THE HISTORY OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN TANZANIA

Simeon Olaosebikan Oni, Ph.D, 2023

The concept of human rights is eroneously believed to have its origin in the West and that it was 'imported' into Africa. The question is: Did the indigenous African communities possess or know anything about human rights? If the answer is No, how then is human rights a global concept if the continent of Africa truly had no idea of human rights? The negative picture painted by the West concerning the concept of human rights is that it is alien to the indegenous African political system. They postulate that the African concept of justice has little or no regard for human rights. The ideal concept of human rights was missing not only in non-western traditions but also in western societies. The pro-African writers believe that the concept of human rights is given better expression than the then neo-colonial States. The Westernview that the customs and traditions of the pre-colonial African communities knew nothing like human rights is jaundiced and considered as another Western attempt to discredit, subjugate and re-colonise Africa. This paper shall examine the degree of compliance of Africa with the universal human rights concept and suggest appropriate recommendations to make African concept of human rights to be more proactive where necessary.

This work critically examines African notion of rights. The conception of human right in Africa is deeply rooted in African world view and belief system. This work adopts the theory of natural rights and secondary sources to explain the notion of rights in Africa. The findings revealed that, Africans had a system of human rights and specific provisions of human rights such as right to land, life, and political participation even before Europe became civilized. These rights were preserved in various African traditional, constitutional and customary laws. Human rights in the pre-colonial Africa (Tiv political system) encompass both rights and obligation, which provides the community with cohesion and strength. This notion of right was built largely around the conception of duty which requires the individual to place the community and the common good before individual satisfaction. The work recommends that these rights as conceived by Africans should be integrated in nation's constitution so that the citizen can live minimal good life in their domains.

2020

The root of most Human Rights discussions in Africa stems from the input of the west. This tracing of everything human right in Africa to sources outside Africa gives the impression that the idea of the better morality, better religion, better idea of right as distinct from wrong and better idea of human rights was introduced by foreign forces into our “barbaric practice and tradition”. The writer as a prelude to our discussion will be examining the concepts "Africa" and “human rights”, going further to refute the erroneous assertion as evidenced supra that human rights is a relatively new concept to Africa, concluding the discussion with a subtle outlook of the African Charter.

Human rights are considered to be entitlements due to every man, woman, and child as members of the human family. These rights have been codified to inform, guide, and restrict human interaction on a global scale. They include the security of the person; the right not to be deprived of life or liberty; the right not to be tortured or subjected to cruel or inhumane or degrading treatment or punishment; the right not to be held in slavery or servitude; the freedom of thought, conscience, and religion to name a few. In addition there are economic, social, and cultural rights such as the right to food, shelter, health care, and social services; the right to work; the right to education; and the right to water i . Moreover, these rights are nonderogable, in that their violation can never be justified, even in a state of national emergency.

Human Rights Review, 2004

The article discusses the problems in applying the African concept of human rights in practice in relation to human rights protection and violations in Africa. First, the article analyzes the plausibility of the philosophical and political foundations of African redefinition of human rights based on traditional African collectivist values which tries to, on the one hand, fulfill global democratic demands and, on the other hand, to promote cultural integrity and traditional values of communal responsibility, egalitarianism, and solidarity. Second, the article brings out the problems that occur in applying the African concept of human rights into legal and political practice.

I begin with some typical criticisms of Human Rights, put forward in African ethics, to identify problems that have been raised against a dominant Western account, due to its normative grounding in an overly individualistic conception of human personhood. I also give an overview of alternative accounts put forward by African philosophers, such as Kwame Gyekye and Thaddeus Metz, who ground Human Rights in distinctively African ontologies of personhood. I then explain how Western philosophers such as Edmund Burke, Karl Marx and TH Green, raised similar criticisms against natural rights to those raised by African philosophers against Human Rights. From this discussion, I argue against switching one account of personhood for another, in favour of a rights recognition thesis. In sum, to better attend to the problem of Western bias in social contract theory, identified by African thinkers, and to avoid naturalising the universality of Human Rights, I develop a rights recognition thesis to account for the normative foundations for universal Human Rights based on an explicitly and distinctively African social contract.

Human Rights & Human Welfare, 2001

The title of this book is somewhat more expansive than its contents. The author, a native Ghanaian who holds a Ph.D. from the University of Tennessee and teaches government at South Texas College, reports on an interesting study of human rights/human dignity conceptualizations among the Akan people of Ghana. The Akan constitute about 60% of Ghana's 14 million people and consist of five major groups: Fanti, Ashanti, Akim, Brong, and Akwapim. A sizable Akan population also lives in the Ivory Coast. The author maintains that because the Akan share fundamental values and social structure with many other African peoples, the conclusions of this study can be generalized to Sub-Saharan Africa.