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Developing the Virtues
This chapter describes a social cognitive theory of moral identity. It trades on important themes in ethical theory that emphasize the importance of second-order desires and strong evaluation. After placing moral identity within an historical context of moral development research, and describing Blasi's pioneering work in reaction to it, I outline the key elements of the social cognitive alternative that emphasizes the accessibility and centrality of moral identity within the working self-concept; and the role of situations in activating or deactivating its accessibility. The empirical warrant for this approach is reviewed. A claim is made that social cognitive moral identity theory is a progressive research program; and has implications for current debates about the situationism and the stability of moral dispositions. Moral Self-Identity and the Social-Cognitive Theory of Virtue "Something there is that doesn't love a wall, that wants it down."-Robert Frost (The Mending Wall) I. An Historical Introduction
Recent theorizing in moral psychology extends rationalist models by calling attention to social and cultural influences . Six studies using adolescents, university students, and adults measured the associations among the self-importance of moral identity, moral cognitions, and behavior. The psychometric properties of the measure were assessed through an examination of the underlying factor structure (Study 1) and convergent, nomological, and discriminant validity analyses (Studies 2 and 3). The predictive validity of the instrument was assessed by examinations of the relationships among the self-importance of moral identity, various psychological outcomes, and behavior (Studies 4, 5, and 6). The results are discussed in terms of models of moral behavior, social identity measurement, and the need to consider moral self-conceptions in explaining moral conduct.
Review of General Psychology, 2023
The acquisition of virtue can be conceptualized as a self-regulatory process in which deliberate practice results in increasingly higher levels of skillfulness in leading a virtuous life. This conceptualization resonates with philosophical virtue theories as much as it converges with psychological models about skill development, expertise, goal motivation, and self-regulation. Yet, the conceptualization of virtue as skill acquisition poses the crucial question of motivation: What motivates individuals to selfimprove over time so that they can learn from past experience, correct mistakes, and expand their ethical knowledge to new and unfamiliar circumstances? In this paper, it is argued that the motivation to increase one's level of skillfulness in leading a virtuous life is supported by a specific identity goal, namely the goal to be a moral person. However, this moral identity goal needs to carry specific goal characteristics in order to effectively provide this motivation. It needs to be sufficiently abstract, internally motivated and promotion-rather than prevention-oriented. Research in developmental psychology suggests that the moral identity of children is rather concrete, externally motivated, and prevention-oriented. With development, higher levels of abstraction, internal motivation, and promotion-orientation gain importance providing an important motivational basis for a self-regulated process of virtue acquisition.
The study of moral identity may be one of the more promising new trends in moral psychology. Moral identity is the degree to which being a moral person is important to a person's identity. This article reviews the various ways in which moral identity is understood, discusses predictors and processes of moral identity, and presents evidence regarding links between moral identity and various moral actions. The article closes with a critical evaluation of the moral identity concept and a discussion of future research directions.
Human Development, 2015
The notion that self-identity and morality are deeply implicated has long-standing roots in both ethical theory and psychology. In ethical theory it is evident in Harry Frankfurt's [1971] account of what it means to be a person: A person (as opposed to a wanton) is someone who cares about morality. A person cares about the desirability of one's desires (second-order desires) and then wishes to will them all the way to action (second-order volitions). Similarly, Charles Taylor [1989] argued that identity is defined by reference to things that have significance for us. It is the result of strong evaluation about what is worthy or unworthy, and these discriminations are made against a horizon of significance that frames and constitutes who we are as persons. He writes, "My identity is defined by the commitments and identifications which provide the frame or horizon within which I can try to determine from case to case what is good or valuable, or what ought to be done or what I endorse or oppose" [Taylor, 1989, p. 27]. The affinity of selfhood and morality is a theme in several psychological traditions as well. Erikson [1968, p. 39] argued, for example, that an ethical capacity is the "true criterion of identity," but he also noted that "identity and fidelity are necessary for ethical strength" [Erikson, 1964, p. 126]. This suggests that moral identity is the clear goal of both moral and identity development and that in the moral person the two developmental tracks are ideally conjoined. Similarly, Damon and Hart [1982] showed that, within each domain of the "Me Self" (physical, active, social, psychological), the highest level of self-understanding implicates a moral point of view. This suggests that the moral self is the clear outcome of self-development [Lapsley, 2005]. Indeed, recent research has shown that morality is considered indispensable to selfhood; it is the moral self that is essential to our identity, more than personality traits,
This research applies identity theory to understand the moral self. In identity theory, individuals act on the basis of their identity meanings, and they regulate the meanings of their behavior so that those meanings are consistent with their identity meanings. An inconsistency produces negative emotions and motivates individuals to behave differently to produce outcomes that will better match their identity meanings. A two-part survey and laboratory study were conducted to investigate the application of identity theory to the moral self. The findings are consistent with identity theory predictions. In the survey that addresses past experiences, we find that individuals' moral identity guides their behavior. When an identity discrepancy emerges between moral identity meanings and perceptions of themselves in a situation, negative feelings are experienced. These same effects are observed when these individuals are placed in an immediate moral dilemma in the laboratory. Overall, the results reveal how identity theory helps explain the individual as a moral entity.
