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2011, Law & Society: Private Law - Property eJournal
Mortgage securitization, subprime lending, a persistently weak housing market, and an explosion of residential mortgage defaults – today’s homeowners and banks face a new and challenging landscape. Recently, courts in several states have issued decisions that alter the terrain for mortgage foreclosures. In Massachusetts, New Jersey, and New York, among other states, courts have dismissed foreclosure actions on the basis of what might seem to be highly technical deficiencies in the pleading or proof. The most well-known–and controversial–in this cluster of cases is U.S. Bank National Ass’n v. Ibanez, decided by the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts this year. In Ibanez, the court held that two assignee banks failed to obtain legal title to foreclosed properties because they failed to prove that they held valid assignments of the foreclosed mortgages at the moment that the foreclosure proceedings were begun.
Before: JACOBS, POOLER, and CARNEY, Circuit Judges. Appeal from an order of the United States District Court for the Western District of New York (Richard Joseph Arcara, J.) denying the motion of the Bank of New York Mellon Trust Company’s (“BNY Mellon” or “the Bank”) for judgment on the pleadings. The district court concluded that plaintiffs have Article III standing to sue BNY Mellon for violating the timely recordation requirements imposed by New York State’s mortgage-satisfaction-recording statutes and certified the question for interlocutory appeal. On review, we hold, first, that state legislatures may create legally protected interests whose violation supports Article III standing, subject to certain federal limitations. We further decide that the New York law violations alleged here constitute a concrete and particularized harm to plaintiffs in the form of both reputational injury and limitations in borrowing capacity over the nearly ten-month period during which their mortgage discharge was unlawfully not recorded and in which the Bank allowed the public record to reflect, falsely, that plaintiffs had an outstanding debt of over $50,000. In addition, the Bank’s failure to record plaintiffs’ mortgage discharge created a material risk of concrete and particularized harm to plaintiffs by providing a basis for an unfavorable credit rating and reduced borrowing capacity. These risks and interests, in addition to that of clouded title, which an ordinary mortgagor would have suffered (but plaintiffs did not), are similar to those protected by traditional actions at law. Whether better characterized as “substantive” or “procedural” wrongs, the Bank’s violations of the state statutes are plausibly alleged to have caused actual harm and subjected plaintiffs to a real risk of material harm, the very sort of which the state statutes appear designed to protect mortgagors such as plaintiffs against. As a result, we conclude that the Maddoxes’ allegations support their Article III standing, and that they may pursue their claims for the statutory penalties imposed by the New York Legislature, and other relief, in the federal district court, subject to compliance with other jurisdictional prerequisites and class certification requirements. Order affirmed and case remanded. Judge Jacobs dissents in a separate opinion.
Loyola University Chicago Law Journal, 1988
This Article is an expanded version of a report covering the new foreclosure law prepared for the 1987 Illinois Judicial Conference. The Conference presentation on the new act was made by Judges William T. Caisley and Anthony J.
SSRN Electronic Journal, 2011
/billion-dollar-foreclosure-mess-took-root-at-75khouse/ (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (describing lender who often cannot truthfully certify he possesses "true and accurate copy of the note or mortgage").
2012
In 2007, Rick Sharga, vice president of marketing at RealtyTrac, stated that with more stringent lending and underwriting standards, "we will likely see a significant foreclosure decrease" 1 within the next three years. However, a sustained and considerable decrease in foreclosures has yet to occur. In fact, the real estate market downfall and resulting mortgage and housing crisis have proven to be wider, deeper, and more serious than first anticipated. Since 2007, millions of homeowners faced, and continue to face, foreclosure proceedings. 2 To provide protections for homeowners, federal and state actors have attempted regulatory and legislative solutions to stem the foreclosure crisis. The attempted regulatory and legislative responses, such as foreclosure moratoria, have failed to pull the real estate housing market out of crisis and provide meaningful relief to homeowners facing foreclosure. 3 Many factors contribute to this failure, but namely, lack of uniform rules and policies among the relevant federal and state agencies for lenders, homeowners, and servicers. This Article contends that, with the rate of foreclosures predicted to steadily continue into 2015, 4 the need for standardized intervention remains imperative to sustain the goal of home ownership, safeguard consumers, guide lenders and servicers, and stabilize the real estate market.
