The concept of self (atman) in Nyaya-Vaisesika philosophy

Tetsugaku: The Journal of Hiroshima Philosophical Society 75, 2023

The verb jñā ‘know, cognize’ (dhātupāṭha IX.36: jñā ava¬bodhane ‘apprehending’) is a term crucial in the theory of knowledge. It denotes the action of knowing, which requires a karman ‘object’. According to NS 1.1.10: ic-chādveṣaprayatnasukhaduḥkhajñānāny ātmano liṅgam, a self (ātman) is a unique substance (dravya) that is inferable as the seat of the qualities (guṇa) of desire (icchā) and aversion (dveṣa), effort (prayatna), pleasure (sukha) and pain (duḥkha), and knowledge (jñāna). We can see from this that the self serves as knower (jñātṛ), i.e., a kartṛ ‘agent’ of the action of knowing. In addition, NS 1.1.9: ātmaśarīrendriyārthabuddhimanaḥpravṛtti-doṣapretya¬bhāvaphaladuḥkhāpavargas tu prameyam places the self in the category of prameya ‘what is to be known through a means of knowledge (pramāṇa)’. We can see from this that the self is also an entity to be known (jñeya), i.e., a ka¬rman of the action of knowing. Accordingly, it seems that we can establish without difficulty the use of the following utterance: [1] ātmā ātmānaṃ jānīte ‘The self knows the self [for itself].’ In this utterance, the syntactic words (pada) ātmā and ātmānam are the nominative and accusative singular forms of the nominal ātman, respectively; the syntactic word jānīte is the third singular present middle form of the verb jñā. This utterance assumes that only one self is involved in the situation. However, things are not that simple. The assignment of the name karman to the self (A 1.4.49 kartur īpsitatamaṃ karma), whereby an accusative ending occurs after the nominal base ātman (A 2.3.2 karmaṇi dvitīyā), involves a theoretical difficulty. Thus the purpose of the present paper is to critically examine how Nyāya establishes the status of being a karman for the self concerning the action of knowing.

2019

India has a rich and diverse history of philosophy. The integral understanding of ‘Self’ is often neglected, which is given by Indian philosophy and the western view is more popular. This essay starts with the introduction of main orthodox and heterodox schools of Indian philosophy. Then discussion on six major epistemologies followed by these schools, which follow these epistemologies in-parts or as whole is presented. Further the article looks into an analytical discussion on the concept of ‘self’ as given by these classical Indian schools, especially Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas, Vedanta and Buddhism in detail. In the conclusion, the answer to the question -What is the comparison and contrast of their views with popular western philosophers such as Locke, Sartre, Hume, Descartes and Kant?, is given.

Journal of Hindu Studies 6 (3) pp. 391-393., 2013

The paper gives an account of Rāmakaṇṭha's (950-1000) contribution to the Buddhist-Brāhmaṇical debate about the existence or non-existence of a self, by demonstrating how he carves out middle ground between the two protagonists in that debate. First three points of divergence between the Brāhmaṅical (specifically Naiyāyika) and the Buddhist conceptions of subjectivity are identified. These take the form of Buddhist denials of, or re-explanations of (1) the self as the unitary essence of the individual, (2) the self as the substance to which mental properties belong, (3) the self as the agent of both physical actions and cognitions. The difference of Rāmakaṇṭha's position from both Nyāya and Buddhism is then elaborated. He posits a self, but not one that is an eternally unchanging substance, nor one that is anything other than consciousness. Hence his difference from Nyāya. He falls with Buddhism in holding that consciousness does not require anything other than itself to inhere in, but departs from Buddhism in holding that consciousness is not momentary but enduring. The guiding metaphor here is light, but light considered as a dynamic, qualitatively unchanging repetition of the action of illumination.

With or Without the Self? Arguments in Favor of the Hindu Concept of the Atman over the Buddhist Understanding of the Anatman, 2021

As found in the Upanishads, readers come to encounter many ideas regarding the “Self” as opposed to the “self,” or the Atman versus the atman. Now, complicating matters further readers encounter the antithetical concept, of the Atman and atman, or the Buddhists understanding of the anatman as found in the Dhammapada. First, this piece will unpack the idea of both the “Self” and the “self,” or the Atman and the atman, as understood in Hindu philosophy and theology. Next, this essay will then describe the Buddhists understanding of anatman, or the absence, or emptiness of the self, or the nullification of the self, or the atman as well as even of the Self, or the Atman. Finally, this piece will resolve by arguing in favor of the Self, or the Atman as well as the self, or atman over the Buddha’s notion of the anatman.

Asian Studies, 2016

I contrast briefly the Buddhist concept of Self as a process and a conditional reality with the concept of the substantial metaphysical concept of Self in Brahmanism and Hinduism. I present the criticism of the Buddhist thinkers, such as Nāgārjuna, who criticize any idea of the metaphysical Self. They deny the idea of the Self as its own being or as a possessor of its mental acts. However, they do not reject all sense of Self; they allow a pure process of knowledge (first of all, Self-knowledge) without a fixed subject or “owner” of knowledge. This idea is in a deep accord with some Chan stories and paradoxes of the Self and knowledge.

