Reinhart Koselleck's Work on the Concept of Crisis (2016) {2015}

International Theory, Research And Reviews In Social, Human and Administrative Sciences, 2023

Reinhart Koselleck and Walter Benjamin are the two thinkers most emphasized in terms of historical theory today. The two thinkers look at historical events from a cultural and social projection, develop an understanding of culture and conceptual history, have a unique understanding of temporality, use theology creatively in their theories, criticize modernity and enlightenment, and interpret the present as a place and process that reveals history. These are approaches that have been effective in gaining a place in the theory literature. Another important feature of Koselleck and Benjamin is that they give an important place to the concept or thought of crisis in their philosophy of history. Both thinkers deal with the concept of crisis by associating it with the modern. Koselleck and Benjamin crisis; While discussing in the context of temporality, theology, apocalypse, revolution, salvation, the relationship between past-present-future and modernity, they basically point out the necessity of considering the concept or idea of crisis together with social and political history. Unlike Koselleck, Benjamin defends the idea of revolutionary intervention in crisis due to its connection with the idea of the revolutionary subject that will transform history. This study compares the historical theories of Koselleck and Benjamin, both in general terms and with a focus on the concept and thought of crisis. Because Koselleck and Benjamin’s approaches to the concept and thought of crisis can only be understood in the context of the two thinkers’ theories of history. Therefore, the study discusses the fundamental differences and similarities in both the historical theories of the two thinkers and their approaches to the concept and thought of crisis.

Unpublished (rejected for publication by various academic journals), 2012

[This paper has been submitted to various relevant academic journals but was rejected each time. I am uploading it in case anyone finds it intresting or useful] This paper presents a critique of one of the aspects of Koselleck’s history of the concept of crisis, namely its supposed theological origins/connotations. After discussing some other histories of the concept, namely Masur’s, Starn’s and Shank’s, Koselleck’s thesis is evaluated. His writings on the history of crisis are taken to be exemplary of the general practice of conceptual history and are reproduced in more recent articles dealing with crisis. Koselleck argues that the modern experience of time and history is a secularization of Christian eschatology. The concept of crisis is included in this secularizing process and is linked to the theological idea of the Last Judgment and of the apocalyptic foreshortening of time that precedes the second coming of Christ. Koselleck’s arguments in favor of this theological genealogy of the concept and of its modern meanings are then presented and criticized. My critique focuses on the way Koselleck establishes or rather fails to establish the link between theology and modern crisis, arguing that there is no textual support for his assertions. By way of conclusion, the idea that crisis is linked to tragedy is put forward as a hypothesis that needs to be further investigated, an idea hinted at by some authors but not explored by Koselleck or any other theorist thus far.

2013

The high rate of appearance of the words ‘crisis’ in English, ‘crise’ in French and ‘Krise’ in German, has generated an ambiguous attitude among researchers. On the one hand, the growing use of the term since the mid-18th century, particularly in the social and political realms, is too significant to ignore and is deemed to reveal important information on Western European cultural history. On the other hand, ‘crisis’ and its counterparts are often used loosely, they appear in the most varied contexts and do not seem to have a stable signified. In fact, what does ‘crisis’ mean? When we describe our times in terms of crises, what exactly do we want to say? This introductory chapter examines the concept of crisis in Modern Western European thought and its functions in philosophical, scientific and political discourses. Relating to Reinhart Koselleck’s work and many others, it shows how the concept turned into a subject matter in its own right. We argue that “the trouble with crisis”, i.e. the allegedly obscure nature of the word, is the result of several semantic processes of abstraction that the term was subject to. Contrary to the widely accepted view that abstraction equals loss of meaning, we suggest that the trends of abstraction ‘crisis’ went through are strongly meaningful, and merit semiotic, cognitive and epistemic analyses. Finally, these historical trends resulted in a number of major semantic clusters, still active today in Western European languages, rendering the concept most potent and useful for various discursive ends.

The goal of this essay is threefold: to provide an outline for crisis theory (1), to clarify the concept of critique, and especially of social critique(2) and to reflect on the mutual relation of these concepts and on their significance for the problem of deliberative social change (3). This is part of the theoretical foundation of a bigger work titled: On the crisis of the liberal world. Most of the problems and themes are handled abstractly here and are further elaborated and applied in the main text. Although the text itself is a fragment, and furthermore it may be viewed as excessively fragmented, I still hope that it has unity, consistency, and value.

Human Arenas, 2021

The aim of this paper is to reflect on historical vicissitudes of relationship between crisis and critique. Starting point is an observational diagnosis of present socio-political conditions, which have transformed crisis from a turning point into a continuation and radicalization of the existing order. In an attempt to understand the ongoing subversion of transformative potentials of crisis, a similar process of pacification and subversion of critique in dominant theoretical paradigms will be examined. It will be argued that both sociopolitical and mainstream theoretical processes work toward pacification of the status quo that raises both existential and theoretical concerns. In order to support the claim that a different relationship between crisis and critique is possible, it will be referred to Reinhart Koselleck's seminal study, Critique and crisis (1959), where it is shown how absolutist state generated its critique by Enlightenment and then Enlightenment conditioned radical changes in form of French Revolution. Relying on that example, the following questions will be raised: What kind of historical structures have been lost since times which generated Enlightenment as a critical stance? What kind of theoretical tools are we missing in post-Enlightenment post-modern times in order to conceptualize and condition radical changes? What is the role of psychological theorizing in sustaining adaptation to the existing order instead of arguing and demanding its radical change? How to reclaim transformative potentials of critique and crisis?

