Moral Realism and Moral Objectivity

The Southern Journal of Philosophy, 1991

Science, thanks to its link with observation, retains some title to a correspondence theory of truth; but a coherence theory is evidently the lot of ethics. --W. V. Quine

I consider a variety of interpretations of the metaethical views of the average, philosophically untrained moral relativist and evaluate them in light of how well they explain certain facts about relativist behavior. I conclude that the best interpretations of ordinary relativism are based on the idea that the ethical standards of those who attribute moral praise or blame or who assess attributions of praise or blame for truth or falsity are the primary determinants of the truth values of moral judgments. Such a view allows an agent's practical reasons to affect the truth values of moral judgments when those reasons are sufficiently salient in the attributor's or assessor's context. I also offer a relevant alternatives account of moral judgment that models relativistic thinking about how changes in the ethical standards in place in various contexts occur and how these changes affect the correctness of moral judgments.

Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics, 2005

Kpanie Addy MA Philosophy 'The very existence of other cultures with different moralities from ours is, in itself, enough to show that moral relativism is true.' Discuss. This essay discusses the view that the very existence of other cultures with different moralities from ours is, in itself, enough to show that moral relativism is true. To reformulate the issue as a question: does the existence of other cultures with moral views dissimilar to ours constitute a condition sufficient for establishing the truth of moral relativism? A careful treatment of this issue requires understanding moral relativism; I shall therefore begin by briefly sketching out this viewpoint. A focused discussion of the matter in hand will then follow. I shall deploy arguments in support of my opinion that the case for moral relativism actually seems to founder when premised on moral diversity. I shall conclude this essay by stating why in my view moral relativism lacks viability as an ethical position. Moral relativism, as Harman explains, is the view that "moral right and wrong (good and bad, justice and injustice, virtue and vice etc.) are always relative to a choice of moral framework. What is morally right in relation to one moral framework can be morally wrong in relation to a different moral framework. And no moral framework is objectively privileged as the one true morality" (Harman and Thomson 1996: 3). Meiland and Krausz express a similar view: "moral relativism tells us that an action is morally right only relative to a particular moral code or set of moral principles" (1982: 8). The term, moral relativism (MR) or ethical relativism, thus aptly reflects the general idea underlying this viewpoint that moral truth is relative to or contingent on a specific moral framework and equally relative is the justifiability of such truth. MR contrasts sharply with the view that there is an objective, universal, absolute moral truth which exists, as Mackie picturesquely puts it, as part of the fabric of the world. It thus diametrically opposes moral objectivism and universalism, both of which, in very simple terms, are claims supporting the position that objective standards bearing on truth or falsity obtain with regard to evaluating moral judgments and that such judgments have universal application. MR, although often likened to moral scepticism, differs significantly from the latter viewpoint. Outlining this difference helps to further clarify what MR consists in. Meiland and Krausz highlight the key similarity and difference as follows:

Principles of Health Care Ethics, 2006

Synthese, 2009

Moral relativism is an attractive position, but also one that it is difficult to formulate. In this paper, we propose an alternative way of formulating moral relativism that locates the relativity of morality in the property that makes moral claims true. Such an approach, we believe, has significant advantages over other possible ways of formulating moral relativism. We conclude by

Moral relativism is an attractive position, but also one that it is difficult to formulate. In this paper, we propose an alternative way of formulating moral relativ-ism that locates the relativity of morality in the property that makes moral claims true. Such an approach, we believe, has significant advantages over other possible ways of formulating moral relativism. We conclude by considering a few problems such a position might face. Moral relativism is an attractive position, but also one that it is difficult to formulate. In this paper, we propose an alternative way of formulating moral relativism that locates the relativity of morality in the property that makes moral claims true. Such an approach, we believe, has significant advantages over other possible ways of formulating moral relativism. We conclude by considering a few problems such a position might face. 1

Cambridge University Press eBooks, 1996

Philosophical Topics, 2010

The Philosophical Review, 1986

to provide an analysis of epistemology or ethics that permits us to see how the central evaluative functions of this domain could be carried out within existing (or prospective) empirical theories. Second, he attempts to show how traditional nonnaturalist accounts rely upon assumptions that are in some way incoherent, or that fit ill with existing science. And third, he presents to the skeptic a certain challenge, namely, to show how a skeptical account of our epistemic or moral practices could be as plausible, useful, or interesting as the account the naturalist offers, and how a skeptical reconstruction of such practices-should the skeptic, as often he does, attempt one-could succeed in preserving their distinctive place and function in human affairs. I will primarily be occupied This content downloaded from 132.174.255.116 on Wed, 05 Aug 2020 21:59:02 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms MORAL REALISM they revealed by reason or by some special mode of apprehension? (7) Bivalence-Does the principle of the excluded middle apply to moral judgments? (8) Determinateness-Given whatever procedures we have for assessing moral judgments, how much of morality is likely to be determinable? (9) Categoricity-Do all rational agents necessarily have some reason to obey moral imperatives? (10) Universality-Are moral imperatives applicable to all rational agents, even (should such exist) those who lack a reason to comply with them? (11) Assessment of existing moralities-Are present moral beliefs approximately true, or do prevailing moral intuitions in some other sense constitute privileged data? (12) Relativism-Does the truth or warrant of moraljudgments depend directly upon individually-or socially-adopted norms or practices? (13) Pluralism-Is there a uniquely good form of life or a uniquely right moral code, or could different forms of life or moral codes be appropriate in different circumstances? Here, then, are the approximate coordinates of my own view in this multidimensional conceptual space. I will argue for a form of moral realism which holds that moral judgments can bear truth values in a fundamentally non-epistemic sense of truth; that moral properties are objective, though relational; that moral properties supervene upon natural properties, and may be reducible to them; that moral inquiry is of a piece with empirical inquiry; that it cannot be known a priori whether bivalence holds for moral judgments or how determinately such judgments can be assessed; that there is reason to think we know a fair amount about morality, but also reason to think that current moralities are wrong in certain ways and could be wrong in quite general ways; that a rational agent may-fail to have a reason for obeying moral imperatives, although they may nonetheless be applicable to him; and that, while there are perfectly general criteria of moral assessment, nonetheless, by the nature of these criteria no one kind of life is likely to be appropriate for all individuals and no one set of norms appropriate for all societies and all times. The position thus described might well be called 'stark, raving moral realism', but for the sake of syntax, I will colorlessly call it 'moral realism'. This usage is not proprietary. Other positions, occupying more or less different coordinates, may have equal claim to either name.