Journal of Business & Economics Research (JBER), 2011
Foreclosures are at a record high, causing families to be displaced, blighted neighborhoods and the reduction of home values. This paper examines a few unusual cases recently determined, whereby the Court exercises its equity powers to find a just result.
Todd, Scott's AI, wrote this Abstract: Historically, judicial pensions were funded by taxpayer dollars to ensure neutrality and prevent financial conflicts of interest. However, beginning around 2005-2008, many states, including Washington and New York, shifted judicial retirement investments into mortgage-backed securities (MBS)—the very financial instruments at the center of foreclosure disputes. This raises a critical question: Did judges overseeing foreclosure cases have a financial stake in ruling against homeowners? The Supreme Court in Jesinoski v. Countrywide (2015) held that a borrower rescinds a loan under TILA simply by giving written notice. Yet, many state courts—including those in Washington—ignored this ruling, favoring banks and mortgage servicers. If judicial retirement funds relied on the performance of MBS, courts had a built-in incentive to suppress homeowner claims and uphold foreclosures. This potential conflict of interest demands further investigation. How deeply were judicial pensions tied to MBS? And did this influence rulings in favor of lenders over homeowners? This article presents the foundation of this argument based on available evidence, particularly in Washington State. More historical research is needed to determine how widespread this issue is.
Social Justice, 2014
The real estate foreclosure crisis that began in 2006 was a global crisis involving multinational financial institutions that devastated families and communities across the globe. Yet, the United States was clearly the epicenter of this crisis. The foreclosure crisis was a principal factor in the reduction of the home ownership rate in the United States from 69 percent in 2006 to 63 percent in 2013. Major banking interests employed questionable and fraudulent lending practices that introduced new words, such as "subprime lending" and "predatory practices," into the public discourse. The American public, especially the American homeowner, realized that the worm that turned the apple brown was birthed by US banking interests. The resultant real estate "bubble" that burst exposed the inability of governmental regulations to keep abreast of changes in lending practices taking place in US banks and other financial institutions. More important, it also expose...
Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, 2011
This Point/Counterpoint addresses the causes and consequences of the foreclosure crisis. Here, we feature a lively debate between two teams comprised of nationally renowned housing and mortgage policy experts. The first panel
Loyola Journal of Public Interest Law, 2009
Thank you for including me in this important conference. I do not study predatory lending but I do study bankruptcy. Commercial law scholars have long scrutinized the intersection between bankruptcy and the ways in which credit products are marketed, distributed, monitored, and enforced. 1 The bankruptcy system offers a window into private debtor-creditor relationships as well as a locus for enforcement of legal or equitable principles relating to those relationships. This includes dealings arising from the origination and servicing of purchase-money and postpurchase mortgage home credit. Millions of homeowners and former homeowners have passed through the doors of the bankruptcy system. 2 Most bankrupt homeowners have at least one mortgage, and some have two or three. 3 Especially when debtors seek to cure and reinstate mortgages in chapter 13 repayment plan cases, problems with mortgage origination, servicing, and third party interventions can be exposed and confronted. 4
Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, 2011
This Point/Counterpoint addresses the causes and consequences of the foreclosure crisis. Here, we feature a lively debate between two teams comprised of nationally renowned housing and mortgage policy experts. The first panel
Chap. L. Rev., 2011
Copyright (c) 2011 Chapman Law Review Chapman Law Review. Spring, 2011. 15 Chap. L. Rev. 171. LENGTH: 26770 words Foreclosing on the Federal Power Grab: Dodd-Frank, Preemption, and the State Role in Mortgage Servicing Regulation. NAME: Kurt Eggert*. ...
SSRN Electronic Journal, 2020
Differences in mortgage law have significant effects on loan characteristics at origination. Borrower-friendly laws impose higher costs and risks for lenders and, thus, induce effects on mortgage pricing and leverage. However, not all borrower-friendly laws have the same effects. This finding is established using loan-level data for the U.S. mortgage market between 2001 and 2011. Judicial foreclosure requirements imply higher mortgage interest rates due to higher recovery costs and activate the price channel. Recourse restrictions imply higher loan collateralization to compensate for the fewer recovery opportunities and activate the collateral channel.
