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2016, Proceedings of Frontiers of Fundamental Physics 14 — PoS(FFP14)
We discuss the problem of theory change in physics. We characterize a physical theory based through its kinematical symmetries. The progressions of theories is mathematically described as Inönü-Wigner extensions of the associated kinematical groups. This is compatible with the modern ideas in philosophy of science-e.g. the semantic approach to a scientific theory, with the advantage of remaining conceptually simple and admitting a well defined mathematical structure, with hints at a logic of discovery. This is also linked to the Bargmann-Wigner program. We propose extensions of our idea in the final discussion.
2005
Symmetry considerations stand at the core of classical and quantum physics. No modern-and few older-physical theories forgo the immense services that these considerations offer. It is therefore only natural that philosophers of physics have increasingly started to study the motivations for, as well as the technical implementations and the interpretative implications of, symmetries in fundamental physics. Apart from the extraordinary foundational interest of symmetries, they provide a vehicle to study more general philosophical issues such as the relation between the physical world and its representations and between physics and mathematics. Moreover, traditional problems in metaphysics and philosophy of science such as the nature and status of laws of nature, scientific realism, and determinism naturally arise in, and enjoy substantial fertilisation from, the context of symmetries in physics. This volume, edited by Katherine Brading and Elena Castellani, which grew out of a workshop held at Oxford in 2001, thus fulfills the felt need to collect the current philosophical debates on different aspects of symmetries in physics. The editors declare at the outset that their intention was to offer a ''format that would provide a point of entry into the subject for non-experts, including students and philosophers of science in general.'' (p. ix) Indeed, some of the articles are clearly accessible (and relevant!) to this wider audience. A number of articles-among them some of the most interesting contributions-, however, presuppose at least a willingness on the part of the reader to engage with more technical material. Although this may partially undermine the editors' expressed intention, they need not worry, for these articles will stir the interest of the specialist. What is more, some of the contributions present splendid and truly didactical reviews of the core issues in the subject and will therefore be of great service in advanced courses in the foundations and philosophy of physics. Please join me in more extensively exploring the collection, which is divided into four parts. Part I concerns continuous symmetries and constitutes the most voluminous section of the collection. After brief selections of classic texts on the subject by Weyl and Wigner, Christopher Martin sets out to survey the role and significance of continuous symmetries in fundamental physics and to introduce the philosophical
arXiv (Cornell University), 2016
Every physical theory has (at least) two different forms of mathematical equations to represent its target systems: the dynamical (equations of motion) and the kinematical (kinematical constraints). Kinematical constraints are differentiated from equations of motion by the fact that their particular form is fixed once and for all, irrespective of the interactions the system enters into. By contrast, the particular form of a system's equations of motion depends essentially on the particular interaction the system enters into. All contemporary accounts of the structure and semantics of physical theory treat dynamics, i.e., the equations of motion, as the most important feature of a theory for the purposes of its philosophical analysis. I argue to the contrary that it is the kinematical constraints that determine the structure and empirical content of a physical theory in the most important ways: they function as necessary preconditions for the appropriate application of the theory; they differentiate types of physical systems; they are necessary for the equations of motion to be well posed or even just cogent; and they guide the experimentalist in the design of tools for measurement and observation. It is thus satisfaction of the kinematical constraints that renders meaning to those terms representing a system's physical quantities in the first place, even before one can ask whether or not the system satisfies the theory's equations of motion. † This paper has been submitted to Philosophy of Science, Mar. 2016. I thank Chris Pincock for detailed comments, insightful suggestions and hard questions on an earlier draft of a manuscript of which this paper is a fragment, and for many enjoyable, illuminating conversations about these things in general. I thank Adam Caulton, Bill Demopoulos, and Sebastian Lutz for enjoyable and helpful conversations on the structure and semantics of theories in general. Finally, I thank Howard Stein for many fruitful and delightful conversations over many years touching on all sorts of matters related to the issues I address here in particular, and, in general, for more than I can well say. This paper owes a clear and debt to several of his papers, especially Stein (1992, 1994, 2004).
