Why We Enjoy Coincidences

Qualitative Research, 2019

In this article we develop an approach to coincidences as discursive activities. To illustrate the range of empirical questions that can be explored in the analysis of coincidence accounts, we examine one single written account, which was submitted to a website of a research project to investigate the statistical dimensions of coincidence experiences. Our analysis is broadly ethnomethodological in that we examine this single case to identify how structural and narrative components work to constitute the recognizably coincidental quality of the events so described. The analysis identifies a mirror structure that resembles chiasmus, a figurative device found in classical texts. The analysis also describes how the account is designed to address inferential matters related to the site to which it was submitted. In the discussion we reflect on the implications of this approach for other approaches to coincidence.

Coincidence and Mysteries of the World. Unbelievable Incidents

Journal of Scientific Exploration

Sharon Rawlette’s offering to those appreciative (even enamoured) of the fickle, unpredictable, and mystifying world of coincidences, is a mammoth tome of 600+ pages ambitiously bearing the title The Source and Significance of Coincidences. As the title suggests, Rawlette seeks to explain who or what might cause coincidences (these explanations are far-ranging), and she endeavours to point out what they mean (usually they only have a positive spin). Right from the outset, Rawlette gives the term coincidence its own special definition, but anyone steeped in the Jungian tradition cannot help but see that Rawlette’s brand of coincidence runs parallel with Jung’s (1952/1969) meaningful coincidence, better known as synchronicity. The many examples she gives fit the bill, and they don’t require an overly flexible turn of mind to see it, but Rawlette insists on distinguishing her type of coincidences from paranormal experiences (‘telepathic messages’), after-death (discarnate) communicatio...

The book in question is being revised so as to present a more unified whole consisten with the title of the book.

Axiomathes, 2022

It is a common opinion that chance events cannot be understood in causal terms. Conversely, according to a causal view of chance, intersections between independent causal chains originate accidental events, called ''coincidences.'' The present paper takes into proper consideration this causal conception of chance and tries to shed new light on it. More precisely, starting from Hart and Honoré's view of coincidental events (Hart and Honoré in Causation in the Law. Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1959), this paper furnishes a more detailed account on the nature of coincidences, according to which coincidental events are hybrids constituted by ontic (physical) components, that is the intersections between independent causal chains, plus epistemic aspects; where by ''epistemic'' we mean what is related, in some sense, to knowledge: for example, access to information, but also expectations , relevance, significance, that is psychological aspects. In particular, this paper investigates the role of the epistemic aspects in our understanding of what coincidences are. In fact, although the independence between the causal lines involved plays a crucial role in understanding coincidental events, that condition results to be insufficient to give a satisfactory definition of coincidences. The main target of the present work is to show that the epistemic aspects of coincidences are, together with the independence between the intersecting causal chains, a constitutive part of coincidental phenomena. Many examples are offered throughout this paper to enforce this idea. This conception, despite-for example-Antoine Augustine Cournot and Jacques Monod's view, entails that a pure objectivist view about coincidences is not tenable.

2015

This article was published in The Australian Journal of Parapsychology, June 2015, Vol. 15, No. 1, pp. 53-79. A coincidence can be broadly defined as ‘a notable co-occurrence of events’ which may have causal or non-causal origins. Some coincidences have discernible causal connections, though these may be quite subtle and complex. Others are clearly attributable to the random play of chance or luck, while certain ostensibly random coincidences can be distinguished by the numinosity and meaning they hold for the individual involved. C. G. Jung coined the term synchronicity for such coincidences. However, there is currently no generally accepted overarching theoretical framework that deals comprehensively and inclusively with the several disparate categories under which different sorts of coincidences might be appropriately classified. Just as planets and stars appear as points of light in the night sky and are indistinguishable to the untrained eye, so coincidences may seem on the surface to be all of one kind. This, unfortunately, has led to a tendency towards either/or explanations to account for them, a situation exacerbated by the ideological and metaphysical presumptions that have historically been equated with particular explanations. This state of affairs is not made any easier by the very real difficulties that occur both in terms of accurate gathering of information in regard to coincidences and also to the analysis itself. Some of the pertinent issues involved will be explored in this article, with a particular focus on synchronicity, for it is with respect to this intriguing concept that much of the confusion lies.

2019

This article was published in The Australian Journal of Parapsychology, June 2019, Vol. 19, No. 1, pp. 45-75. A coincidence, which we can define as ‘a notable co-occurrence of events’, is fairly common in everyday life, though interpretations as to why coincidences occur, or what they mean, most certainly differ. There are a number of books on coincidences and a number of theories as well as to what they might or might not mean, from mathematical probability to Jungian synchronicity. However, less has been written about the use of coincidence in fiction and literature— and ‘literature’ in this essay refers to literary fiction, to be distinguished by its artistic or aesthetic merit from popular fiction, though the two may overlap. There have been very different attitudes to coincidence over time, and one can trace its evolution in literature from the fatalism of Ancient Greece to the ‘providential tradition’ of the Victorian era, where the good are rewarded with positive coincidences and outcomes as visible signs of God’s providence, defined in the Concise Oxford Dictionary as ‘the protective care of God or Nature.’ This approach is largely dispensed with in the secularism of the 20th century, though the use of coincidences by authors is certainly not dispensed with, and here particular mention should be made of Boris Pasternak and his purposeful and wide-ranging employment of coincidences in Doctor Zhivago. A further shift takes place in the later decades of the 20th century, with the advent of postmodernism and its penchant for ambiguity, including when it comes to the understanding and interpretation of coincidences.

1997

We give a simple way of demonstrating that coincidences really are "out there", as probability theory predicts, if we take the trouble to look

2009

The naïve see causal connections everywhere. Consider the fact that Evelyn Marie Adams won the New Jersey lottery twice. The naïve find it irresistible to think that this cannot be a coincidence. Maybe the lottery was rigged or some uncanny higher power placed its hand upon her brow. Sophisticates respond with an indulgent smile and ask the naïve to view Adams' double win within a larger perspective. Given all the lotteries there have been, it isn't at all surprising that someone would win one of them twice. No need to invent conspiracy theories or invoke the paranormal-the double win was a mere coincidence.

Synthese

A traditional account of coincidences has it that two facts are coincidental whenever they are not related as cause and effect and do not have a common cause. A recent contribution by Lando (Noûs 51(1): 132–151, 2017) showed that this account is mistaken. In this paper, I argue against two alternative accounts of coincidences, one suggested by Lando, and another by Bhogal (Philos Phenomenol Res 100(3): 677–694, 2020), and defend a third one in their place. In short, I propose that how explanatory links relate to non-coincidental facts in explanation is what drives a wedge between coincidences and non-coincidences. This proposal is not susceptible to the worries I raise, and is more general, since it is not restricted to coincidences and non-coincidences involving physical facts.