An Interpretation of the Church-Turing Thesis
Mihai Ganea
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Abstract
The Church-Turing thesis is given a provable interpretation based on the idea that a computation by an idealized human agent must be a logically definable finite mathematical object. The argument is preserved under a large variation in the expressive power of the underlying logical language, thus providing a possible explanation of why the notion of effective computability is so robust.
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