While paying tribute to C.F. Andrews, the person who, attracted by Tagore, settled in Shantiniketan, Bhattacharyya alluded to the relentless struggle of Andrews against evil and injustice in any part of the globe. And all these he wanted to do in the name of religion. Following many of his compatriots like Tagore and Gandhi, Andrews sacrificed his life to end man's alienation and the resulting boredom through non-violence. Non-violence is a fight not against the oppressor as human, but against the evil forces that dominate him. The danger with violence is that it might produce a new cycle of oppression by ending the old one. Tagore, of course, brings in the idea of identification to fight all the varieties of alienation. Bhattacharyya does not forget to mention that on some decisions of Gandhi, Andrews had the honesty to dissent. As for Gandhi, religion and politics intermingle, so is with Andrews. Andrews was more of a 'religious politician'. He left Santiniketan as many New Perspectives in Indian Philosophy on the other, in one point they agree. It is that consciousness is no attribute of the self, but is the self itself. In other words, the self is no substance, if substance is to be distinguished from attributes. If, however, by substance one means a permanent standing entity, the pure consciousness of the Sāṃkhya, the Yoga, and the Advaita Vedānta may well be called a substance. For, certainly, as neither an attribute nor an act nor a function, it is a permanent standing entity. Here lies the difference between these philosophers, on the one hand, and Kant, Gentile, and the Vijñānavādi Buddhist, on the other. These latter understand by 'self' pure consciousness as an act; and the Vijñānavādin's ālayavijñāna, though agreeing largely with the Advaita Vedāntin's pure consciousness, is never a standing separate entity, but, even as autonomous, distributes itself among mental states. Some Buddhists deny self altogether, and are content with the series of mental states. Others, mainly of the Vaibhāśika school, do not deny it altogether, but yet take it as wholly indefinite. To the Mādhyamikas, it is neither assertible, nor deniable, nor both assertible and deniable, nor neither of these two. The Nyāya, the Vaiśeṣika, the Mīmāṃsā, the Viśiṣṭādvaita and some other types of Indian philosophy, which are all arranged against the Buddhists in that they admit a standing permanent self as substance, do not, however, equate self with consciousness. The self, according to them, is a substance, to which consciousness belongs either as an attribute or as essence. While the Nyāya and the Vaiśeṣika regard consciousness as an accidental attribute of the self, consciousness or knowledge sometime occurring and sometimes not occurring in the self, for the Viśiṣṭādvaita consciousness is an essential feature of the self-the self never failing to be conscious. And for the Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsakas, the self is as much conscious as no conscious, i.e. in part conscious and in part non-conscious. Consciousness and that which has it, are subjective, and so whatever is non-The Mīmāṃsāka themselves do not admit God, though many Dharmaśāstras, and Smṛtis allow it.

Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 90:4, 2012, 812-815., 2012

Sydney Studies in Religion, 2008

1~ome of these issue~have been explored, and hence a slight overlap, in my essay entitled 'SaIikara's attempted reconciliation of You and I -YU$madasmadsamanvaya' in Relativism, Suffering, and Beyond: Bimal K. Matilal Memorial Volume, eds P. Bilimoria and J. N. Mohanty, Delhi, 1996. I have also dealt with some of these issues in my monograph, The selfand its destiny in Hinduism, Victoria, 1990. 2 8gveda, trans. Wendy O'Flaherty, Harmondsworth, 1981, pp. 25-26.

2013

From very early times, the Buddhist intellectuals have made the notion of a self existing over and above the bodily and mental constituents one of their main targets. Their critique first culminates in Vasubandhu’s treatise against the Buddhist personalists (early 5th century CE). The eighth-century philosophers Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla provide another milestone in the history of the mainstream Buddhists’ critique of the self and the person: their Tattvasaṅgraha(pañjikā) contains the most learned and elaborate treatment of the subject (at least before Karṇakagomin’s and Śaṅkaranandana’s Nairātmyasiddhi monographs). But how have Dignāga and Dharmakīrti (6th century [?]) contributed to this heated debate? The present study attempts to answer at least in part this question by offering a monographic account of Dharmakīrti’s position regarding the self. The book’s introduction deals with Dharmakīrti’s view of the self as the paramount expression of nescience. Chapter 1 is devoted to his critique of the two main expressions of Buddhist substantialism, viz. the Buddha-nature teachings and Personalism (pudgalavāda). Chapter 2 presents his way of undermining the non-Buddhists’ arguments in favour of the self. Finally, Chapter 3 provides a detailed account of Dharmakīrti’s most original contribution on the subject, viz. his demonstration that the (belief in the) existence of a self makes salvation impossible.