Human Rights_ Habermas

In my brief analysis, 1 I will examine the question of the role Habermas' liberal theories play in his discursive theory of democracy, with special regard to the success of classical liberal freedom providing classical liberal rights of freedom, especially prevailing private autonomy. The question is interesting in itself since, as it is well-known, Habermas' theory of discussion refers to all parts of life and everyone concerned. It is a question then whether deliberate decision-making providing a wide-scale dispute is possible to conciliate with the liberal ideal advocating the sanctity of private life, whether the results of the discussion do not affect " detrimentally " private life and the regulations of the fi ght for status. Before fi nding a more accurate answer to these questions, I will examine how Habermas positions himself, on the one hand, advocating the importance of civil dialogue from the republican viewpoint and, on the other hand, against the deliberative ideals providing a wide multifariousness, and what kind of results he deems worthy of keeping from the liberal concept characterized by him as ideal-typical. According to my preliminary assumption, Habermas deems his own idea of democracy as a kind of a synthesis of liberal and republican theories, and he thinks he is capable of dissolving the contradiction existing between liberal and republican theories within his own theory, in the fi rst place with regard to the nature of political process, social integration, and rights. In the second part of my work, I will examine the strength of this idea of Habermas only according to one viewpoint: how much does democracy resolve in the discourse on the confl ict of negative and positive freedom, the confl ict of human rights and popular sovereignty?

2023

This paper explores a normative layer of Habermas’s public sphere in its relation to human rights. His public sphere came into being as a result of a spontaneous nonconformity manifested by the early bourgeoisie’s reaction to an absolutist regimen making inroads in the realm of basic human liberties; it managed to survive the changeable conditions of society and state thanks to its participants’ capability of cultivating collective self-determination, fed from the outset by the intellectual claims of modernity. Thereafter, the link between Habermas’s public sphere and human rights bifurcates, leading concurrently to liberal individual rights (Menschenrechte) and to the republican freedom of popular sovereignty (Volkssouveränität). Further revisions and corrections transpose that simple dualism from the clear-cut bourgeois world of universal morality into the realm of legalism and the protocols de rigueur in the world of systems. Habermas integrates individual human rights and popular sovereignty in the procedures of a democratic state, overcoming this ostensibly irreconcilable duality in his genuine claim about the co-originality of civil autonomy. This thesis institutionally unifies universal pre-constitutional morality, with legalism regulating the democratic world of legal subjects (citizens) and their constitutionally guaranteed entitlement.

2013

Dignity is an appeal to human nature. Transposed in the juridical field, human dignity highlights the necessity to establish (in favour of the individual) a juridical treatment compatible with human nature. Our disquisition is destined to analyse the contributions brought by the concept of human dignity in the process of the juridical avowal of human rights and to study, at the same time, the category of relations between two frameworks of analysis: human rights and human dignity. We propose the thesis of conceptual correspondence human-rights-human dignity, in the attempt to demonstrate two fusing frameworks of analysis, that can almost mutually define one another. The intricacy, the hardship of legal reconnaissance, the variety of significance, give the precise nature of human dignity and human rights, pleading in favour of this conjugate study. The defining of man – as an analytical category – is seated within human dignity, pointing out, as natural consequences of this seating, ...

2016

It promotes a critical reflection on the theoretical foundations of the dominant discourse of human rights, from a relativistic role of European Modernity seeking afford to see ideas, struggles, thoughts and peripheral stories as a first step to reshape this discourse whose effectiveness remains questioned, in practice. It assumes that the theoretical foundations of the dominant discourse of human rights has been the subject of extensive research, which, at first, might suggest that the discussion on this subject was already exhausted and therefore does not deserve greater contributions. These conceptions about the human rights foundations, usually rest in some incontrovertible premises. This discourse, for reasons that will be presented, was designed as a hegemonic discourse. The theoretical reference counter-hegemonic is based on Makau Mutua and Sousa Santos’ thinking. The general objective of the authors is to generate a critical reflection of this dominant conception of human ri...

WISDOM, 2020

The article explores the notion and peculiarities of the concept of “human dignity” in the modern democratic, legal state. In the given research the author implements holistic, systematical (methodical) analysis of content and distinguishing features of the dignity as the structural element of the concept “legal status of the individual”. This study is also focusing on various approaches of well-known jurists on the essence, content and legislative consolidation of the dignity of the individual. The author comes to a conclusion, that the dignity of a person, who is a subject of law, is ensured by the complex of subjective rights and freedoms assigned to him or her, which constitute the legal status of a person. In other words, the person is both a subject of law and of “dignity”. Therefore, the dignity of the person becomes, from a legal point of view, a complex interdisciplinary legal institute. Consequently, the whole mission of this legal institute is to fulfil the virtues of man...

