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Moral Self-Identity and the Social-Cognitive Theory of Virtue

Developing the Virtues

Abstract

This chapter describes a social cognitive theory of moral identity. It trades on important themes in ethical theory that emphasize the importance of second-order desires and strong evaluation. After placing moral identity within an historical context of moral development research, and describing Blasi's pioneering work in reaction to it, I outline the key elements of the social cognitive alternative that emphasizes the accessibility and centrality of moral identity within the working self-concept; and the role of situations in activating or deactivating its accessibility. The empirical warrant for this approach is reviewed. A claim is made that social cognitive moral identity theory is a progressive research program; and has implications for current debates about the situationism and the stability of moral dispositions. Moral Self-Identity and the Social-Cognitive Theory of Virtue "Something there is that doesn't love a wall, that wants it down."-Robert Frost (The Mending Wall) I. An Historical Introduction