Acta Physica Hungarica A) Heavy Ion Physics, 2004
Symmetry played a central role in the works of E.P. Wigner. He made a great contribution to the extension and reinterpretation of the concept of symmetry. He proposed a new classification. The paper investigates in the light of Wigner's works how do we see now the classification of physical symmetries.
SYMMETRY: THE THEORY OF EVERYTHING, 1997
This paper is critical of reductionist theories of everything (TOE) and proposes instead an outline for a holistic TOE based on symmetry. Symmetry is entirely omnipresent in the universe, it has a relational architecture and can be characterised by its formative, energetic and infinite potentials as well as its basis in meaning and consciousness. These inclusive and generic features combine to provide the necessary holistic attributes for a successful theory of everything. The history of physics is a history of the unification of science. Newton, Maxwell, Einstein, and Bohr each developed a series of symmetrical connections which were previously unknown. Perhaps because of these isomorphic developments the search for a theory of everything (TOE), a theory that can explain the basic laws of the entire universe in all its infinitely subtle detail, appears more than an act of faith. At the heart of a TEO are the concepts of unity and unification and these have been the outcomes of physics for the last three hundred years.
Memories of 38° Congress of the Italian Society of History of Physics and Astronomya cura di Salvatore Esposito, Lucio Fregonese e Roberto Mantovani. Pavia University Press, Pavia. 2018: 43-51. ISBN: 978-88-6952-058-7, 2018
Symmetry is for physics what is understood as conservation laws. It is natural for physicists today to derive laws of nature and prove their validity by means of laws of invariance or conservation instead of deriving these laws from those we believe are the laws of nature. This turn represents the first turning point in the application and use of the notion of symmetry in the twentieth-century’s physics as a metalinguistic term. Thus, the magnitudes are automorphisms, ensuring the invariance or conservation of laws in any reference system, showing symmetry as a metalinguistic term. In this article, we postulate the explicit use of symmetry as a principle, studying this notion as a metalanguage term in relativistic physics, assuming that under certain transformations the aspects that characterizes phenomena, systems or laws are unchangeable, thus being independent from any particular observation (principles of symmetry). Keywords: symmetry, principle, metalanguage, invariance, physics.
European Journal for Philosophy of Science
Symmetry-based inferences have permeated many discussions in philosophy of physics and metaphysics of science. It is claimed that symmetries in our physical theories would allow us to draw metaphysical conclusions about the world, a view that I call ‘symmetry inferentialism’. This paper is critical to this view. I claim that (a) it assumes a philosophically questionable characterization of the relevant validity domain of physical symmetries, and (b) it overlooks a distinction between two opposing ways through which relevant physical symmetries become established. My conclusion is that symmetry inferentialism loses persuasive force when these two points are taken into consideration.
The vague accuracies of events dancing two and two with language which they forever surpass William Carlos Williams Paterson In theory, there's no difference between theory and practice. In practice, there is. Yogi Berra ABSTRACT I argue that an adequate semantics for physical theories must be grounded on an account of the way that a theory provides formal and conceptual resources appropriate for— that have propriety in—the construction of representations of the physical systems the theory purports to treat. I sketch a precise, rigorous definition of the required forms of propriety, and argue that semantic content accrues to scientific representations of physical systems primarily in virtue of the propriety of its resources. In particular, neither the I thank John Norton and the group of Fellows at the Center for Philosophy of Science at the University of Pittsburgh, fall, 2008, and also colloquium audiences at the London School of Economics, fall, 2009, and at the University of...
In this paper Galilei-invariant physical theories within the framework of Lagrange formalism are represented in two different formulations: The conventional form is accommodated to space and time translations whereas the dual form is accommodated to Galilei boosts. This coexistence of both forms called the dual structure is put into an axiomatic formulation for arbitrary field theories of continuous systems.