The Pedagogy of Economic, Political and Social Crises, 2018

The Chinese ideogram for crisis combines two characters: danger and opportunity. This indicates the duality of crisis and suggests several important issues for current and future analyses of crisis, crisis construals, and crisis lessons. First, the ideogram signifies that crises have both objective and subjective aspects corresponding to danger and opportunity respectively. Building on Régis Debray, we can say that, objectively, crises occur when a set of social relations (including their ties to the natural world) cannot be reproduced (cannot "go on") in the old way. Subjectively, crises tend to disrupt (even "shock") accepted views of the world and create uncertainty on how to "go on" within it. For they threaten established views, practices, institutions, and social relations calling into question theoretical and policy paradigms as well as everyday personal and organizational routines. Second, in this sense, crises do not have predetermined outcomes: how they are resolved, if at all, depends on the actions taken in response to them. They are potentially path-shaping moments with performative effects that are mediated through the shifting balance of forces competing to influence crisis construal, crisis-management, crisis outcomes, and possible lessons to be drawn from crisis. Third, without the objective moment, we have, at worst, deliberately exaggerated or even manufactured "crises", at best, unwarranted panic based on mis-perception or mis-recognition of real world events and processes. 1 Sometimes, crises may be manufactured or, at least exaggerated, for strategic or tactical purposes not directly related to immediate events or processes. Agents may, for "political" motives, broadly interpreted, conjure crises from nowhere or exaggerate the breadth, depth, and threat of an actual crisis (Mirowski, 2013). After all, "one should never let a serious crisis go to waste" (cf. Rahm Emanuel's comment, made on the Bloomberg television channel in November 2008 in his capacity as transition manager for President-elect Barack Obama). 2 A rigorous analysis of crises, crisis construals, and crisis-management must be able to distinguish these alternatives or it could fall into a simplistic form of constructivism. Fourth, without the subjective moment, while disinterested observers may perceive a crisis developing either in real time or after the "event", the crisis will have insufficient resonance for relevant participants to spur them into efforts to take decisive action. Yet the notion of critical moment and turning point is a key feature of crises as conventionally understood. Fifth, from this perspective, then, crises are 2 complex, objectively overdetermined moments of subjective indeterminacy, where decisive action can make a major difference to the future (Debray, 1973, p. 113; see also pp. 99-100, 104-105). However, cautioning against too easy an adoption of this kind of perspective, Janet Roitman (2014, p. 41) notes that, while positing a given situation as a crisis makes certain questions possible, it also forecloses other kinds of question and lines of investigation. In other words, an over-reliance by participants or observers on interpreting specific symptoms as evidence of a continuing crisis or yet another crisis can create a blind spot that sidelines alternative descriptions, diagnoses, prognoses, and potential courses of action. Taking crisis for granted as a starting point means that the nature of crisis as an explanandum is left unexamined and therefore directs attention to the search for the best explanation (or, at least, some explanation). So, rather than asking whether X (an event or process) does or does not constitute a crisis, its unquestioned, unreflective treatment as a crisis, of whatever kind, short-circuits analysis of the crisis and, hence, decision-making about suitable responses. Although Roitman directs her criticism against historical narratives shaped by the interpretive couplet of crisis-critique that is allegedly characteristic of modernity since the eighteenth century (cf. Koselleck, 1988; Festl, Grosser, and Thomä, 2018), her arguments are also very apt for the inflation of crisis diagnoses and discourses in recent decades as mentioned in Chapter 1. Indeed, the more that crisis discourse expands, the greater the risk that crisis becomes an empty concept. This is especially true where crisis is employed counter-intuitively, as is often the case nowadays, to describe an enduring condition rather than, as implied in its original meaning, to identify a moment for decisive action that might restore the status quo ante or lead to more or less radical social transformation. This risk can be remedied on condition that the durability of crises is related to contingent conditions that block a resolution that might otherwise occur. This is compatible with the general principles of critical realism and is analysed by Gramsci, for example, in terms of a "catastrophic equilibrium of forces" (1971: 219-23, 300; cf. Gramsci 1975: Q13, §27; Q14, §23; Q22, §10; for a discussion in relation to the crisis in Europe, see Keucheyan and Durand, 2015). These contingencies are illustrated in Chapter 4, where Andrew Gamble refers to the impasse of the British state or economy, which he regards as structural and deep-seated, leading to inertia, deadlocks or catastrophic equilibria. Likewise, Will Hout notes the permanent crisis in development assistance and explains this in terms of a failure to look beyond symptoms to deeper causes of poverty, inequality, and unsustainable