Ethics & Behavior, 2013
The concept of moral identity based on virtue ethics has become an issue of considerable import in explaining moral behavior. This attempt to offer adequate explanations of the full range of morally relevant human behavior inevitably provokes boundary issues between ethics and moral psychology. In terms of the relationship between the two disciplines, some argue for “naturalized (or psychologized) morality,” whereas, on the other hand, others insist on “moralized psychology.” This article investigates the relationship between virtue ethics and moral identity based on previous research on the relationship between ethics and moral psychology. This article especially attempts to show that meaningful links between the two concepts possible by using theoretical frameworks constructed by the most influential philosophers of science such as Kuhn and Lakatos.
Human Development, 2005
Theory and research regarding moral motivation has focused for decades on the roles of moral reasoning and, to some extent, moral emotion. Recently, however, several models of morality have positioned identity as an additional important source of moral motivation. An individual has a moral identity to the extent that he or she has constructed his or her sense of self around moral concerns (e.g., moral values). This paper reviews theory and research linking moral identity to moral behavior and commitment. Additionally, it suggests several key unanswered questions about moral identity and provides recommendations for future research.
Psychology of Learning and Motivation, 2009
This chapter was originally published in the book The Psychology of Learning and Motivation, Vol 50, published by Elsevier, and the attached copy is provided by Elsevier for the author's benefit and for the benefit of the author's institution, for noncommercial research and educational use including without limitation use in instruction at your institution, sending it to specific colleagues who know you, and providing a copy to your institution's administrator. All other uses, reproduction and distribution, including without limitation commercial reprints, selling or licensing copies or access, or posting on open internet sites, your personal or institution's website or repository, are prohibited. For exceptions, permission may be sought for such use through Elsevier's permissions site at:
Journal of Applied Developmental Psychology, 2005
2009
Abstract 1. This article proposes and tests a social-cognitive framework for examining the joint influence of situational factors and the centrality of moral identity on moral intentions and behaviors. The authors hypothesized that if a situational factor increases the current accessibility of moral identity within the working self-concept, then it strengthens the motivation to act morally. In contrast, if a situational factor decreases the current accessibility of moral identity, then it weakens the motivation to act morally.
Handbook of Moral and Character Education, 2013
Current research on moral identity shows that moral identity predicts moral action in Western cultures but not in non-Western cultures. The present paper argues that this may be due to the fact that the concept of moral identity is culturally biased. In order to remedy this situation, we argue that researchers should broaden their scopes of inquiry by adding a cultural lens to their studies of moral identity. This change is important because although some concept of moral identity likely exists in all cultures, it may function in different ways and at different levels in each place. We propose that moral identity is a context-dependent construct tied to varying social and cultural obligations. We argue that Western moral identity stresses an individually oriented morality, whereas, people from Eastern cultures consider a highly moral person to be societally oriented. We conclude by discussing the implications of this view for future research.
2013
Reed, A. I., & Aquino, K. F. (2003). Moral identity and the expanding circle of moral regard toward out-groups.
Humanities and Social Sciences Communications
Within social-cognitive accounts of moral behavior, moral self-consistency or integrity, as conceptualized by Blasi, is assumed to link moral identity to moral behavior. The present study provides a novel account of moral self-consistency as an aspect of the self-organization of moral identity. I used two elements of moral identity to study moral self-consistency: moral values and moral scripts. The moral self-consistency of 410 participants was operationalized as the extent to which their responses on moral values, measured by the moral foundation's questionnaire, predicted their responses on moral scripts, measured by the Moral Foundations Vignettes. I identified two types of moral self-consistency: (1) individualizing and (2) binding. As predicted, when the respondents' moral integrity was activated, (a) individualizing moral self-consistency was greater if it focused on individual moral integrity rather than national moral integrity, and (b) liberals exhibited more binding moral self-consistency than conservatives. This paper discusses the implications and limitations of the present study, as well as the potential for further development of social-cognitive accounts of moral identity. "If you want to be a good person, make sure you know where true goodness really lies. Don't just go through the motions of being good."