Epistemological Studies in Philosophy, Social and Political Sciences, 4, 1: 20-28. , 2021
Physical theories are complex and necessary tools for gaining new knowledge about their areas of application. A distinction is made between abstract and practical theories. The last are constantly being improved in the cognitive activity of professional physicists and studied by future physicists. A variant of the philosophy of physics based on a modified structural-nominative reconstruction of practical theories is proposed. Readers should decide whether this option is useful for their understanding of the philosophy of physics, as well as other philosophies of particular sciences. The article is written within the theme "Communicative transformations in modern science" of "Program targeted and competitive topics of the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine". Keywords: practical physical theories; physical lingua franca; subsystems of theories; subsystem flexibilities; main and auxiliary components; basic and satellite levels.
Journal of Student Research
The concept of symmetry is essential in understanding classical and quantum physics. Symmetry describes a system that remains unchanged in structure and behavior after undergoing a transformation. In this paper, I will describe the implications of symmetries (global and gauge) in Newton’s laws of mechanics, Maxwell’s electromagnetism equations, and quantum particle physics – in particular the Higgs mechanism – with the help of Noether’s Theorem. Purely based on symmetrical elements, this paper will then determine the isospin composition of pions given certain restraints. This solution will connect findings in preceding theories to current and future studies relevant to the subject of symmetry in physics.
2015
Can metatheoretical misconceptions be ultimately responsible for the lack of breakthroughs in fundamental physics in recent decades? The answer outlined in the essay is yes. First I discuss such a misconception – that mathematics in physics is merely a description and therefore even fundamental mathematical entities (such as a manifold) do not represent counterparts in the physical world. Then I examine an instance of this misconception – that the four-dimensional manifold in relativity is only “an abstract four-dimensional mathematical continuum” – and summarize Minkowski’s arguments that this four-dimensional manifold does represent a real four-dimensional world (spacetime). Finally, I discuss several negative implications of this misconception for the advancement of fundamental physics, including one which makes it impossible even to identify a radical (but not inconceivable) reason for the unsuccessful attempts to create a theory of quantum gravity.
Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A, 1973
Symmetry, 2020
In standard quantum theory, symmetry is defined in the spirit of Klein’s Erlangen Program—the background space has a symmetry group, and the basic operators should commute according to the Lie algebra of that group. We argue that the definition should be the opposite—background space has a direct physical meaning only on classical level while on quantum level symmetry should be defined by a Lie algebra of basic operators. Then the fact that de Sitter symmetry is more general than Poincare symmetry can be proved mathematically. The problem of explaining cosmological acceleration is very difficult but, as follows from our results, there exists a scenario in which the phenomenon of cosmological acceleration can be explained by proceeding from basic principles of quantum theory. The explanation has nothing to do with existence or nonexistence of dark energy and therefore the cosmological constant problem and the dark energy problem do not arise. We consider finite quantum theory (FQT) w...
Advances in Historical Studies, 2021
In last century, the historians of physics improved their historical accounts till up to obtain be interpretative accounts. The two main interpretative accounts have posed fundamental problems. Koyré: whether in theoretical physics mathematics is also idealistic in nature; Kuhn: whether and how the notions of paradigm, anomaly, crisis, scientific revolution and incommensurability are essential for a deep understanding of the history of physics. For their part, the philosophers of science have suggested a program for unifying the entire science; hence, they attributed to the concept of reduction between two theories insisting on the same field of phenomena a crucial role. A great debate tried to define this notion of reduction. Since longtime a particular, but more accurate notion of reduction has been applied by physicists: the reduction through a limit of a fundamental parameter of the reducing theory. But Berry, Rohrlich and Batterman pointed out that this reduction is impossible when the limit is singular, as it occurs in te cases of physical optics and geometric optics, statistical mechanics and thermodynamics, quantum mechanics and classical mechanics, etc. Hence, to represent an entire theory as the final point of a singular limit operation applies idealistic mathematics more than what was suggested by Koyré, i.e. to represent a physical law through an idealistic mathematical notion. In addition, a new mathematics-the constructive one-characterizes a singular limit as undecidable. Hence, a singular limit between two theories actually represents a difference between two different kinds of mathematics. This particular situation suggests a mathematical definition of the notion of incommensurability. As a consequence of the resulting incommensurabilities among many couples of theories the foundations of physical theories are pluralist, not only in both epistemological and ontological senses, but also in mathematical sense. Hence, the traditional vision of the historical growth of theoretical physics-as a series of theories as concentric circles, each theory being compatible with the previous onesis denied; since longtime the history of physics is developing along a plurilinear path.
