Jurisprudence_Or_Legal

Rechtsgeschichte - Legal History, 2021

Acta Juridica Hungarica, 2009

Surveying the ways-along with the whys and hows-of connecting law and philosophising, as contrasted to the appearances of modern formal law, it is concluded that in the final analysis law is a façon de parler-a specific communication, or game carried out in an open scene-, an actual event, if one played by humans practicing whilst simultaneously referencing it. The contemporary outcome of reflection upon its developments is (1) the reduction of legal philosophising to discourse-reconstruction, in terms of which instead of the issue of "what is it?", "all that notwithstanding: how can it be achieved?" is usually raised; (2) the unresolved enigma of natural law, calling for axiology to define at least some foundational standards as stepping stones (albeit without a claim that any statement has genuinely concluded from them or been subordinated to them, as in the classical era when natural law and positive law were at odds); and (3) positive law without legal positivism, according to which a new synthesis and correlation amongst humans' natural, societal and intellectual worlds is expected to be reached. At the same time, flourishing at the peripheries, a genuine foundation is coming to the fore, in order to suitably respond to global challenges.

American Journal of International Law, 1986

The Encyclopedia of Christianity, ed. Erwin Fahlbusch, 2003

This Article provides a brief analysis of the main shifts in Western law and legal theory in four watershed Enlightenment of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. It shows how major shifts in dominant religious ideas transformed the legal ideas and institutions of their day. It concludes that, although recent secular movements have removed traditional forms of religious influence on Western law, contemporary Western law still retains important connections with Christian and other religious ideas and institutions.

Law and Method, 2012

1995

Even a cursory reading of the course catalogues of most American law schools indicates that the number of "theory" courses available in the curriculum has increased. So, too, has the number of faculty members with advanced degrees in academic fields. Among those without advanced degrees, moreover, the commitment to interdisciplinary scholarship and instruction appears to be at an all time high. The (more or less "high") theory invasion has not been restricted to electives and advanced courses. Discussions of justice, efficiency, interpretive theory, and the sociology of knowledge are now familiar in basic torts, contracts, procedure, constitutional law, and criminal law courses. Recently, claims on behalf of the role of theory in the law school classroom have come under attack. The critics do not deny that some theory is valuable. They deny, however, that much of it is relevant to the careers that law students are likely to pursue. They also have doubts about the balance currently being struck between the legal and the theoretical components of the curriculum. 1 My remarks are intended to defend the teaching of theory in the core of the law school curriculum. It is not enough that theory be set aside for an advanced course in jurisprudence or a seminar on problems of race and gender in the law. Considerations of efficiency and justice are not just windows through which we can assess or reform existing law, they are important standards of law. Indeed, the view that such standards are not law is itself a theoretical claim about the nature of law. The truth of that claim cannot be presupposed by the law school curriculum. Part of the point of the curriculum is to provide students with the framework and skill for evaluating its truth. Kant famously held that theory and practice are inconceivable without one another. He may or may not have been right. Nevertheless, legal theory is both instrumentally and intrinsically valuable. It is instrumentally valuable insofar as it contributes to or enhances actual legal practice. It is intrinsically valuable in two ways. First, it is an aspect of the integrity of * John A. Garver Professor of Jurisprudence and Philosophy, Yale University. I would like to thank several individuals for extremely useful discussions that have contributed to my thinking on several of the key aspects of this essay. These include

Research Handbook on the Sociology of Law, 2020