Causality, antinomies, and Kant's way to the Critique

Synthese, 2014

Interpreters have found it exceedingly difficult to understand how Hume could be right in claiming that his two definitions of 'cause' are essentially the same. As J. A. Robinson points out, the definitions do not even seem to be extensionally equivalent. Don Garrett offers an influential solution to this interpretative problem, one that attributes to Hume the reliance on an ideal observer. I argue that the theoretical need for an ideal observer stems from an idealized concept of definition, which many interpreters, including Garrett, attribute to Hume. I argue that this idealized concept of definition indeed demands an unlimited or infinite ideal observer. But there is substantial textual evidence indicating that Hume disallows the employment of idealizations in general in the sciences. Thus Hume would reject the idealized concept of definition and its corresponding ideal observer. I then put forward an expert-relative reading of Hume's definitions of 'cause', which also renders both definitions extensionally equivalent. On the expert-relative reading, the meaning of 'cause' changes with better observations and experiments, but it also allows Humean definitions to play important roles within our normative practices. Finally, I consider and reject Henry Allison's argument that idealized definitions and their corresponding infinite minds are necessary for expert reflection on the limitations of current science.

International Journal of Arts and Humanities (IJAH), 2019

This work is a critical exposition of the core aspects of Hume's empiricist epistemological views. The epistemological problem of the origin, scope and certainty of knowledge was a subject of fierce debate between the Continental Rationalists and the British Empiricists. While the rationalists argued for the supremacy of reason, the empiricists stood for experience. As an empiricist Hume believed that certain knowledge is only gained through experience which consists of sensations, emotions and passions. Hume reduced the contents of the mind to perception which he divided into impressions and ideas. He also copiously addressed the idea of causality questioning the impressions that provide one with such an idea. This work employing the critical and expository methods surveyed the key points in Hume's discussion on perception and the association of ideas as well as Hume's analysis of the idea of causality. It gave a background of the empiricists project before presenting his epistemological theory of perception. The work further treated Hume's position with regard to the association of ideas and his analysis of causality. In the area of causality, the work critically looked at Hume's consideration of temporal succession, contiguity and necessary connection. In conclusion the work praised Hume's courageous, rigorous and consistent empiricist stance whose intensity led to a skeptic logical conclusion which is a necessary "antidote to dogmatism and fanaticism."

A specter is haunting Hume scholarship: the specter of the “New Hume.” Contrary to more traditional interpretations, according to which Hume rejects belief in any conception of causation that invokes (metaphysically) necessary connections between distinct existences, proponents of the New Hume hold that Hume at the least allowed for the possibility of such connections—it’s just that he thought we couldn’t know much, if anything, about them, if we assume that they do exist. I will argue that the views of the “New Humers” (as I shall call them) are mistaken. I will begin by discussing their reading of Hume on causation, using Galen Strawson as a foil. I then examine the relation between Hume’s view of relations (pun intended) and his account of “necessary connexions”. Next, I argue that this account, once properly understood, shows that he did not believe in what we would think of as necessary connections while at the same time explaining why, as the New Humers point out, Hume sometimes writes in ways that can make it sound like he does, as well as reconciling Hume’s two definitions of causation. After that, I answer objections, and then raise some doubts about Hume’s account before finally concluding the paper.

An Enquiry Concerning Humean Understanding: A Criticism of Hume's Conception of Causal Events In An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, Hume provides an empirical account of knowledge that hinges upon the Copy Principle. The Copy Principle states that for every idea there is a corresponding impression or set of impressions that gives rise to the idea itself or its component ideas. With this foundation, Hume criticizes the idea that we have access to causation as the necessary connection between cause and effect. Considering the collision of two billiard balls, Hume identifies no sensory impression from which we copy our notion of causation. Therefore, he concludes that we perceive nothing in the collision that necessitates the outcome,

The European Legacy, 2013

This article shows that in 1.4.2.15-24 of the Treatise of Human Nature, Hume presents his own position on objects, which is to be distinguished from both the vulgar and philosophical conception of objects. Here, Hume argues that objects that are effectively imagined to have a “perfect identity” are imagined due to the constancy and coherence of our perceptions (what we may call ‘level 1 constancy and coherence’). In particular, we imagine that objects cause such perceptions, via what I call ‘indirect causation.’ In virtue of imagining ideas of objects that have a perfect identity, our perceptions seem to be even more constant and coherent (what we may call ‘level 2 constancy and coherence’). Thus, in addition to seeing that Hume is presenting his own position on objects in this section of the Treatise, we see that he is working with a previously unrecognized kind of causation, i.e., indirect causation, and that he has two kinds of constancy and coherence in mind: level 1 and level 2.