Synthese, 2011
This paper elaborates on the following correspondence theorem (which has been defended and formally proved elsewhere): if theory T has been empirically successful in a domain of applications A, but was superseded later on by a different theory T * which was likewise successful in A, then under natural conditions T contains theoretical expressions ϕ which were responsible for T's success and correspond (in A) to certain theoretical expressions ϕ * of T *. I illustrate this theorem at hand of the phlogiston versus oxygen theories of combustion, and the classical versus relativistic theories of mass. The ontological consequences of the theorem are worked out in terms of the indirect reference and partial truth. The final section explains how the correspondence theorem may justify a weak version of scientific realism without presupposing the no-miracles argument.
The paper discusses the invariance view of reality: a view inspired by the relativity and quantum theory. It is an attempt to show that both versions of Structural Realism (epistemological and ontological) are already embedded in the invariance view but in each case the invariance view introduces important modifications. From the invariance view we naturally arrive at a consideration of symmetries and structures. It is often claimed that there is a strong connection between invariance and reality, established by symmetries. The invariance view seems to render frame-invariant properties real, while frame-specific properties are illusory. But on a perspectival, yet observer-free view of frame-specific realities they too must be regarded as real although supervenient on frameinvariant realities. Invariance and perspectivalism are thus two faces of symmetries.
The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 2012
This paper develops an analogy proposed by Stachel between general relativity (GR) and quantum mechanics (QM) as regards permutation invariance. Our main idea is to overcome Pooley's criticism of the analogy by appeal to paraparticles.
Foundations of Physics, 2005
As an approach to a Theory of Everything a framework for developing a coherent theory of mathematics and physics together is described. The main characteristic of such a theory is discussed: the theory must be valid and and sufficiently strong, and it must maximally describe its own validity and sufficient strength. The mathematical logical definition of validity is used, and sufficient strength is seen to be a necessary and useful concept. The requirement of maximal description of its own validity and sufficient strength may be useful to reject candidate coherent theories for which the description is less than maximal. Other aspects of a coherent theory discussed include universal applicability, the relation to the anthropic principle, and possible uniqueness. It is suggested that the basic properties of the physical and mathematical universes are entwined with and emerge with a coherent theory. Support for this includes the indirect reality status of properties of very small or very large far away systems compared to moderate sized nearby systems. Discussion of the necessary physical nature of language includes physical models of language and a proof that the meaning content of expressions of any axiomatizable theory seems to be independent of the algorithmic complexity of the theory. Gödel maps seem to be less useful for a coherent theory than for purely mathematical theories because all symbols and words of any language must have representations as states of physical systems already in the domain of a coherent theory.
Journal of physics, 2022
Since it started about three centuries ago, theoretical physics went through a huge advancement and, particularly in the last century, the development was material. Its application to engineering brought a massive revolution in the way we humanity live now. Its interpretation opened up astoundingly deep understanding of our universe. One important research activity for the future is to further develop our theories and to further deepen our understanding of the universe. However, as Tomonaga said, when we are in a phase of looking for new paradigm, it is important to understand how our current theory was developed. The purpose of this paper is to present a logical and historic study of the conceptual development of theoretical physics. As the field of theoretical physics is so vast, we cannot cover all theories we have now. We will focus on the most fundamental theories of physics. As this field of physics is as deep and intricate as pure mathematics, if not more, it will be helpful to compare our challenge with that pure mathematicians are facing in the field of the foundations of mathematics. Such common ground will inevitably lead us to deeper philosophical issues. After all what we call physics started with Newton who developed both calculus and dynamics. He called it not physics but natural philosophy. So, it is naturally expected that philosophy, mathematics and theoretical physics develop hand in hand. It has been about a century since these fields started to develop separately and it is about time to restart the original interaction between these three intrinsic intellectual activities. Certainly this will help our timely search for a new paradigm. We must move forward.
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