Meaning, dispositions and normativity

Midwest Studies in Philosophy, 1992

Minds and Machines, 2003

A central part of Kripke's influential interpretation of Wittgenstein's sceptical argument about meaning is the rejection of dispositional analyses of what it is for a word to mean what it does . In this paper I show that Kripke's arguments prove too much: if they were right, they would preclude not only the idea that dispositional properties can make statements about the meanings of words true, but also the idea that dispositional properties can make true statements about paradigmatic dispositional properties such as a cup's fragility or a person's bravery. However, since dispositional properties can make such statements true, Kripke-Wittgenstein's arguments against dispositionalism about meaning are mistaken.

2007

2014

RIFL, 2018

This paper focuses on Wittgenstein's use of the notion of disposition. In the Philosophical Investigations, Wittgenstein characterizes understanding as a mastery of a technique. This is a dispositional notion and many scholars have rightly presented dispositional readings of Wittgenstein's later philosophy in virtue of his remarks on meaning and understanding. Wittgenstein seems to suggest that understanding the meaning of a word is best characterized as having the disposition to correctly use that word, that is, as knowing how to employ the word. However, scholars think that the notion of disposition as an ability-even if it is correctly 'applicable' -is not endorsed by Wittgenstein, because they think that he had in mind a narrow and materialistic conception of disposition as a state of a physical apparatus. This paper argues that Wittgenstein does not endorse a materialistic and narrow conception of disposition. By contrast, Wittgenstein criticizes one particular misleading use of the concept and he actively employs a de-naturalised notion of disposition as acquired ability, or embodied practice.

Philosophical Investigations, 2005

Whether the later Wittgenstein succeeded in destroying " the mythologized " and abstract theories of rule following is still a matter for debate. The question is important because it grounds Wittgenstein's position against a Platonist, idealistic, convention-alist, relativist and even skeptical views regarding the concept of rule following. It has been argued that Wittgenstein's views on rule following does not succeed in giving a comprehensive theory. Some even argued that Wittgenstein's views even leads to a skeptical conclusion that there are no rules to be followed. In this article, I argue that when Wittgenstein rejects necessary conditions that determinate the application of rules, he does not slip into a skeptical position. Rather, he introduces a concept of rule following based on practice, rejecting classical objectivist approaches. Through this concept, in fact, Wittgenstein wants to overcome certain dichotomies such as objectivity/subjectivity, socie-ty/individual, and mind/body. His views on rule following emphasizes the role of individual in following a rule and thereby his or her moral responsibility.

The aim of this paper is simple: I wish to bring into dialogue two unlikely partners on the meaning and character of conceptual predication vis-à-vis "the world"-namely, John Duns Scotus and Ludwig Wittgenstein. It is well known that both Scotus and Wittgenstein were champions of language in their day; both focused intensely on the significance of logic as it concerns (and is concerned by) man's interaction with his environment. And although a boundless gulf separates them insofar as a doctrine of extramental reality is either necessarily defensible or hopelessly vulnerable, the considerations offered by both men on logic as a form of thinking are, I think, remarkably similar and astonishingly complementary.

Prolegomena: Journal of Philosophy, 2003

Abstracts In the text the author tries to investigate Wittgenstein's notions of action, practice and pragmatism in his book On Certainty. An attempt is made to sketch the criterion of Wittgenstein's analysis of certainty and to define the crucial concepts such as world-picture, practice, ...

In this paper, we will unpack a core strand in the thought of Ludwig Wittgenstein as understood by John McDowell. Wittgenstein defends the picture of concept-application, the practice of acting in accord with the meaning of a concept, as such an enterprise is ordinarily understood by its practitioners. Such ordinary intuitions regard language, contextually meaningful behavior, and thought, as objectively constrained activities. That is, the practice of applying concepts to particular circumstances is normative- subject to standards of right and wrong which are independent of the practitioners’ conceptions of those standards. Wittgenstein rejects the premise that for any such picture to obtain requires that concept-application be answerable (capable of being judged as right or wrong from the perspective of) to a description of reality which does not presuppose categories of meaning and understanding available through learning concepts. Such a picture of reality as logically independent from the concept of normativity is problematic on its own terms, and is unnecessary for concept-application to be subject to standards of right and wrong which transcend practitioners’ conceptions. In its place, we present McDowell’s understanding of standards as internal to the practices we learn when we learn to cognitively engage the world. Central to this understanding is the idea that there is a logical relationship between classifications for accord being unreflectively available to a practitioner and the concept of rule following. At the basis of following a rule is a ‘blind obedience’ to what is given to the practitioners as in accord with the rule (‘knowing which direction a street sign points’). Such blind obedience does not stand in need of justification because part of the concept of what it is for there to be meaningful engagement with the world is for there to be a ground outside the spheres of justifications. We then revisit the notion of normativity, to understand how classifications for accord which are internal to our practices can meet the stringent requirements described in the opening section.