Keston that, despite the intricate detail and many other factors indicating the documents' authenticity, final judgment should be delayed until enquiries could be made and time had produced documentary and other confirmation-or the contrary.. Now, a year later, more than enough confirmation is available. In all, some 20 samizdat documents have arrived by various routes from Georgia, about half of. them directly concerned with the church situation, and others partially SO.l Articles by outsiders, analysing them, have begun to appear.2 But first some history. Today Georgia is one of the Soviet Union's 15 republics, with a population of less than five million, yet its statehood and Christianity are much older than Russia's. Georgia was converted in the early fourth century. Two centuries later its Church gained autonomy from the Patriarch of Antioch and in the eighth century autocephaly. Politically, after many centuries of rule or domination by Persians, Byzantians, Arabs, Seljuk Turks, Mongols, Ottomans and again Persians, with occasional periods of independence, Georgia became part of Russia in the first years of the nineteenth century. As a result, the Church lost its autocephaly in ISI I, and vigorous russification began: Church Slavonic was made compulsory in the churches, and Georgian was banned. Only in March 1917, when the tsarist order collapsed, was the autocephaly restored (though the Russian Church did not recognize this until 1943), and between 1915 to 1921 it was reinforced by Georgia's brief independence. When the Bolsheviks annexed the country in 1921 the Church was prominent among the resisters and suffered savage persecution. Today, out of nearly 2,500 Orthodox churches open before 1917 only 40 remain in operation (plus a few which belong to the Russian Church). This decline is much more drastic than in the Russian Church, where the equivalent figures are about 54,000 and 7,500, i.e., one in seven churches surviv

2014

This excellent collection brings together some of the best researchers in the fi eld, who skilfully tackle the problem of applying traditional understandings of religion and politics or secularisation theory to the world of Eastern Christianity. They offer new insights into the ways in which churches have coped with the particular challenges they face in responding to political reconstruction, nation-building, political confl ict, religious pluralism and the consequences of globalisation.'

Genocide Studies and Prevention, 2006

The scholarship on the Armenian Genocide has expanded enormously during the past three decades. Most of these works have focused on the causes and consequences of the genocide, Western responses to and Turkish denial of the genocide, and, more recently, Armenian-Turkish reconciliation. The role of the Armenian Apostolic Church, however, has received little attention in the literature. In addition to its ecclesiastical duties, the Armenian Church has over the centuries performed various secular functions, including, in the Ottoman Empire, acting as the principal representative agency for the Armenian millet. This article briefly examines the responses of the Armenian Patriarchate in Constantinople to the internationalization of the Armenian Question and then focuses on the three ecclesiastical leaders who played a central role in attempts to address the crises enveloping the Armenian people during World War I: Patriarch Zaven Der Yeghiayan of the Armenian Patriarchate in Constantinople, Catholicos Sahag II Khabayan of the Great House of Cilicia at Sis, and Catholicos Kevork V Surenyants of the Mother See at Echmiadzin. All three witnessed the destruction of their people and had the unenviable task of searching for the means to end the human catastrophe. Indeed, the Armenian Church itself, a most conservative institution harboring the utmost loyalty to the Ottoman Empire, in the end became a victim of the genocidal scheme of the Young Turk regime.

The article is published in: Textus et Studia, nr 4(4) 2015, s. 71–93. The article is intended as an introduction into the study of a particular source on the Soviet-period history of the Church. It demonstrates potential for the interdisciplinary survey of “letters to power” as an action and a source within broader contexts of the Orthodox Church’s integration into a Soviet society and its defensive strategies. Soviet believers’ letters, written in defense of their Church and their religious rights, became the most widespread form of their protest against discriminatory policy pursued by the state. In the first part the author provides a general overview of believers’ petitioning (as the text and the action) focusing on their reasons for writing letters, their self-representation and the view of the authorities. The author also examines discursive techniques and rhetorical conventions used it the letter. In the second part of the article the author examines a revealing case: the petitioning campaign of Orthodox believers from Chernihiv in defense of St. Trinity Church as it is presented in their letters written between 1962 and 1972.

Balcanica Posnanensia. Acta et studia, 2023

The aim of the article is to present the concept and actions taken by the Soviet diplomacy and the hierarchy of the Russian Orthodox Church to subjugate the Orthodox communities in the communist Balkan countries. The mechanism of the subjugation of the Balkan churches has been included into a comparative perspective and integrated into the broader concept of the Moscow Patriarchate towards gaining a leading role in the Orthodox world in the first years after the end of the Second World War. The process of dependency and its effects are reflected in diplomatic documents, but also in those produced by the Orthodox Churches themselves. The key element for gaining central position in the Orthodox world by Moscow was the organisation of anniversary celebrations and conferences to integrate the community and to involve it in the implementation of plans towards Soviet political domination. The results of these efforts were very limited in relation to ambitions outlined by the leadership of the Soviet state, revealing differing positions of the major patriarchates, as well as a real strength of authority and prestige that the Ecumenical Patriarchate invariably enjoyed.

Occasional Papers on Religion in Eastern Europe, 2022

The article examines the process of restoring Orthodox church brotherhoods in the 1860s on the territory of the Right-Bank Ukraine, defines the goals and objectives of these organizations, and analyzes the content and consequences of missionary and related educational and charitable work. The subjects of the research are the Orthodox church brotherhoods and their missionary work. The analysis of historiography is carried out and the need for further scientific research in the study of the topic is indicated. The role of brotherhoods in interfaith encounters is clarified, as are the methods aimed at combating Late Protestant confessions. Despite a certain positive effect, the dependence of church brotherhoods on the state and formalism in the organization of their work prevented them from fully realizing the tasks assigned to them. The Russian Orthodox Church in general and the Orthodox brotherhoods failed to stop the development and spread of the evangelical movement in the Ukrainian lands. The Orthodox Church did not take opportunities to renew and reform the church, which opened up in the process of inter-confessional confrontation with heterodox confessions.