Ethnocracy and Post-Ethnocracy in Fiji

2004

Cornell International Law Journal, 1992

1990

Most discussions of the Fiji military coups of I987 and the subsequent political instability have focused on the question of ethnicity, particularly on the argument that indigenous Fijians have always been committed to retaining political control of their country and could not be expected to permit a government dominated or even partly controlled by Fiji Indians to remain in power. From this followed not only the first coup, but the process of constitutional review-whereby a new parliamentary and electoral structure will probably be implemented that will preclude any group similar to the ousted Labour-National Federation Party Coalition from gaining control again. The underlying concerns relate only partly to political power; it is also widely claimed that Fijians fear that an "Indian" government would permit Fijian land (83 % of the country is under traditional clan ownership) to be alienated, inevitably creating much poverty and displacement among those who are now primarily subsistence farmers. Whether many Indians would have regarded a political challenge on this extremely sensitive matter as feasible or desirable is another matter, and the question reflects the interpenetration of mystification and actuality that always seems to have been a prominent feature of Fijian colonial and neocolonial politics: a fear that may have been substantially ungrounded becomes a "political fact" and subsequently an actuality and a cause.! Some of the commentators interested in the Fiji situation looked for a broader range of causes for the discontent that led to the new Fiji Labour Party (FLP) being elected in coalition with the established, almost wholly Indian, National FederationParty (NFP), as well as for a wider field of causes for the coup itself. Corruption among the traditional chiefly elite was raised, and it was suggested that had the new government not been

Journal of South Pacific Law, 2017

Fiji has a checkered history with democracy. Since gaining independence from the United Kingdom in 1970, its politics have been marked by a pattern of coups and constitutional reform. After the first military coup in 1987, three constitutions designed by political elites have attempted to resolve ethnic tensions and foster democratic stability. Underlying Fiji's constitutional reforms is a struggle for supremacy between two very different conceptions of the nation, namely ethnic and civic. While the 1970 and 1997 Constitutions sought a form of multicultural compromise with the realities of Fiji's demographic make-up, demands for continued ethno-political paramountcy by sections of the indigenous Fijian (iTaukei) population led to the overthrow of the democratically-elected governments in 1987 and 2000. In fact, the 1990 Constitution institutionalized the privileged ethno-political status of indigenous Fijians. Subsequently, the coup of 2006 ushered in a period of political reform that has sought to promote a more civic and 'ethnically blind' set of constitutional arrangements. This article investigates the potential for democratic stability provided by the 2013 Constitution. It argues that while the 2013 Constitution and its provisions do shift the discourse away from previous preoccupations with race and ethnicity, the context of the constitution-making process also indicates that the Bainimarama regime was largely intent on maintaining the status quo.

The Contemporary Pacific, 2000

The only thing left with the Fijian people is leadership of this country. In business we are behind, in education we are behind. Therefore leadership should be in indigenous Fijian hands. pita nagusuca, submission to constitutional review commission, 27 july 1995 We Indians are not happy, because we are part and parcel of Fijian people. How we are omitted? [from the 1990 constitution]. .. When Fijians are photo, Indians are frame. When Fijians are shirt, Indians are buttons. You take the frame out, the photo drops. You take the buttons out, shirt looks ugly and useless. parmanand singh, submission 024044 to constitutional review commission The political logic of accepting difference is inventing and supporting institutions that help difference to be maintained. It is not necessary to create one people and one nation; rather, we should learn to view a system of difference as our unity. subramani, Altering Imagination

Nations and Nationalism, 2004

Since Fiji became an independent state in 1970 it has experienced three coups against elected governments. On each occasion, intervention has been justified on the grounds that the rights and interests of indigenous Fijians have been under threat from a government controlled by Indo-Fijians, the country's second largest ethnic group. This is despite the fact that the constitutions under which these governments were elected contained extensive provisions for the protection of indigenous rights and interests precisely to meet such concerns. Since the coup of May 2000, the 1997 constitution has been resurrected through the legal process and fresh elections held. Although this represented a formal victory for the forces of constitutionalism, the election itself resulted in the return to office of the post-coup interim administration that had been appointed by the military and which had pledged to uphold the primacy of Fijian interests against other claims. The story of nationalism versus constitutionalism in Fiji is one in which all the efforts of institutional designers seem to have been consistently trumped by the successful manipulation of ethnic identity, especially (although not exclusively) by Fijian nationalists. But it also suggests that there is more to the problems of stability in Fiji than the fact of ethnic difference. In addition, the article critically assesses arguments which favour the development of a new form of constitutionalism which dispenses with the liberal 'rule of uniformity' in favour of principles and practices that give explicit recognition to cultural difference. in Durban, South Africa. I am grateful to the British Academy for a grant which enabled me to attend as well as to members of the panel for their helpful insights and comments.

Kathmandu School of Law Review

Fiji a country of 300 islands, having multi-ethnic communities, has gone through a number of constitutional changes from Colonial to post independence time. This paper vividly explores the constitutional history of the Fiji along with a critical review on emerging issue of the ‘Draft constitution’ listing the key human rights violation that occurred during the three Coup de Tats and comparing ‘consociational’ to ‘hegemonic’ constitutions.

A day after the military takeover of the Fiji government on 5 December 2006, Commodore Bainimarama proclaimed a nationwide state of emergency that gave wide-ranging powers to the military to enforce the new regime’s agenda. These repressive powers were entrenched in the Public Emergency Regulations (PER) imposed after the 10 April 2009 abrogation of the 1997 Constitution. Early promises of elections by 2009 were not kept; instead, successive decrees were promulgated to restrict human rights, suppress freedom of expression and clip the wings of the judiciary and indigenous Fijian institutions. They were aimed at stifling the capacity and will of the people to demand a return to democracy, and at entrenching the position of Bainimarama’s unelected government.1 The allocation of key government ministries and departments to military officers, and the winning over of specific indigenous communities by the provision of infrastructure projects have strengthened this position. All of these actions, combined with a strategy of sidelining any political or military leader capable of replacing Bainimarama as PM or military commander, suggest that the post-April 2009 authoritarian military regime has become what Geddes terms a ‘personalist’ regime, (in contrast to military or single-party regimes) even if this was not an original aim of the coup. In personalist regimes ‘access to office and the fruits of office depends much more on the discretion of an individual leader’ (Geddes 1999:121). But, despite the high levels of repression, the fragility of Fiji’s economy poses a threat to the current government, adding to the threat imposed by those few still voicing opposition.