˜The œSouth Atlantic quarterly, 2024

The Pedagogy of Economic, Political and Social Crises, 2018

The Chinese ideogram for crisis combines two characters: danger and opportunity. This indicates the duality of crisis and suggests several important issues for current and future analyses of crisis, crisis construals, and crisis lessons. First, the ideogram signifies that crises have both objective and subjective aspects corresponding to danger and opportunity respectively. Building on Régis Debray, we can say that, objectively, crises occur when a set of social relations (including their ties to the natural world) cannot be reproduced (cannot "go on") in the old way. Subjectively, crises tend to disrupt (even "shock") accepted views of the world and create uncertainty on how to "go on" within it. For they threaten established views, practices, institutions, and social relations calling into question theoretical and policy paradigms as well as everyday personal and organizational routines. Second, in this sense, crises do not have predetermined outcomes: how they are resolved, if at all, depends on the actions taken in response to them. They are potentially path-shaping moments with performative effects that are mediated through the shifting balance of forces competing to influence crisis construal, crisis-management, crisis outcomes, and possible lessons to be drawn from crisis. Third, without the objective moment, we have, at worst, deliberately exaggerated or even manufactured "crises", at best, unwarranted panic based on mis-perception or mis-recognition of real world events and processes. 1 Sometimes, crises may be manufactured or, at least exaggerated, for strategic or tactical purposes not directly related to immediate events or processes. Agents may, for "political" motives, broadly interpreted, conjure crises from nowhere or exaggerate the breadth, depth, and threat of an actual crisis (Mirowski, 2013). After all, "one should never let a serious crisis go to waste" (cf. Rahm Emanuel's comment, made on the Bloomberg television channel in November 2008 in his capacity as transition manager for President-elect Barack Obama). 2 A rigorous analysis of crises, crisis construals, and crisis-management must be able to distinguish these alternatives or it could fall into a simplistic form of constructivism. Fourth, without the subjective moment, while disinterested observers may perceive a crisis developing either in real time or after the "event", the crisis will have insufficient resonance for relevant participants to spur them into efforts to take decisive action. Yet the notion of critical moment and turning point is a key feature of crises as conventionally understood. Fifth, from this perspective, then, crises are 2 complex, objectively overdetermined moments of subjective indeterminacy, where decisive action can make a major difference to the future (Debray, 1973, p. 113; see also pp. 99-100, 104-105). However, cautioning against too easy an adoption of this kind of perspective, Janet Roitman (2014, p. 41) notes that, while positing a given situation as a crisis makes certain questions possible, it also forecloses other kinds of question and lines of investigation. In other words, an over-reliance by participants or observers on interpreting specific symptoms as evidence of a continuing crisis or yet another crisis can create a blind spot that sidelines alternative descriptions, diagnoses, prognoses, and potential courses of action. Taking crisis for granted as a starting point means that the nature of crisis as an explanandum is left unexamined and therefore directs attention to the search for the best explanation (or, at least, some explanation). So, rather than asking whether X (an event or process) does or does not constitute a crisis, its unquestioned, unreflective treatment as a crisis, of whatever kind, short-circuits analysis of the crisis and, hence, decision-making about suitable responses. Although Roitman directs her criticism against historical narratives shaped by the interpretive couplet of crisis-critique that is allegedly characteristic of modernity since the eighteenth century (cf. Koselleck, 1988; Festl, Grosser, and Thomä, 2018), her arguments are also very apt for the inflation of crisis diagnoses and discourses in recent decades as mentioned in Chapter 1. Indeed, the more that crisis discourse expands, the greater the risk that crisis becomes an empty concept. This is especially true where crisis is employed counter-intuitively, as is often the case nowadays, to describe an enduring condition rather than, as implied in its original meaning, to identify a moment for decisive action that might restore the status quo ante or lead to more or less radical social transformation. This risk can be remedied on condition that the durability of crises is related to contingent conditions that block a resolution that might otherwise occur. This is compatible with the general principles of critical realism and is analysed by Gramsci, for example, in terms of a "catastrophic equilibrium of forces" (1971: 219-23, 300; cf. Gramsci 1975: Q13, §27; Q14, §23; Q22, §10; for a discussion in relation to the crisis in Europe, see Keucheyan and Durand, 2015). These contingencies are illustrated in Chapter 4, where Andrew Gamble refers to the impasse of the British state or economy, which he regards as structural and deep-seated, leading to inertia, deadlocks or catastrophic equilibria. Likewise, Will Hout notes the permanent crisis in development assistance and explains this in terms of a failure to look beyond symptoms to deeper causes of poverty, inequality, and unsustainable

Praktyka Teoretyczna, 2021

In this article, we offer a critical social analysis of crisis in light of capitalist development and, above all, in the post-2008 world. We discuss five approaches in the social sciences that deal with the problem of crisis and develop some theore­tical lines for a critical approach to the theme. We argue that precarity can be an important topic for grasping the current crises via critical approaches. The text also presents the six articles that are part of the issue we edited for Praktyka Teoretyczna entitled “Latency of the crisis.”