Brinkmanship between Great Powers: US and Russia

2013

This study assesses alternative roles of strategic nuclear weapons in US-Russian relations after expiration of the 2002 Moscow Agreement, a successor agreement to the START I Treaty. A range of alternative nuclear futures beyond a QDR-defined baseline in a post-2012 security environment are explored, focused on the degree in which the U.S. would require nuclear weapons to manage its relationship with Russia and other states, key indicators of changes in U.S-Russian security relationships, future threats and political utility of nuclear weapons under alternative futures and nuclear force postures. Key questions for investigation are: • To what degree will the US need nuclear weapons after 2012? • Will the United States need nuclear weapons to manage its relationship with Russia after 2012? • What direction might future American and Russian nuclear force postures take after expiration of the Moscow Agreement after 2012? What are the indicators of change? • For the US and Russia, will the future political utility of nuclear weapons increase or decrease after 2012? • Given a degree of uncertainty in the US-Russian cooperative relations, what combination of currently planned and programmed strategic force investments offer the least risk? Six alternative nuclear futures are outlines and assessed.

Issue Brief, 2019

The demise of the INF treaty between Russia and the United States (US) has drawn critical scrutiny. Whilst both Russia and the US have traded allegations and counter-allegations over responsibility for the demise of the INF treaty, global concerns mount about an intensified to nuclear arms race. The demise of the Treaty has further presaged the emergence of the ‘new’ Cold War (NCW) narrative. The question is whether the current Russia-US rivalry is indeed a NCW phase or is it a mere case of failed accommodation of interests by both the countries at the bilateral level. Also, the emergence of this New Cold War narrative for the West towards Russia is limited to its military resurgence. Interestingly, Russia too seem to accept this narrative. This could possibly because it elevates its position in the great power rivalry in par with the US despite its many drawbacks such as in its economic growth performance. Given these scenarios, it is crucial to evaluate the relevance of INF Treaty in today’s global context, and deconstruct the much hyped NCW narrative to evaluate the future scope of Russia-US relations and its likely impact on common partners such as India.

The overriding issue that dominated the three days of presentations and dialogue was the impact of "perceptions and misperceptions" on current U.S.-Russian relations. In many aspects, the United States and Russia have similar security concerns regarding the threats posed by terrorism and WMD proliferation. Moreover, there was complete agreement among the fifty participants that the potential for deliberate hostilities between the two countries was nonexistent. However, these apparent "unifying factors" were not perceived as sufficient to overcome the bilateral uncertainty and misunderstanding that currently surround strategic modernization efforts in both countries. On several occasions, workshop participants mentioned that the state of bilateral tensions reminded them of the atmosphere that existed in the early 1980s. As one Russian participant observed, "The classic Cold War model is reemerging-don't cooperate easily; don't give them anything…."

2018

2020

With arms control in crisis and strategic stability in jeopardy, it is worth remembering the remarkable success of nuclear cooperation between the United States and Russia in the late Cold War and post-Cold War periods, often referred to as the ‘Golden Age of Arms Control’. In an effort to understand the current deterioration in U.S.-Russian arms control, this article presents a history of bilateral cooperation since the 1980s from both the American and Russian perspectives. We describe its past successes and investigate the current impasse using historical analysis and a collection of interviews with former diplomats, negotiation participants, and academics. From this analysis, we offer recommendations on best practices to reinvigorate arms control talks based on the historical lessons of success.

2023

— Russia has achieved substantial success in constraining Western support for Ukraine through use of threatening language around the possible use of nuclear weapons. Western leaders have explicitly justified reluctance to provide essential military assistance to Ukraine by reference to Russian narratives of uncontrollable escalation. — Purveyors of Russian nuclear rhetoric, including President Vladimir Putin, toned down their threatening language significantly in the last few months of 2022 and into 2023. Nevertheless, Moscow’s prior long-running campaign of nuclear intimidation continues to deliver results in terms of deterring Western responses to Russian aggression, and shielding Russia from the consequences of its actions in Ukraine. — This represents a striking success for Russian information campaigns. That success results from consistent failure among Western audiences and decision-makers to consider how unrealistic Russia’s threats are, or measure them against its real – and unchanged – nuclear posture. It is essential for responses to Russia’s intimidatory rhetoric to be guided by a realistic assessment of its basis in reality, rather than by fear-induced paralysis. — Actual use of nuclear weapons by Russia remains not impossible but highly unlikely. A decision to launch a strike would have to overcome a range of systemic and practical obstacles. Regardless of Western responses, the global consequences of breaking the nuclear taboo would be severe for Russia. — Nevertheless, Western nuclear powers have given Moscow grounds for confidence that there would not be retaliation in kind. US and allied messaging to Russia does not currently convey sufficient determination to respond adequately to nuclear use, and so should be urgently revised to achieve appropriate deterrent effect.

Political Analysis, 2018