Comments to Maria Baghramian and Annalisa Coliva’s “Relativism”

Relativism: New Problems of Philosophy, 2019

One of the difficulties facing a book aiming to discuss and assess the various arguments for and against relativism is that there is no firm consensus on how relativism should be characterised, let alone defined. The difficulty is compounded by the fact that relativism has frequently been defined more clearly by its opponents rather than by its defenders. A further difficulty facing discussions of relativism is that relativism comes in many varieties and falls into several sub-categories, so any generalised assessments and criticisms of the thesis cannot be very informative or effective. These difficulties will become evident in Chapter 2, in our sketch of the history of relativism, as well as in our assessments of some of the core contemporary debates surrounding it. This chapter, however, attempts to address these difficulties in a preliminary fashion by outlining some core general features of relativism. Section 1.1 attempts to provide a unified account of relativism by outlining a cluster of core features that we think are central to the characterization of all instances of relativism. In section 1.2, we attempt to motivate relativism by outlining some of the reasons why, despite a long history of critical reactions, and indeed in the face of such criticisms, philosophers, and even non-philosophers have found relativism an appealing option. We also connect these motivating reasons to the discussions of the core features of relativism in 1.1. In Section 3, we outline and briefly discuss some varieties of and subcategories of relativism and thus provide a roadmap both to the topic and to this book.

Analysis, 2022

One could say of relativism what Hermann Ebbinghaus once observed with respect to psychology: to wit, that it has a "long past but a short history" (1908, 3). Although relativistic motifs have always played a significant role in philosophy, their systematic investigation-and thus the explicit formulation of different forms and strengths of relativism-is a child only of the twentieth century. Perhaps one could even maintain that most of the really important, detailed and systematic work on relativism was done by philosophers alive today. This volume documents both the long past and the short history of relativism.

ABSTRACT Relativism: a conceptual analysis Vittorio Villa In my paper I will try, in the first part, to give a conceptual definition of relativism, with the aim of singling out the possible basic elements common to all the most relevant relativist conceptions. In conformity with my definition, we have to qualify as “relativistic” all the conceptions according to which all or a relevant part of – cognitive, semantic, ethic, cultural, etc. - criteria and beliefs are necessary dependent on a given context (paradigm, culture, language, conceptual scheme, etc.) that is by its turn chosen as point of reference. From this point of view it is “absolutism” which stands in radical opposition to relativism. In the second part of the paper I will deal with some important critical observations which have been recurrently aroused against relativism. From this point of view, a quite serious problem arises from the fact that many relativists would like to have the chance, at least in some important cases, of expressing some objective judgments, for instance in terms of ethically “right” or “wrong”, or in terms of empirically “true” or “false”. In the third part of my paper, in order to answer to this difficulty, I will propose a sketch of a viable and coherent relativistic conception: a conception that doesn’t incorporate at all absolutist elements and that nevertheless could be able to explain the presence of a common core of criteria and beliefs in all our conceptual schemes and beliefs. Two distinctions are of particular importance here: firstly, the distinction between local conceptual schemes and long term frameworks, through which it is possible to clarify that even the most stable and consolidated beliefs common to our conceptual schemes are after all relative; secondly, the distinction between environment (the commonly shared source of our stimulations and perceptions) and world (the subject of our linguistic and theoretical representations, which is always a human construction). Through this last distinction it becomes possible, in my opinion, to speak, even inside a coherent relativist epistemological conception, of the existence of an objective reality. Vittorio Villa

Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society: Supplementary Volume, 2019

What is it about relativism that justifies, or at least explains, its continued appeal in the face of relentless attacks through the history of philosophy? This paper explores a new answer to this old question, casting the response in metaphilosophical terms. §i introduces the problem. §ii argues 10 that one part of the answer is that some of the well-known defences of relativism take it to be a philosophical stance-that is, a broad perspective or orientation with normative consequences-rather than a doctrine or a thesis. §iii draws attention to an assumption, not always explicitly stated by its proponents, that the relativist stance leads to the cultivation 15 of some key intellectual virtues. Open-mindedness, tolerance, intellectual humility, and curiosity are examples of the intellectual virtues that relativ-ism can foster. §iv argues that the defence of relativism on the basis of the virtues that are assumed to follow from it, at best, is only partially successful. Moreover, there is a range of epistemic vices, resulting from the 20 stance, that undercuts the virtue-based defence presented in §iii.

Eidos, 2010

This paper comments on Maria Baghramian's study 'The Virtues of Relativism'. We agree that some relativist positions are naturally couched as 'stances' and that it is fruitful to connect relativism to virtue epistemology. But I argue against Baghramian's claims that relativism is committed to "equal validity" or to 'anything goes'.