Humanity of Rights , 2022

Claudio Corradetti's Human rights and critical theory is an argument for the idea of pluralistic universalism. The purpose of the volume is to demonstrate that human rights are something epochal and revolutionary, something that was realized at a specific historical moment, modernity, through a process of self-reflection. Subjects attain an idea of themselves as subjects and at the same time as subjects of law. In the following pages, while accepting Corradetti's thesis on the revolutionary character of human rights, I will argue the anthropological foundation of such rights, under penalty of the artificiality of the law itself. I will show that the subject of these rights cannot be considered one-dimensional nor can the law be fully resolved only in its legal formulation. The revolution of law is possible above all because the way of thinking of the subject's self-reflection in the world is revolutionary: not only as a legal actor, but as ontologically endowed with dignity and values whose rights are a legal and political expression. What is meant by "human being"? And what is the human being subject to law? What makes it possible to attribute the rights to an individual? Why, precisely in modernity, do you feel the need to organize rights legally and to formulate human rights, while maintaining that they are the prerequisite for being part of civil society? Through a brief reconstruction of some salient moments in the history of law up to modernity, I will propose some reflections on the underlying conception of human beings. This conception remains problematic, however, it is important to ask the question about the sense of "human being" and the fact that this question remains "open" both in the formulation of the idea of law and in the values on which we believe it is based. The idea is that the revolution brought about by modern law is so well beyond its logical and legal forms-which however remain essential-and is of consequence not only to a new vision of the world order but also of human beings.

2017

This paper will evaluate the convenience of using the legal concept of human dignity in the human rights discourse and its effectiveness to address injustice in a twenty-first century democratic society. This article will argue that the difficulty of defining human dignity does not diminish its merits and allows it to be both solid and adaptable to new challenges. Then, this paper will argue that human dignity is a powerful concept due to its capacity to bring change and modernise society and will conclude that there is a strong relationship between time, human dignity, human rights and democracy. Resumen: Este artículo evaluará la conveniencia de utilizar el concepto legal de la dignidad humana en el discurso de los derechos humanos y su efectividad para luchar contra la injusticia en una sociedad democrática del siglo XXI. Se expondrá que la dificultad de definirla no menoscababa su valor y le permite ser un concepto sólido y adaptable a nuevos desafíos. Se argumentará que la dignidad humana es un concepto poderoso debido a su capacidad para cambiar y modernizar la sociedad y se concluirá que existe un fuerte vínculo entre el tiempo, la dignidad humana, los derechos humanos y la democracia.

The present paper, based on a comparative method, aims to analyze the dimension given by the constitutional courts of the Brazil, as well as in the regional systems of protection of Human Rights With respect to the concept and extension of the principle of the dignity of the human person, establishing approximations and critical analyzes on philosophical aspects that permeate its birth and its cultural, individual and juris-prudential assimilations. Finally, it is concluded that while dignity-based reputation is a universal virtue , its content largely depends on the social, religious, and traditional values of certain communities.

Introduction: Human dignity, as coined by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR / 1948), is an expression social solidarity, which should cement the relations between people. Human dignity is the foundation of all rights, such as freedom, equality, justice and peace in the world, and in Brazil, human dignity was deemed a fundamental pillar of the country's post-1988 constitutional order. Objective: This article seeks to a deeper investigation about the social nature of human dignity and its definition over time. Methods: This is an exploratory research meant to unpack the concepts of "human dignity", "bioethics", "human rights" and "constitution". After describing the conceptual evolution of human dignity and the facts relevant to its conceptual formation in world history-as a normative standard and a legal rule-, we address the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR/1948), the Declaration of Helsinki (DH/1964), the Universal Declaration on Bioethics and Human Rights (UDBHR/2005), and the definition adopted in the Constitution of the Federative Republic of Brazil (CFRB/1988). The study was carried out without temporal limitation, and included a review of referenced books, legal doctrines, as well as articles and books in the SciELO database. Results and discussion: The findings ratify that human dignity is the foundation of all rights, including those of freedom, equality, justice and peace in the world, and must also guide the rights and duties of social regulation. Human dignity has changed from a criterion of power attributed to the social position of individuals to a value of the right to freedom, which now goes beyond the right of freedom and is the basis of modern constitutional democracy, which makes possible the realization of solidarity, as well as the duty and purpose of the state and the community. The will of the subject, of society, of the science and of the state, as well as the rules of domination and regulation, must have a limit on human dignity, and human dignity is not just fundamental right, in the sense of the Constitution, and must prevail over the exclusive will of science, the State and society. Therefore, in the making of power decisions and in realization of possible innovations of science involving human beings, human dignity demands the explicit consideration of respect and promotion of it. Conclusion: Human dignity is enshrined in Brazilian constitutional law, as well as in bioethics and in human rights, and it constitutes all the fundamental rights of the human person. It is not merely a rule of autonomy and liberty, and it is an obligatory and non-derogable precept in the making of power decisions, a true main foundation of constitutional democracies.

2018

Introduction: Human dignity, as coined by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR / 1948), is an expression social solidarity, which should cement the relations between people. Human dignity is the foundation of all rights, such as freedom, equality, justice and peace in the world, and in Brazil, human dignity was deemed a fundamental pillar of the country’s post-1988 constitutional order. Objective: This article seeks to a deeper investigation about the social nature of human dignity and its definition over time.     Methods: This is an exploratory research meant to unpack the concepts of "human dignity", "bioethics", "human rights" and "constitution". After describing the conceptual evolution of human dignity and the facts relevant to its conceptual formation in world history - as a normative standard and a legal rule -, we address the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR/1948), the Declaration of Helsinki ...