The Development of the Moral Personality

Current directions in psychological science, 2010

Most of us have at one point speculated about why one individual grew up to be honest and fair while another became wicked and untrustworthy. In the current review, we present the case that new directions in the empirical study of moral personality development are needed. We set the stage for this future work by presenting six propositions that should serve as the foundation for future research in the field. We conclude by providing an example of how using a more integrative and inclusive framework for studying personality can readily incorporate these propositions.

The Philosophy and Psychology of Character and Happiness , 2014

The language of moral virtue comes easily to most of us. When we think about the moral what comes to mind are certain dispositions to do the right thing at the right time for the right reason. We have in mind the possession of certain traits that conduce to living well the life that is good for one to live. To be honest, generous, fair-minded, compassionate, resolute in the service of justice, these and other virtues are the ambition that we have for ourselves and for our children. Indeed how to raise children of good moral character is a pressing concern of parents and educators alike. We hope children come to exhibit traits of character that are praiseworthy and reflect credibly on their formation as a person. Indeed, we would be disappointed if our children developed only a glancing acquaintance with the virtues. Traits and Paradigms Yet it is by no means clear how virtues are to be understood as psychological constructs, or how to understand their causal role in behavior. To say that virtues are traits that produce enduring dispositions to act in certain ways is to say something controversial, although this might come as a surprise to the lay reader. Indeed for many decades the language of traits, virtues and character got little traction within academic psychology, although for somewhat different reasons. The behaviorist paradigm was suspicious of the unobserved mentalist entities that traits seemed to imply, and drew attention instead to the reinforcing contingencies of environments as best explanations of behavior (Skinner, 1972). Hence the behaviorist paradigm gave priority of explanation to salient features of situations. The cognitive-developmental tradition, particularly in the form of Lawrence Kohlberg's moral stage theory, 1 also doubted the empirical reality of traits as predictors of behavior; and worried that the language of traits might give comfort to ethical relativists (insofar as the valuation of traits could depend upon community or cultural standards; Gibbs, 2013; Kohlberg, 1981). Traits also seemed to run afoul of the "moral law folk theory" 2 that has dominated Western reflection on moral matters since the Enlightenment, and is assumed by many of the major theories of moral psychology, including Kantian ethics (Johnson, 1993). This is the view that we are essentially dualistic in our nature, consisting of body and mind, the physical and spiritual that are in conflict, a belief that comes easily to most of us. According to Kantian ethics, reason formulates general laws 1 Kohlberg's theory proposed that individuals develop cognitively toward a deontological sense of moral judgment, moving through three levels (preconventional, conventional, postconventional) and five or six stages. Moral reasoning develops from active social life during the course of maturation. Neo-Kohlbergian research found that enriched social experience, especially Western higher education, contributes to the development of general postconventional moral reasoning (reasoning like a philosopher). 2 Moral law folk theory refers to the common perception that body and mind are separable entities.

Explorations in Moral Psychology, 2009

Journal of Moral Education, 2011

Journal of Moral Education, 2011

Developmental Review, 1996

Previously, we argued that moral development research has for too long been reliant on the moral philosophy of Immanuel Kant. The Kantian legacy forces improper restrictions on the moral domain, fails to acknowledge mature but non-Kantian moral conceptions such as eudaimonism, and isolates moral development from the development of the self. Now we respond to critical commentary from advocates of post-Kantian formalism (Helwig, Turiel, & Nucci, 1996) and post-Kantian altruism (Eisenberg, 1996). Helwig et al. deny the validity of eudaimonism as a moral perspective while asserting that it has been incorporated wholesale into a post-Kantian moral synthesis. We refute each of the arguments they present. Even if their objections to eudaimonism are completely correct, they have still not explained how anyone might develop a eudaimonistic moral conception. Eisenberg questions our definitions of altruistic and prosocial behavior; we defend them on their own terms, while showing how they are largely in accord with Eisenberg's own practice, and that of other "prosocial development" researchers. We conclude that moral personality is a legitimate object of study (despite efforts by Helwig et al. to push it out of the scientific arena) and discuss the challenges posed by taking moral personality seriously.

Human Development, 2015

The notion that self-identity and morality are deeply implicated has long-standing roots in both ethical theory and psychology. In ethical theory it is evident in Harry Frankfurt's [1971] account of what it means to be a person: A person (as opposed to a wanton) is someone who cares about morality. A person cares about the desirability of one's desires (second-order desires) and then wishes to will them all the way to action (second-order volitions). Similarly, Charles Taylor [1989] argued that identity is defined by reference to things that have significance for us. It is the result of strong evaluation about what is worthy or unworthy, and these discriminations are made against a horizon of significance that frames and constitutes who we are as persons. He writes, "My identity is defined by the commitments and identifications which provide the frame or horizon within which I can try to determine from case to case what is good or valuable, or what ought to be done or what I endorse or oppose" [Taylor, 1989, p. 27]. The affinity of selfhood and morality is a theme in several psychological traditions as well. Erikson [1968, p. 39] argued, for example, that an ethical capacity is the "true criterion of identity," but he also noted that "identity and fidelity are necessary for ethical strength" [Erikson, 1964, p. 126]. This suggests that moral identity is the clear goal of both moral and identity development and that in the moral person the two developmental tracks are ideally conjoined. Similarly, Damon and Hart [1982] showed that, within each domain of the "Me Self" (physical, active, social, psychological), the highest level of self-understanding implicates a moral point of view. This suggests that the moral self is the clear outcome of self-development [Lapsley, 2005]. Indeed, recent research has shown that morality is considered indispensable to selfhood; it is the moral self that is essential to our identity, more than personality traits,