Academia.eduAcademia.edu

On the continuity of expected utility

1993, Economic Theory

Abstract

We provide necessary and sufficient conditions for weak (semi)continuity of the expected utility. Such conditions are also given for the weak compactness of the domain of the expected utility. Our results have useful applications in cooperative solution concepts in economies and games with differential information, in noncooperative games with differential information and in principal-agent problems. I Introduction Recent work on cooperative solution concepts in economies and games with differential information (e.g. Yannelis [25,1, Krasa-Yannelis 1-16-1, Allen [2,3,1, Koutsougeras-Yannelis [17], Page [22]) has necessitated the consideration of conditions that guarantee the (semi)continuity of an agent's expected utility.1 Specifically, in this paper (g2, ~, P) is a probability space, representing the states of the world and their governing distribution, (V, I1" 11) a separable Banach space of commodities, and X :,(2 ~ 2 v a set-valued function, prescribing for each state ~o of the world the set X(~o) of possible consumptions. We define the set L~a~ of feasible state contingent consumption plans to consist of all Bochner integrable a.e. selections of X, that is, the set of all x~&~ such that x(~o)~X(og) a.e. in .(2. As usual, 5e~, stands for the (prequotient) set of all Bochner-integrable V-valued functions on (s ~, P); the ~ 1-seminorm on this space is defined by LIx tll:= LIx(,.