Military Modernization and the Russian Ground Forces

This broad overview of Russia’s military capability is not a catalogue of equipment but rather an indicator of trends. Individual sections discuss a range of current factors affecting overall capability that are still in flux, including issues of affordability, manning, organizational development, and the implementation of lessons learned from Ukraine and Syria. This white paper also considers short-term timelines of opportunities versus threats—perceived or actual—for the Russian military, before concluding with a number of broad recommendations.

Report abstract: Russian conventional capability has increased and will continue to do so during the coming ten-year period. Increased spending on defence and especially on procurement will mean that units are better trained and better equipped. Russia's military reform appears to enter a phase of consolidation after a couple of years of upheaval, restructuring, downsizing and the introduction of new concepts. During the next few years the curricula for military education and training will undergo further change, exercises will include new elements and more fine-tuning of the organisation will take place. In a short-term perspective, Russia will probably not change its nominal goal of 1 million men in the Armed Forces. In a ten-year perspective, however, demographic and economic realities will probably force the MoD to revise its personnel plans downwards. The future defence budget's share of GDP will probably be between 3.5 and 4 per cent and there is currently a political ...

This critical comment examines the incentives, major priorities, difficulties and first results of the Russian military reform that is being implemented since 2008. The authors conclude that despite numerous drawbacks and barriers to the reformist efforts certain successes can be identified. Particularly, there is a clear shift from the old-fashioned, Soviet-type army to a more compact, mobile, better equipped and combat-ready armed forces that are capable to cope with today's challenges to Russian national security.

Russian Military Capability in a Ten-Year Perspective -2016 FOI-R--4326--SE 2 Cover photo: Russian cadets sing national anthem during a graduation ceremony in Moscow, on Saturday, 25 June 2016. Ivan Sekretarev/AP/TT Nyhetsbyrån.

2011

Russia has undertaken several largely piecemeal and halting efforts to revamp the armed forces it inherited from the Soviet Union. In 2007, near the end of then-President Vladimir Putin's second term in office, he appointed Anatoliy Serdyukov-the former head of the Federal Tax Service-as defense minister as part of an effort to combat corruption in the military and carry out reforms. After the August 2008 Russia-Georgia conflict revealed large-scale Russian military operational failures, the leadership became more determined to boost military capabilities. U.S. government and congressional policymakers are following the progress and goals of these reforms as they consider issues related to U.S.-Russia relations and U.S. national security interests. The reforms launched by Russian leadership called for reducing the total size of the armed forces from its size of 1.2 million in 2008 to under 1 million. Three major initiatives included accelerating planned cuts in the officer corps to reduce their numbers from 355,000 to a lateradjusted total of 220,000. The reforms also included revamping the training of noncommissioned officers to make them more effective and introducing military police, both aimed partly at boosting discipline in the barracks. The reforms aimed to reduce the four-tier command system of military districts, armies, divisions, and regiments to a two-tier system of strategic commands and fully manned brigades that could be quickly deployed for combat. A large-scale 10-year weapons modernization plan also was launched, and military budgets are being increased substantially. The weapons modernization plan prioritizes the procurement of new missiles and platforms to maintain strategic nuclear deterrence, but also includes new planes, helicopters, ships, missiles, and submarines for the Ground Forces, Air Force, Navy, and other arms of service. Russia's national security strategy, military doctrine, and some aspects of the military reforms reflect assessments by some Russian policymakers that the United States and NATO remain concerns, if not threats, to Russia's security. Other assessments, however, emphasize enhancing counter-terrorism capabilities and possibly hedges against the rise of China. Seeming to stress these latter concerns, in December 2008, Serdyukov asserted that the reforms were aimed at switching to a performance-capable, mobile, and maximally armed military ready to participate in at least three regional and local conflicts. Compared to Russia's previous attempts to revamp its armed forces, the current reform effort has gone further in altering the force structure and operations of the armed forces, according to most observers. However, the reforms face daunting delays, modifications, and setbacks. It remains highly uncertain whether Russia will be able to marshal the budgetary and demographic resources to field a substantially professional military with high readiness, as planned, or to modernize its ailing defense industries to obtain a new array of weaponry over the next 10 years. U.S. policymakers have maintained that Serdyukov's defense reforms pose both risks and opportunities for the United States and the West. While warning that Russian military programs are driven largely by Moscow's perception that the United States and NATO remain the greatest potential threats, U.S. policymakers also have raised the possibility that Russia's military reforms might in the future make it feel less strategically vulnerable and that it might participate more in international peacekeeping operations. In general, U.S. policymakers and others have urged a policy of hedging against these possible risks through countervailing diplomacy and defense efforts while also following an engagement policy with Russia to cooperate on global issues of mutual interest and to encourage Russia to democratize, respect human rights, and embrace pro-Western foreign policies.

