Bring Back Substances!

Substance and Attribute, 1978

A lot of words investigated by philosophers get their inception for conventional or extra-philosophical dialect. Yet the idea of substance is basically a philosophical term of art. Its employments in normal dialect tend to derive, often in a twisted way, different from its philosophical usage. Despite this, the idea of substance differs from philosophers, reliant upon the school of thought in which it is been expressed. There is an ordinary concept in play when philosophers discuss " substance " , and this is seen in the concept of object, or thing when this is contrasted with properties, attributes or events. There is also a difference in view when in the sense that while the realists would develop a materialistic theory of substance, the idealist would develop a metaphysical theory of substance. The problem surrounding substance spans through the history of philosophy. The queries have often been what is substance of? And can there be substance without its attributes? This paper tends to expose the historical problems surrounding substance. This paper criticizes the thinking which presupposes that there could be a substance without its attributes or substance existing alone. This paper adopts complimentary ontology principles which state that for anything to exist, it must serve as a missing connection to reality. This suggests that everything interconnects to each other and substance cannot exist in isolation.

Halifax, N.S. : Saint Mary's University, 2019

This thesis explores the ontology of relations and the implications of it. I make the case that relations between multiple substances are impossible. Furthermore, I argue that existence is a predicate, and can therefore be the predicate of a relation. I do this to push the argument that substances cannot exist in relation to each other. The conclusion I make from this is that only one substance can exist, since otherwise a substance could exist in relation to another substance. This conclusion, I point out, is the doctrine of substance monism. Furthermore, I argue that the self exists, because it is given in experience. Because the self is a substance, and I have argued for substance monism, the self is the only substance there is. This conclusion is idealism, and, in conjunction with substance monism, necessitates solipsism.

Descartes’s interrelated theories of attributes and conceptual distinction (or rational distinction) are developed. This follows Nolan (1997) in identifying substances and their attributes as they exist apart from the mind’s concepts. This resource is then used to articulate a solution to a famous problem about Descartes’s concept of substance. The key is that the concept of substance is itself to be regarded as an attribute of independently existing things.

Quaderns de Filosofia, 2015

I defend in this paper the following two theses: first, that Descartes was a Pluralist as regards extended substances, that is, that for him the extended world includes a plurality of bodies, including ordinary objects, each of which may be adequately described as a substance; and that for him the notion of substance is a rather slim notion, making no specific requirements as regards individuation or persistence conditions, and determining therefore no strict constraints on the kind of material objects that may count as substances. In short, I will be arguing for a certain view concerning the extension of the phrase ‘extended substance’ by defending a specific view of what ‘substance’ means.Keywords: substance, body, Monism, dependence

Journal of Philosophical Research, 2014

African Journal of Basic & Applied Sciences 8 (1): 55-62, 2016

Down through the ages, the human person has been encapsulated in wonder. This wonder is not only intrinsically but also extrinsically motivated. Everything around the human person is a mystery to him. The human mind was uneasy facing the mysteries of life and the universe at large. The reality of change has constituted a serious puzzle to a rational mind. The question now is: What is it that remains despite the series of changes that we observe in the universe? To calm such uneasiness, philosophers have come up to address one of the most fundamental problems in the history of philosophy: the metaphysical problem of substance. Therefore employing the philosophical method of critical analysis, this study is set to critically analyze the metaphysical notion of substance via the views of some selected philosophers. This paper observes that in order to understand any being, it is important to have an idea about the nature of the substance of that being. Also, the study further notes that for there to be any scientific investigation, one must have an idea of the substance (the object of investigation).

I defend in this paper the following two theses: first, that Descartes was a Pluralist as regards extended substances, that is, that for him the extended world includes a plurality of bodies, including ordinary objects, each of which may be adequately described as a substance; and that for him the notion of substance is a rather slim notion, making no specific requirements as regards individuation or persistence conditions, and determining therefore no strict constraints on the kind of material objects that may count as substances. In short, I will be arguing for a certain view concerning the extension of the phrase ‘extended substance’ by defending a specific view of what ‘substance’ means.

Leibniz's Key Philosophical Writings, 2020

The 1695 publication of the “New System of the Nature of Substances and their Communication, and of the Union which Exists between the Soul and the Body” in the June 27 and July 4 issues of the Parisian Journal des sçavans marks an important milestone in Leibniz’s philosophical trajectory. It presented the first comprehensive public presentation of his metaphysics as it had matured over the preceding decades, and it would spark many lively exchanges and debates between Leibniz and his philosophical contemporaries in the decades to come. This chapter provides background regarding the text’s genesis and reception, and introduces its main philosophical themes. After highlighting some interpretative challenges raised by both the “New System’s” form and philosophical content, I go on to explore two key elements of the metaphysical picture it advances: Leibniz’s account of individual substances, and his theory of the pre-established harmony between them.