Journal of Religion and …, 2011
The notion that self-identity and morality are deeply implicated has long-standing roots in both ethical theory and psychology. In ethical theory it is evident in Harry Frankfurt's [1971] account of what it means to be a person: A person (as opposed to a wanton ) is someone who cares about morality. A person cares about the desirability of one's desires (second-order desires) and then wishes to will them all the way to action (second-order volitions). Similarly, Charles Taylor [1989] argued that identity is defined by reference to things that have significance for us. It is the result of strong evaluation about what is worthy or unworthy, and these discriminations are made against a horizon of significance that frames and constitutes who we are as persons. He writes, "My identity is defined by the commitments and identifications which provide the frame or horizon within which I can try to determine from case to case what is good or valuable, or what ought to be done or what I endorse or oppose" [Taylor, 1989, p. 27].
Sociology has seen a renewed interest in the study of morality. However, a theory of the self that explains individual variation in moral behavior and emotions is noticeably absent. In this study, we use identity theory to explain this variability. According to identity theory, actors are self-regulating entities whose goal is to verify their identities. An individual's moral identity-wherever it falls on the moral-immoral continuum-guides behavior, and people experience negative emotions when identity verification does not ensue. Furthermore, the identity verification process occurs within situations that have cultural expectations-that is, framing rules and feeling rules-regarding how individuals should act and feel. These cultural expectations also influence the degree to which people behave morally. We test these assumptions on a sample of more than 350 university students. We investigate whether the moral identity and framing situations in moral terms influences behavior and feelings. Findings reveal that the identity process and framing of situations as moral are significantly associated with moral action and moral emotions of guilt and shame.
Social structure and …, 2008
Moral cognition and decision making, Vol. 50 of the Psychology of Learning and Motivation series , 2009
We review how the construct of the moral self has arisen within moral development theory and discuss the search for integrative linkages with other domains of psychology, including personality. Next, we describe moral personality and then programs and approaches to developing moral identity in children. Moral schema development and moral information processing research is outlined, including mapping expert-novice differences. Finally, we conclude with two emerging integrative theories, one on educational intervention for moral skill development and the other a neurobiological model of moral functioning which draws on evolutionary themes in the development of a moral brain.
Review of General Psychology, 2023
The acquisition of virtue can be conceptualized as a self-regulatory process in which deliberate practice results in increasingly higher levels of skillfulness in leading a virtuous life. This conceptualization resonates with philosophical virtue theories as much as it converges with psychological models about skill development, expertise, goal motivation, and self-regulation. Yet, the conceptualization of virtue as skill acquisition poses the crucial question of motivation: What motivates individuals to selfimprove over time so that they can learn from past experience, correct mistakes, and expand their ethical knowledge to new and unfamiliar circumstances? In this paper, it is argued that the motivation to increase one’s level of skillfulness in leading a virtuous life is supported by a specific identity goal, namely the goal to be a moral person. However, this moral identity goal needs to carry specific goal characteristics in order to effectively provide this motivation. It needs to be sufficiently abstract, internally motivated and promotion- rather than prevention-oriented. Research in developmental psychology suggests that the moral identity of children is rather concrete, externally motivated, and prevention-oriented. With development, higher levels of abstraction, internal motivation, and promotion-orientation gain importance providing an important motivational basis for a self-regulated process of virtue acquisition.
Frontiers in Psychology, 2020
The relationships among character strengths (forgiveness and gratitude), happiness, and prosocial bystander behavior in bullying were analyzed. The sample includes 500 (early adolescents) and 500 (middle adolescents) of both genders, between 12 and 18 years old (M age = 14.70, SD = 1.58). Two structural equation models were calculated. Results of the first model indicated that forgiveness, gratitude, and happiness had a direct positive relation with prosocial bystander behavior. Furthermore, human strengths were indirectly related to prosocial behavior in bullying for this effect in happiness. The second model showed that prosocial bystander behavior had a positive effect on human strengths and happiness. Multigroup analyses indicated that gender and stage of adolescence did not moderate the relations found in the model. Overall findings suggest a reciprocal relationship between character strengths, happiness, and prosocial bystander behavior.
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