Most of us perceive Hume as a sceptic regarding objective existence of causal powers or a necessary connexion between cause and effect, as well as a sceptic about objective existence of any secret powers of nature. However, in recent decades, there are many articles and books that with this traditional interpretation diverge. These interpreters, including in particular Galen Strawson, John P. Wright, Peter Kail and to some extent also Simon Blackburn, denote Hume a realist regarding causal powers in nature, so-called capital-C Causes. This new interpretation is being called The New Hume Debate, according to the book, which maps fundamental articles of this debate. The aim of this paper is not only to provide a general characteristic of this new interpretation and its main arguments, but especially to highlight some problems which the new interpretation has to face.

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Nous, 1998

Both Kant and Hume considered the notion of necessary connection to be a crucial component of our concept of causality. Writing in Treatise I.iii.2, Hume remarked, Shall we then rest contented with these two relations of contiguity and succession, as affording a compleat idea of causation? By no means. An object may be contiguous and prior to another, without being consider'd as its cause. There is a NECESSARY CONNEXION to be taken into consideration; and that relation is of much greater importance, than any of the other two above-mention'd. @T: 77# 1 Kant agreed with this claim. Indeed, it was precisely because he thought that Hume had failed to provide for any real sense of necessary connection that he considered Hume to have launched an attack~Angriff ! on the concept of causality and thereby on the whole of metaphysics~Prolegomena 257:14-258:9!. 2 the concept of a cause so obviously contains the concept of a necessity of the connection with an effect and a strict universality of the rule, that it would be completely lost if one wanted to try, like Hume, to derive it from a frequent conjunction of that which happens with that which precedes it, and a consequent tendency to associate representations~hence, a merely subjective necessity!. @B5#

We give a brief introduction of Hume’s epistemology and his penetrating analysis of causality. It is pointed out that there are some flaws in his epistemology and his theory of causation. Alternative theories of causation are then briefly introduced. Partly inspired by Hume’s analysis of necessary connexion, we present a new argument of causation. We argue that Hume’s removing necessary connexion from causality can help to provide a promising way to unify the law of causality and indeterminism. We then propose a generalized principle of causality, according to which there are two kinds of causes: concrete causes and universal causes, and correspondingly there are two kinds of effects: lawful events and random events. Each actual effect is composed of both lawful element and random element. A detailed analysis of the motion of objects is also given to support the new principle.

2009

The goal of this dissertation is to follow the discussion about causation on David Hume's philosophy. First, I try to show how such concept was treated by previous philosophers that might somehow have influenced Hume. I then analyze his contribution to the subject up to the point in which he introduces the idea of necessary connection. The final part of the work is aimed at studying the most important interpretative branches that try to make sense of Hume's ambiguous statements about necessary connection, and the implications the correct understanding of this concept has for his theory of causation.

2012

The research is related to David Hume. This philosopher is described as being an empiricist, but it should be noted that the empiricism promoted by Hume represents the development up to the final consequences of this philosophical doctrine that should be subjected to the observability requirement. The core problem for Hume’s philosophy is the difficulty of causality thinking. The Scottish philosopher promotes a moderate and inconsistent skepticism because he does not doubt the permanency of facts. The Humean epistemology is mixed with elements belonging to some naïve ontology of a materialistic nature and with elements of a sensualistic psychology of an associationist type. The causality or the causal connection between events is based on a psychological belief, which has a pragmatic end for people, in that it offers us the psychological comfort of habitual events and the familiar existential. Causality refers to certain events that have already happened in a certain way, but it can...