Does Action Theory Rest on a Mistake?

The existence of essentially intentional actions has been recently challenged by some philosophers of action. In my paper, I will use Michael Thompson’s naive action theory to argue for the view that essentially intentional actions exist, or naive essentialism. My paper has four parts. First, I present some key features of naive action theory and the broader Anscombean tradition of action theory. One central feature is the concept of “naive rationalization”, which states actions can be explained by other actions in virtue of a grounding relationship between parts and wholes. More specifically, an action p can be explained by being seen as a metaphysically dependent “sub-action” of a larger intentional action q. For example, an action of “egg-mixing” can be explained by being seen as a part of a larger action of “omelet-making”. Second, I utilize the aforementioned key concepts of naive action theory to distinguish between essentially and accidentally intentional actions. Essentially intentional actions are intentional in themselves as opposed to being intentional in virtue of some other action, and are thereby never sub-actions. Accidentally intentional actions are intentional in virtue of something else, and are thereby always sub-actions. Third, I provide the Grounding Argument for the existence of essentially intentional actions. In broad strokes, the argument demonstrates that given accidentally intentional actions are always dependent on some other action in order to be intentional, essentially intentional actions must exist to serve as the terminus of such chains of dependence. Lastly, I will briefly respond to a possible objection to my argument. The significance of my paper is that it expands upon naive action theory, demonstrates the existence of essentially intentional actions, and illuminates the asymmetrical metaphysical and explanatory relationship between distinct kinds of action.

This paper is a response to chapters 3 and 4 of Truls Wyller's book Objektivitet og jegbevissthet ('Objectivity and Self-consciousness'), 1 concerning the theory of action. Wyller presents here a critique of the causal theory of action, arguing instead that actions must be explained non-causally; the views are meant to mesh with the Kant-inspired transcendental idealist framework for thinking about mind and world explored and defended in the book more generally, as well as in other writings (e.g. Wyller 2010). Though I have learned much from Wyller's clear expositions of Kantian themes in relation to contemporary philosophical perspectives, I confess at once to having little sympathy with transcendental idealism. In my view, we should aim to understand thought and action, along with everything else about human beings, in as fully a naturalistic way as possible, that is, as phenomena continuous with the rest of nature -physical and/or biological -not as preconditions for the latter. I will not be directly arguing for this naturalistic view and against transcendental idealism here. What I will be arguing is that Wyller's observations about action, which aim to undermine one very well known causalist account of it due to Donald Davidson, can in fact be reconciled with a causal -and hence broadly naturalistic -understanding of it once we understand the notion of cause in a more appropriate way than Davidson does.

Inquiry, 1976

Recent work in the theory of action by analytical philosophers has focused on explaining actions by citing the agent's motivating reason(s). But this ignores a pattern of explanation typical in the social sciences, i.e. situating the agent in a reference group whose members typically manifest that behavior. In some cases the behavior of such groups can itself be shown to be the product of social forces. Two extended examples of this explanatory pattern are studied. In each case the motivating reasons of the agents concerned can scarcely be understood apart from reference to the groups of which the^ agents are members and the social forces which work on those groups. However, attention to the agent's own reasons for action remains important, in part because of action theory's critical potential to help liberate people from arbitrary, hypostasized social forces.

On the philosophy and logic of human action, 2017

Introduction In the last century, the philosophy and logic of human action received a lot of attention. Milestones in its development were Anscombe's Intention (1957), Davidson's 'Actions, reasons and causes' (1963) and von Wright's Explanation and understanding. Anscombe aimed at bringing out the subjective basis one must appeal to when ascribing an action to someone. Davidson defended the claim that action explanations are a sort of causal explanations. Von Wright pointed out that explanation in history and the social sciences proceeds in very different ways. Arguably, these studies formed the shape of the philosophical discipline now known as action theory. They sparked a host of philosophical contributions that eventually broadened the perspective on the philosophy and logic of human action so much as to include as diverse approaches as critical reviews of age-old problems (like the problem of weakness of the will) and present day concerns with normative aspects of reason-based approaches (like patient autonomy in medical ethics). So the stream became a river, and the river became a sea. Today there is no denying that action theory is in fairly good shape. Of course, like in all other scientific disciplines there are controversies and difficulties in action theory too. Yet there is a solid consensus as to the phenomena to be explained, there are paradigmatic theories constantly being made reference to, and there are classic contributions providing starting points for old insights and new debates. Although there are specialists in the field, philosophical action theory is not at all marginalised. Even theorists not specialising in action theory acknowledge its relevance for the practical disciplines without hesitation. Also, philosophers of every provenance generally have more than an inkling that the relevance of action theory must somehow extend further to the social sciences proper as well. Last, not least: Being a philosopher of action makes you neither left, centrist or right. It carries no hidden or overt implications as to your ideology, political and moral views, or creed. It is thus safe to conclude that as a scientific discipline action theory is a decent, well-established, and worthwhile field of study in its own right. How come all of this is immediately reversed once we shift focus and turn to economics? Apart from occasional fine words found in introductory chapters the study of human action in economics really has a bad reputation. It will be sketched what the study of human action in the way presented can contribute to the study of the social sciences (in general and economics in particular). From these discussions will emerge the outline of a systematic and integrated treatment making use of the well-estab- lished tools of action theory and some neighbouring disciplines and applying them in the field of the social sciences. It will be seen that the philosophy and logic of human action has quite a lot to contribute to economics and the social sciences. It will also be seen that it does so without compromising the rigour, richness and respectability it deserves as the decent, well- established and worthwhile field of study that it is.