2012
On February 9 of 2012, a bipartisan group of state attorneys general and federal officials announced a landmark $25 billion national accord with the five largest loan servicers-Ally/GMAC, Bank of America, Citi, JPMorgan Chase, and Wells Fargoover mortgage foreclosure fraud and unacceptable mortgage servicing practices. 1 The documents were officially filed in federal district court and made public on March 13, 2012. The settlement was approved on April 4, 2012. The accord will enable distressed homeowners to stay in their homes through enhanced loan modifications. It also will provide payments to victims of unfair foreclosure practices and provide support for housing counseling and state-level foreclosure prevention programs. In addition to the monetary allocations, the settlement will require comprehensive reform of mortgage loan servicing. To ensure that the banks meet the new standards, the settlement will be recorded and enforceable as a court judgment. Compliance will be overseen by an independent monitor who will report to the attorneys general and the court. Iowa's estimated share of the settlement is $40 million, of which $24 million will go to homeowners who lost their homes to foreclosure or are seeking loan modifications or refinancing. 2 The State will receive a direct payment of over $15 million to support housing counseling, foreclosure prevention and other educational efforts. The Office of the Attorney General will oversee the implementation of the settlement in Iowa. In this paper we summarize the major elements of this complex settlement, and describe how it will impact homeowners and government programs in Iowa. We also provide links that offer more in-depth information on different aspects of the settlement.
The Journal of Law and Economics, 2014
Our finding that default rates are higher in judicial review states is consistent with a longer time to foreclosure reducing the expected costs of default for borrowers in judicial review states. ... The coefficient estimates can be interpreted as follows: when equity is less than or equal to 0, the effect of a change in equity is given by the coefficient on Equity; for values of equity greater than 0 percent but less than 25 percent, the effect of changes in equity on default rates is equal to the sum of the coefficient on Equity and the first interactive variable ([#x2016] (Equity >/= 0) x Equity). ... For example, subprime borrowers in non-judicial-review states are 17 percent (6.8 percent versus 5.8 percent) more likely to file for bankruptcy after a default than are subprime borrowers in states with judicial review (the difference is statistically significant at the 1 percent level). ..
Contemporary Economic Policy, 2017
Pivotal litigation against the largest subprime mortgage servicer in the United States provides lessons about the appropriate regulation of mortgage servicing and adds to research about the causes of the financial crisis. Mortgage servicing is essential to the functioning of the financial system so servicers must be held to a high standard. The litigation revealed egregious practices but was settled quickly for a nominal amount and provided the servicer a very broad release of liability, allowing it to expand without correcting serious problems, and created significant wealth gains for the parent firm. Regulatory authority should not be split between agencies. (JEL G28, G21, K40) * We thank an anonymous referee for very valuable comments.
SSRN Electronic Journal, 2000
Almost five years into the foreclosure crisis, policymakers, the mortgage industry, consumers and taxpayers all express disappointment over the slow pace of modifications, refinancings, and other resolutions of borrowers' distress short of foreclosure auctions. Many analysts point to the prevalence of second liens on the properties as a significant impediment to efficient resolutions of borrowers' distress and therefore to the stabilization of the housing market. In addition, many observers argue that a significant number of second liens are at serious risk of default, and therefore may imperil the financial solvency of the financial institutions holding the liens.
DePaul Journal for Social Justice, 2019
The following is an excerpt from INIQUITY (forthcoming 2019). Inequity explores the legal problems often faced by the author’s homeowner clients and foreclosure bar colleagues alike, including the provision of bad information, inadequate due process, incompetent representation and scams within the foreclosure context. Inequity draws attention to these issues and proposes changes to remedy them. The excerpt chosen focuses on dispelling myths surrounding foreclosure that may contribute to these problems, including the assumption that foreclosures are indefensible, a misconception that the author argues is often fueled by classism and racism. Kelli Dudley, DePaul University College of Law Professor, housing law attorney, and Director of the Resistance Legal Clinic. Dudley was a 2015 recipient of the DePaul University ENGAGE Award. She has practiced law privately for over 15 years, providing vigorous defenses to foreclosure actions, litigating fair housing matters, filing affirmative ...
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