Evaluating public accountability

Australian Journal of Public Administration, 1999

2004

The ‘PubAcc’ (Public Accountability in Contemporary European Contexts) project was carried in 2001–2004 by a research team from the Czech Republic, Denmark, France, Germany, Latvia, Portugal and the United Kingdom. The aim was (1) to analyse public accountability in relation to three different policy-making areas (GM crops, household waste, transport infrastructure projects) in the seven national settings, as well as at European level; and (2) to discuss the significance of public accountability for contemporary democratic governance and legitimacy. Using an expanded conceptual framework – that goes beyond the traditional conceptualisation in terms of formal provisions for openness and scrutiny within state institutions, and relates public accountability to policy- and decision-making processes, the dynamics of social mobilisation, and wider public sphere discourse – seven national profiles were drawn up and 21 empirical case studies were carried out. The research findings point to the following characteristics of public accountability in contemporary European contexts that have policy implications: first, there are substantial differences in the normative conceptualisation and practical experience of public accountability in the seven countries analysed. This needs to be borne in mind when considering public accountability at European level and in relation to new forms of multi-level governance. Second, the differences in the conceptualisation and use of public accountability can be explained with the different historical, political and cultural traditions in the countries analysed. Thus, an in-depth understanding of the political process, policy-making and public sphere activities is essential, in order to be able to gain a more thorough understanding of the role of public accountability in democratic governance and legitimacy. Third, there is a significant difference between the provision of formal structures and procedures of public accountability through state systems, on the one hand, and the ‘practice’ and ‘lived’ experience of public accountability in policy-making and public sphere discourse, on the other. This difference can be interpreted as a (perceived) dysfunction of formal public accountability provisions. Fourth, there has been a growth in ‘extra-parliamentary’ public accountability processes and social mobilisation processes initiated by civil society actors within the public sphere in response to the perceived dysfunction of formal public accountability provisions. Fifth, the processes of ‘Europeanisation’ has had a double-sided impact on public accountability procedures and discourses: in some instances, the Europeanisation of policy-making has fostered public accountability provisions; in other instances, Europeanisation has meant that effective accountability processes have been curtailed due to the pressure to adopt EU law and regulation without in-depth debate and scrutiny at national and subnational level. Finally, scientific-technological policy issues are differently characterised in the seven national contexts, with Latvia and the Czech Republic having experienced less social and political controversy compared with the other countries. In the case of the latter, the often controversial nature of scientific-technological developments has led to attempts to innovate in new forms of governance, with emphasis on stakeholder and citizen participation. This challenges more traditional public accountability provisions. The new mechanisms of public accountability, however, do not fully manage to provide viable alternatives to traditional accountability mechanisms to date.

Journal of Advance Research in Business Management and Accounting (ISSN: 2456-3544), 2019

This research examined the question of accountability; new forms or a democratic deficit. The study examined specially examines the relationship between transparency and accountability, relationship between technocratic decision making and accountability and finally the relationship between proper coordination and accountability. The study is an exploratory study that used mainly secondary sources of information obtained from journals, text books and from the internet. The findings from the review shows that public accountability is important because it provides a democratic means to monitor and control government conduct, prevent the development of concentrations of power, and enhance the learning capacity and effectiveness of public administration. This is because rulers can be investigated and held to account for actions that transgress the law or result in personal enrichment or violate common mores. These tenets are lacking in our public institutions and in broader perspective ...

2005

Human Rights Quarterly, 1990

2006

Working Papers, 2007

2018

This chapter looks at some of the factors that shape and inform accountability in European liberal democratic parliamentary systems. Specifically, we will identify the key institutional features that define parliamentary democracy, and seek to understand how they could mould national political cultures and processes, and in so doing, showing how the nature of their respective systems affect the form issues of accountability take. The chapter provides a snapshot of Europe’s parliamentary liberal democracies, capturing the range of this system type, showing how they function, and how differences in function have been manifest in practice. It assesses how and why different countries have different interpretations and approaches to accountability, and therefore how different agendas develop with respect to the issue.

Public Administration, 2008

Overview of Parliamentary Oversight Tools and Mechanisms, 2022

Oversight is one of the three main functions of parliament, alongside law making and representation. It is through oversight that the parliament asserts the system of checks and balances on the executive branch of government and acts as the defender of citizens’ interests. It ensures that government policies and actions are both efficient and commensurate with the needs of the public, helps identify misconduct or deficits and allows for remedial actions against the executive. As parliamentarians represent the citizenship at large, legislative bodies are well positioned in terms of legitimacy to ensure transparency, accountability and effective government actions in all areas. In that sense, parliamentary oversight is a central means of ensuring good governance and holding the executive to account to prevent or sanction the abuse of authority. To perform this important oversight function, parliaments require tools and mechanisms to hold government to account. This paper provides a comprehensive overview of these instruments, which include hearings, written or oral parliamentary questions, interpellations, summons, votes of no confidence, committees, post-legislative scrutiny, and oversight on government budget proposals and spending, among others. The tools and mechanisms are organised in terms of three main functions: political control, financial oversight and legislative scrutiny. By providing this menu of options, parliaments, CSOs and other stakeholders will be able to understand the available channels and opportunities that are in place in their contexts but not fully utilised, or that are not available and should be. However, the mere existence of parliamentary oversight tools and mechanisms does not translate neatly into their effective use in holding government to account. Effective oversight requires careful consideration of the enabling factors that provide spaces for meaningful review, monitoring and supervision of government activities by parliament. These include opportunities for opposition and independent MPs to perform oversight that may include opposition or independent MPs as committee chairs through proportional distribution, special question time or debates, right of reply or possibility of attaching minority reports. It is also imperative that the parliament establishes and maintains good working relationships with other state and non-state actors providing oversight. Adequate and independent resources should be made available to parliament. Lastly, robust behavioural standards for parliamentarians, such as codes of conduct, conflict of interest policies, and assets and income declarations, also play a key role in enabling and ensuring effective oversight.