Russia's A2/AD Capabilities: Real and Imagined

Scandinavian Journal of Military Studies

Anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) has turned very recently into a buzzword to define Russian strategy to limit, disrupt or even interdict NATO forces to reinforce the Baltic states in the case of an escalation between the alliance and Russia. This article puts in context how these discussions have re-emerged since 2014 and how Russia has developed a comprehensive defense system that effectively give the impression of impenetrable 'bubbles'. Yet, NATO has to cope with a not-so-new threat, being caught between two extremes: on the one hand, being serious and credible-maintaining its superior technological military edge and show-casing it by deploying troops and materials in contested areas, and on the other hand, being a defensive alliance, not giving any credit to the Russians by creating a dangerous spiral. This paper argues that it is time to develop a truly comprehensive counter-A2AD strategy, which would take several aspects: maintaining and expanding the reassurance measures (in the air, on the seas and on the ground), improve our doctrines to think big again (by recreating divisions and corps as maneuver units) and consider the need to be seen as a credible deterrent. These military aspects would be complemented by political and diplomatic considerations to ensure possible retaliatory measures, if Russia would further destabilize its neighborhood through an aggressive policy. What is at stake is NATO's being not just a resilient and adaptive organization facing todays's complex challenges, but its core ability to maintain, 70 years after its birth, the very notion of collective defense in which all the allies trust.

Torun International Studies, 2021

This article presents an analysis of the development of the Russian Anti Access/Anti Denial concept – A2/AD. The considerations contained in this article focus on identifying the threats that the Russian A2/AD concept creates for NATO and Poland. This article compiles empirical data from scientific publications, formal strategic and doctrinal documents, which allowed to define the A2/AD category, specify its essence and characterize it through the prism of military and non-military forces and resources engaged by Russia in several important operational regions: the Kaliningrad Oblast, Crimea, Syria and the Arctic.The aim of this article is to evaluate the Russian Anti-Access/Anti Denial concept from the perspective of the threats it creates for NATO and Poland.The obtained research results allow us to make the conclusion that when assessing the current external conditions, effective opposition to the Russian A2/AD by NATO will be very difficult to implement. Increasing the capabilit...

Journal of Strategic Security, 2021

Anti-Access/Area Denial (A2/AD) is a term that came into use to describe an environment in which an air and air defense force could use a combination of surface-launched ballistic missiles, surface and air launched cruise missiles and long-range surface-to-air missiles to prevent an opposing force from accessing or operating within a large airspace effectively. The descriptions and subsequent analyses of the penetrability of these environments often rests on assessments of the capabilities of just a few newly developed missiles and may fail to consider the additional complexity induced by the large array of the entire complement of air, land and sea launched missiles available to adversaries. This article will focus on Northern Europe as one example of the higher degrees of complexity that our air forces are likely to face should the need arise to fight and win in a 21st Century highly contested environment.

INTERNATIONAL AEGEAN SYMPOSIUMS ON SOCIAL SCIENCES & HUMANITIES-IV PROCEEDINGS BOOK, 2021

The aim of this study is to explain the doctrine of anti-access/area denial (A2/AD), which is frequently used in international security studies recently, and to examine this doctrine within the framework of A2/AD zones established by the Russian Federation (RF). The claim of the study is that the A2/AD zones, which are mostly put forward by the United States of America (USA) as RF and China's approaches that threaten international security, actually constitute the military dimension of the regional oppositions of RF and China against the global hegemony of the USA.

2017

The EU and NATO are facing an increasingly uncertain and complex situation on their eastern and southeastern borders. In what the EU has traditionally conceived as its 'shared neighbourhood' with Russia and NATO its 'eastern flank', Moscow is exhibiting a growingly assertive military posture. The context of the Baltic and the Black Sea regions differs, but Russia's actions in both seem to be part of the same strategy aiming to transform the European security order and its sustaining principles. The Kremlin seems to follow similar policies and tactics, mainly through the militarisation of the Kaliningrad Oblast and Crimea as the centrepiece of its strategy of power projection vis-à-vis NATO and the EU. An all-out war remains an unlikely scenario, but frictions or accidents leading to an unwanted and uncontrolled escalation cannot be completely ruled out. Tensions and military developments take place in both the Baltic and Black seas, but are not only about them. Russia is testing the Euro-Atlantic response and resilience at large. To assess how far it might be willing to go, it is necessary to evaluate how Russia perceives the West and its actions, taking into account the deep and entrenched clash of perceptions between Brussels and Moscow, and the worldview of the latter.

