THE STATE AND DEMOCRACY

2009

Teka Komisji Prawniczej PAN Oddział w Lublinie [Teka Commission of Legal Sciences Polish Academy of Sciences Branch in Lublin], vol. 9, 84-99, 2016

This article discusses two basic concepts in scientific legal discourse – the concept of democracy and the concept of the rule of law. Obviously, both concepts are inextricably linked to the concept of the state of law (legal state). The necessary condition for the rule of law is the existence of the legal order, but it should be emphasised that one may link the idea of the rule of law to either the theory of the separation of powers or the theory of the sovereignty of the people. The author’s analy-sis concerns vertical and horizontal relationships between, in particular, the concept of the rule of law and the concept of the state and law. The author also considers the question of the binding force of legal norms. The thesis that the author makes is that, although there is a relationship between these concepts, one should also point out that both democracy without parliamentarianism and parliamen-tarianism without democracy are possible. Likewise, dictatorship does not essentially contradict democracy, which was emphasised especially by Jean- Jacques Rousseau, just like democracy does not necessarily rule out dictatorship.

In the discipline of international relations, the balance which was expected to be established in the 21st century between the hegemony of the state and social forces has failed to materialize, and the hegemonic structure of the state continues to maintain its supremacy. In nation-states unable to reconcile the conceptual principles of hegemony and the rule of law, the effects of this issue continue to increase and this is the most important reason political and social issues are unsolvable. In this article, the author highlights the relationship between state sovereignty and violence, the oppression of material forces and social forces, and the importance of being transformed from a nation-state to a democratic state.

2018

Current threats and developments raise the question whether democracy still functions. This chapter provides a philosophical analysis of democracy as a political regime and as a ‘form’ of society. The essence of democracy will be addressed by using the ideas of Lefort and Arendt; while the concept of a ‘regime’ is studied by analysing key texts of Plato and Aristotle, stating that this regime constitutes a society that is open to the possibility. The ‘openness’ of democracy is then compared to the ontological inversion of the Aristotelian ontology by Heidegger; democratic openness is an openness to the unexpected and the possible. This means that this ‘possibility’ can also be undemocratic. Therefore, the ‘Weimarian’ debate between Kelsen and Schmitt on a ‘constitutional dictatorship’ is discussed, that is a dictatorship in its classical sense (as a Roman legal concept), in order to defend the state and the legal order during a state of emergency. This chapter will, however, argue f...

Constellations, 1996

I would like to sketch a proceduralist view of democracy and deliberative politics which differs in relevant aspects from both the liberal and the republican paradigm. Let me (1) remind you the opposite features of these two established models. I will then (2) introduce a new proceduralist conception by way of a critique of the "ethical overload" of the republican view. The last part of the paper further elaborates (3) the three normative models of democracy by comparing their corresponding images of state and society.

State power in modern society: the problems of understanding and investigation, 2018

The article analyzes the problems associated with the understanding of state power, as well as theoretical and methodological innovations and research tools used in the study of this political and legal phenomenon. The authors analyze various directions of the legal, political and socio-cultural definition of state power, identify and discuss various dimensions and levels in the conceptualization of the latter. In the context of the paper, the government is as a complex political and legal phenomenon, considered as a specific type of general system of public authority, which is implemented by various political subjects, which have a rigid link to the socio-cultural and territorial space.

2011

Contributions in the normative debate on the legitimacy of the EU are frequently based on two premises: The first premise is that the principles of the democratic constitutional state represent the normative ideal of political rule in the nation-state, but cannot justify the legitimacy of the EU. Consequently, it is claimed that "there is an urgent need to re-set the standards by which we assess the legitimacy of European integration and of the institutions which guide the process" (Majone). This implies a second premise, namely, that the validity of the norms to which "our" assessment of the legitimacy of political rule refers, could be "re-set" via an academic consensus. The paper seeks two counter both of these assumptions, which are assumptions about the structure of the interpretive pattern regarding the legitimacy of political rule. It claims to show an internal contradiction in the type of normative justification that aims to overcome a "touch of stateness" (Shaw/Wiener) by explaining the EU's legitimacy with its assumed non-statal character. To this aim, it presents a detailed hemeneutical analysis of one example of this type, Joseph H. H. Weiler's normative justification of the EU. Weiler explains the legitimacy of the EU with its non-statal constitutional architecture embodying a principle of "constitutional tolerance". However, the analysis reveals that Weiler's justification implicitly presupposes certain features for the EU which he has rejected before as essential elements of the ideal of the democratic constitutional state: a legal citizenship, hierarchically superior European law, and the principle of popular sovereignty. The paper concludes that this can be seen as an indicator speaking against the two premises: the principles of the democratic constitutional state seem to make-up a central component of "our" understanding of legitimate political rule in the nation-state as well as in the context of the EU.

DergiPark (Istanbul University), 2021

At the heart of modern society and states is the concept of the rule of law as a fundamental principle. In the context of Stoicism, it is considered as a moral principle and Roman legal philosophy for removing arbitrariness from political judgments, practices, and processes. Accordingly, this article's main goal is to examine the phenomenon of modern states, which began in Europe but has since spread to many other regions of the world, in terms of the rule of law as this notion is the basis for all modern states (i.e., positive law). A comparative study is conducted in this regard in order to compare and contrast Western legal precedents such as Stoicism, Rechtsstaat [rule of law], also known as État de droit in French and Stato di diritto in Italian, with respect to its philosophical and historical development over time. The relevant literature was analyzed in order to determine the best method. In this framework, the study explores the notions of Rechtsstaat as the German, État de droit as the French, and Stato di diritto as the Italian philosophy of law.

Critique, 2006

ABSTRACT This article explores Walter Benjamin's insight according to which the tradition of the oppressed teaches us that the State of emergency is not the exception but the rule. The liberal state tradition, and not just its authoritarian wing, understands this well and does indeed conceive of the state as the executive committee of the bourgeoisie. The neo-liberal conception of laissez-faire does not extend to the state. Laissez-faire is no response to riots. That is to say, neo-liberalism does not view dictatorship as the opposite to the liberal democratic state but sees it instead as a means that safeguards the ends of the rule of law in the face of democratic pressures.