Davidson’s seminal essay “Actions, Reasons and Causes” brought about a paradigm shift in the philosophy of action. Before Davidson the consensus was that the fundamental task of the philosophy of action was to elucidate the concept of action and the concept of event. After Davidson it has been assumed that the fundamental challenge for the philosophy of action is to answer not the conceptual question “what does it mean to explain something as an action?”, but a metaphysical question, namely, “how is causal over-determination by the mental and the physical possible?” I argue that the two main considerations Davidson provides for construing the question posed by the action/event distinction in metaphysical rather than conceptual terms are inconclusive. To the extent that Davidson’s essay was responsible for this paradigm shift, contemporary philosophy of action may well be said to rest on two unexamined dogmas.

This collection of previously unpublished essays presents the newest developments in the thought of international scholars working on the explanation of action. The contributions focus on a wide range of interlocking issues relating to agency, deliberation, motivation, mental causation, teleology, interprative explanation and the ontology of actions and their reasons. Challenging numerous current orthodoxies, and offering positive suggestions from a variety of different perspectives, this book provides essential reading for anyone interested in the explanation of action. Contributors: Maria Alvarez - Annette Baier - Stephen Boulter - Jonathan Dancy - Fred Dretske - Stephen Everson - P.M.S. Hacker - Sean D. Kelly - Joshua Knobe – E. J. Lowe -Richard Moran - Charles Pigden - A.W. Price - Joseph Raz - David-Hillel Ruben - Constantine Sandis - G.F. Schueler - Helen Steward - Ralf Stoecker - Martin J. Stone - Rowland Stout - Frederick Stoutland - Julia Tanney - Nick Zangwill

Sociological Inquiry, 1979

Parsons's main theoretical work includes two partly separable efforts, not always carefully distinguished: (1) the persistent attempt since the 1940s to develop a basic conceptual frame -the general theory of action-to help unify the social-behavioral sciences; and (2) the more empirical task of developing a theory of "modernization," concerned with the distinctive organizational features of modem societies and their evolution. This section focuses on the first aspect.

1. Preliminaries The philosophy of action has long been dominated by a tradition characterized by its stance on key issues regarding actions. Call this tradition " the dominant view, " or DV for short. On the issue of the metaphysical status of actions, DV takes actions to be metaphysically less fundamental than entities it favors, in that it takes actions to reduce to, are subsumed under, or can be constructed out of such entities. In particular, it takes actions to be a sub-class of a supposedly metaphysically more basic class, namely the class of physical events, separate from other types of events only by the particular nature of their causes. Secondly, on the issue of conceptual status of the concept of action, DV treats the concept as something derivable from, or analyzable into other concepts, such as the concept of bodily movement – a particular type of physical events. Third, on the matter of representational status of the concept of action, DV takes the mental representation of an action qua actions as less central to the proper functioning of agency in humans. The centrality is given instead to capacities whose operation proceeds via representations of the agent's circumstances of action in terms of the contents of certain types of mental states, patterns of reasoning in terms of the causal interaction between these states with such content, and bodily movements caused by the operation of these states. Lastly, DV takes the requirements of practical rationality to apply primarily to the mental causes of actions such as pro-attitudes, and only secondarily to actions which they supposedly cause. Some schools within this tradition go one step further, and claim that there are special norms of instrumental rationality that apply to certain entities – e.g., future-directed intentions – but not to actions at all.

Routledge, 2018

Philosophical Explorations

A con-reason is a reason which plays a role in motivating and explaining an agent's behaviour, but which the agent takes to count against the course of action taken. Most accounts of motivating reasons in the philosophy of action do not allow such things to exist. In this essay I pursue two aims. First, I argue that, whatever metaphysical story we tell about the relation between motivating reasons and action, con-reasons need to be acknowledged, as they play an explanatory role not played by pro-reasons (the reason the agent takes to count in favour of the action taken). Second, I respond to an argument recently developed by David-Hillel Ruben to the effect that a causal theory of action -still known as 'the standard story' -can't account for con-reasons. His argument attempts to show that a fundamental principle of the causal theory can't be reconciled with the role con-reasons play in a certain kind of imagined case. I first argue that a causal theorist is not, in fact, committed to the problematic principle; this argument has an added benefit, since the principle has been taken by many to show that the causal theory generates a puzzle about the possibility of weak-willed action. I then argue that a causal theorist has good reason to reject the possibility of Ruben's imagined cases. If successful, my arguments make clearer the commitments of the causal theory, and show that it can accommodate con-reasons in the way I think they ought to be accommodated.