Survival, 2010

Anders Fogh Rasmussen, NATO Secretary-General, has repeatedly urged European and American leaders to collaborate with Russia in developing a comprehensive missile-defence architecture that would be jointly built and managed by Moscow and its new partners. He has pointed to continuing improvements in Iran's potential capacity to launch ballistic missiles armed with nuclear warheads as an emerging threat to all European countries, including Russia, and has warned that a failure to undertake a vigorous response could endanger Europeans' security. He has further argued that pursuing a joint NATO-Russia initiative could build a foundation for concrete security cooperation among the parties in other areas. Rasmussen's vision of 'one security roof that protects us all' extending 'from Vancouver to Vladivostok' is certainly bold, and his pessimistic threat assessment regarding Iran is now shared by many Western and Russian analysts. In principle, he is also correct that having 'one security roof would be a very strong political symbol that Russia is fully part of the Euro-Atlantic family … not outside, but very much inside'. 1 But past experience suggests that such extensive NATO-Russian cooperation on ballistic-missile defence (BMD) is highly unlikely, notwithstanding the recent upturn in NATO-Russia ties. Even the more limited BMD collaboration outlined in the article by Nikolai Sokov in this issue would be hard to realise unless several factors that have repeatedly disrupted past Russian-American attempts to sustain joint BMD initiatives can be overcome. 2

O veR The last few years, the Russian military has been undergoing a very visible active modernisation. While this constitutes an important change in its own right (since Russia remains a large military power with forces exceeding those of any of its individual neighbours), the most significant change is not to the size of the Russian military but to the nature of its forces: instead of being primarily structured for defensive operations, in case of a hypothetical large-scale military conflict (while also retaining the capability of carrying out operations in low-intensity conflicts), the Russian armed forces are now gaining an offensive-oriented structure, with capabilities tailored for large-scale war. At the same time, despite the painful military reforms undertaken after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the Russian General Staff have managed to preserve the core expertise related to planning large-scale conventional – that is, general non-nuclear – military operations. The country's military involvement in Ukraine (and later in Syria) demonstrated its ability to prepare and conduct – with the use of integrated conventional and sub-conventional means and tactics – precisely these types of operations. The retention of this capability on the Russian side clearly contrasts with the overwhelming concentration on counter-terrorism, peacekeeping and humanitarian operations that have been the main emphasis of Western militaries over the last fifteen years, to the detriment of their ability to conduct large-scale conventional operations. Taken together, these developments have resulted in Russia possessing both the means to conduct large-scale offensive operations in europe, and the planning skills and expertise necessary for the preparation and fulfilment of such operations. Combined with the Russian political leadership's obvious willingness to use these capabilities in an aggressive manner outside its frontiers – as manifested by the annexation of Crimea and subsequent destabilising actions in Ukraine's eastern regions, as well as the extensive military intervention in Syria – Russia's military build-up raises serious concerns about the stability and security of the european continent.

2019

The EU and NATO are facing an increasingly uncertain and complex situation on their eastern and south-eastern borders. In what the EU has traditionally conceived as its ‘shared neighbourhood’ with Russia and NATO its ‘eastern flank’, Moscow is exhibiting a growingly assertive military posture. The context of the Baltic and the Black Sea regions differs, but Russia’s actions in both seem to be part of the same strategy aiming to transform the European security order and its sustaining principles. The Kremlin seems to follow similar policies and tactics, mainly through the militarisation of the Kaliningrad Oblast and Crimea as the centrepiece of its strategy of power projection vis-à-vis NATO and the EU. An all-out war remains an unlikely scenario, but frictions or accidents leading to an unwanted and uncontrolled escalation cannot be completely ruled out. Tensions and military developments take place in both the Baltic and Black seas, but are not only about them. Russia is testing the Euro-Atlantic response and resilience at large. To assess how far it might be willing to go, it is necessary to evaluate how Russia perceives the West and its actions, taking into account the deep and entrenched clash of perceptions between Brussels and Moscow, and the worldview of the latter.