2013

2016

La reforma militar rusa de 2008: ¿una respuesta adecuada a las amenazas y retos del siglo veintiuno? La réforme militaire russe de 2008: une réponse adéquate aux menaces et aux défis du XXIe siècle? A reforma militar russa de 2008: uma resposta adequada às ameaças e desafios do século XXI? Andres Eduardo Fernandez-Osorio a 2008 Russian military reform: An adequate response to global threats and challenges of the twenty-first century? *

Caucasian review of international affairs. online, 2008

After years of neglect due to financial constraints, the Russian military has entered a period of systemic development. The ongoing defense reform has introduced a few important changes, but so far the pace of the reform is slow. In order to review the current reform effort, a number of factors - the resistance of the military elite to reform, the demographic factor, the lack of a clear defense doctrine, the restructuring of the defense industry and the state of the civil control over the military - will be analyzed. These limitations will define not only the pace of the defense reform, but also Russia’s ability to play a more active role in the international arena.

Russia’s 2010 Military Doctrine highlighted NATO as a military danger to the Russian Federation. NATO was listed explicitly in first place among these dangers - specifically the “striving to ascribe global functions to the force capability of NATO, implemented in breach of international law, and bringing the military infrastructure of NATO member countries closer to the borders of the Russian Federation, including by means of enlarging the bloc”. Significantly for our interpretation of Russian statements, NATO is listed as a military danger not as a military threat. The distinction in Russian doctrinal lexicon is important – a “danger” is a situation with the potential “under certain conditions” to develop into an immediate military threat, rather than a threat per se. Clear definitions for both military threat and military danger are included in the Doctrine, as well as the distinction between military conflict and armed conflict. Previously to be found in other doctrinal statements, these definitions are essential for a precise understanding of the threat picture as expressed by official Russia. Other military dangers include deployment of foreign forces on territory adjacent to Russia and its allies, not only on land but also at sea; the creation of strategic missile defence forces; and the development of strategic non-nuclear precision weapons systems. Development of the Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO) is a fundamental task in deterring and preventing armed conflict, alongside cooperation with other international organisations including, interestingly, NATO. Russia will also contribute forces to the CSTO’s rapid reaction group and for deployment as CSTO peacekeepers. Furthermore, the CSTO’s collective defence provision, similar to but more binding than NATO’s Article 5, is now explicitly included in Russian doctrine. Despite widespread reporting that the new Doctrine would display increased readiness for first use of nuclear weapons, this provision is if anything subtly rolled back from the 2000 version of the Military Doctrine – instead of first use “in situations critical to the national security of the Russian Federation”, the criterion is now “when the very existence of the State is under threat”. The related provision promising no use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear states acting alone has been dropped. But Russia’s precise stance on nuclear use is detailed in a classified addendum to the Doctrine, so remains unclear. The provision for use of Russian forces overseas “to defend the interests of the Russian Federation and its citizens, and to protect international peace and security” is included. Operations overseas to remove threats or suppress aggression can also be undertaken at the instigation of the UN “or other bodies”. Preparation for mobilisation receives substantial attention, with several sections retained verbatim from the 2000 Doctrine and others new or re-drafted. These provisions concern both the economy and the military, with no regard to the substantial reorganisation of the military during 2009 towards permanent readiness and away from a mobilisation army. Information warfare (a concept which largely overlaps with what we might term cyber operations) is largely ignored in the Doctrine, except as a military danger and for the stipulation that the means to prosecute it must be developed. Meanwhile, the largely outdated Information Security Doctrine of 2000 remains in force.