General Election: Between Money Politics and Political Identity

Ahmad Taufan  Damanik

General Election: Between Money Politics and Political Identity

2017, Proceedings of the 1st International Conference on Social and Political Development (ICOSOP 2016)

Abstract

North Sumatra is a richly multi-ethnic province is made up of dozens of ethnic groups, both indigenous to the province and migrants or their descendants. Overall, groups indigenous to the province make up about 36 percent; the rest are migrants where the majority of them are Javanese. Although the city famous pluralism and openness, as well as money politics is rampant, primordialism sometimes a factor in local politics. In the mayoral election in 2010 in the city of Medan, for example, although most of the city's Muslims recently that Rahudman Harahap background questionable when it comes to honesty, there is a campaign that is very powerful and effective way to mobilize their support behind him, given that his rival in the second round mayor race is Sofyan Tan, an ethnic Chinese and Buddhist. Ethnic Chinese and, to a lesser extent, non-Muslims also rallied behind Tan, though not so openly (Aspinall, Warburton and Dettman 2011). As stressed throughout this paper, the choice of a system of Proportional Representation (PR) lists open intensive level of competition between the candidates, especially between candidates of the same party. One interesting result, in the field as in many other parts of the country, is the high level of turnover positions: for DPRD Medan for example, only 30 per cent of the successful candidates were established. Patronage is important, though it comes in many forms-not just the distribution of individual gifts and cash, but also long-term social assistance program that the candidate has in some cases been providing for years. As a result, it tends to only the wealthiest candidates-those who have significant personal assets they have, or can borrow or take donations from relatives or rich sponsorswhich has a strong chance of victory. Only a few candidates entered the political rivalry with clear ideas on development policies or government programs.

Key takeaways

Moreover, in reviewing the back ground as well as the profile of candidates through the internal election, they were financially supported by the Chinese community and certainly by a significant percentage of votes as well.
In Medan mayor election on 2010, for example, religious primodialism strongly rose up, particularly in the second round of the election.
The key to success began from selecting candidates of regional election before setting winning strategy.
The Election Monitoring Council of North Sumatera and Medan have been informed either by legislative candidate or by other source of information.
Second, money politic or patronage, is applied in some models, either in a structured way through social projects that is held prior to election, or in an unstructured way based on the social attitudes of the legislative candidates.

Press. 472 pages. ISBN-13: 978-9814722049. Paperback, $34.00. Edward Aspinall and Mada Sukmajati (eds.). 2016. "Unity in diversity" "from Sabang to Merauke"-if the two slogans that represent Indonesia's heterogeneity and geographical reach have become clich es, forgive me for combining the two to describe the fascinating edited volume Electoral Dynamics in Indonesia: Money Politics, Patronage and Clientism at the Grassroots by Edward Aspinall and Mada Sukmajati. The volume certainly comes very close to covering Indonesia's geographic expanse, although Eastern Indonesia gets short shrift as Sumatra and Java comprise the bulk of the cases, but the first slogan is certainly manifest in Electoral Dynamics. It is an exploration of two aspects of patronage in the Indonesian electoral system-the diversity of its implementation throughout the archipelago as well as its "unity," so to speak, in its persistence among victors and losers alike. Toward this end, several research teams examined 22 legislative elections in 2014 with an eye to studying patron-client ties. After a description of the volume's research goals and a discussion of the Indonesian party system, varieties of patronage and descriptions of mobilization networks, the case studies begin. Since the onset of democratization and the messiness that comes with it, Indonesian voters have many different parties to choose from (although among these parties there is little ideological diversity) and many opportunities for patronage windfalls at election time. "Success teams" are tasked with distributing patronage, and, as the book points out, voters are savvy enough to occasionally take the goods or benefit from broader patronage programs such as assistance to sports clubs and other community projects, or promises of development, without delivering a vote-in short, free riding. At the same time, authors argue that cultural norms of reciprocity or obligation may factor into a party's success as it is bolstered by kinship or ethnic relations, a common village heritage, or religious ties. Mostly absent from the analysis are connections to structural, institutional, or cultural approaches to the study of democracy and democratization. Francis Fukuyama receives a nod in the discussion of culture, but the examples are predominantly straightforward narratives of the campaigns and results. The volume, nevertheless, provides ample case studies for others to dissect, with an eye on these theoretical approaches. Lest one think that Indonesian politics is simply about delivering cash, goods or other benefits to (potential) constituents, the volume describes the strategies

This study aims to undestand the influence of money politics to voting behaviours in Enrekang local election 2013. This topic is interesting because there were many money politics practiced during the election. Money was used as tool. To influence political behaviours of the voters during the campaign. Giving presents in the forms of cash, goods, political pledges were used to win the contestation. Due to the money politics practices, as described in the background, the author attempted to answer the research question: “How are the influences of money politics to voting behaviours in the Enrekang local election 2013 ?” The theory used to answer in the question is money in the political contestation, the existence of money democracy party arena, as described by political scientists. Besides this research using voting behavioral theory with sociological, psychological, rational choice as supporting theories factors approach. This study uses quantitative analys, while using sield survey as research survey as research method. Besides, the recearchr conducted interview to sather more deef information. The data were taken primary and secondary. Data gathering teorique undertaken by questionaires, interviews, and documentations study. The unit of analysis of the research the voters, where using multi stage random sampling as the sampling technique, and the number of responden were 276. Money politics practices involved all socio-economi sesments of the society. The practices invated by a candidate had trigger the others to do the same. However, en though the practices existed in the entine, regency, not all voters influenced by the aimstance. There are some area where the voters preter to a a candidate who either orisivaely from the some, village or districts, based on the candidater’s vision and mission, personalty, programs, personal relationship, team relation, or the candidate’s ability in program solving. More oves, in general, money politics tend to influence political behaviors. In some to the area most important factors for the voters to sine their vote. More oves, in saveral money politics tent to influence political behavior. In some area, money had became the most important factor to be considered to give votes. The result of regresion test of money politics rational voting behaviors is 0,429 with significansy value 0,05. If the money politics value increases by 1, the voting behaviors value increases by 0,261, with is the influence of money politics to voting behaviors is 26,1%. Keywords: Enrekang local election, money politics, voting bihavioral

The phenomenon of the proliferation of political practices of kinship networking in Indonesia in the reform era has attracted the authors to conduct the research. It, theoretically, has the potential to endanger democracy due to the different treatment for competing political actors' opportunities, as well as undermine the party's internal mechanisms in recruiting candidates for public officials. The location of this research is Banten Province, where the phenomenon of kinship is very massive happened. The aims of the research are to explore: (1) the history of political dynastic involvement in Local Elections, (2) the factors drive the political dynasty actors to enter the political sphere; (3) the background of the political dynasties involved in the Local Election; (4) the function of political party recruitment in the Local Election, and (5) the instruments are utilized by political dynasty's candidates in the Local Election. The type of research is qualitative, using FGD, interview, and documentation study for collecting data, which will be analyzed using the triangulation method. The results show that democratization and decentralization policy have been the key point for the actors of political kinship network to involve. In addition, The mastery of the economic base became the main driver of the dynastic political actors, so that most of the actors were entrepreneurs. Meanwhile the functions of the party in recruitment are ineffective. Finally, the instruments frequently used by the political kinship network actors are money politics, kinship networks, and the use of mass organizations as a means of voters mobilization Keywords-political kinship network; local election; Banten I. INTRODUCTION Elections are often positioned as the main precondition of democracy due to its close relationship. Obviously, there is no democratic country that does not run elections on a regular basis. Elections become links that help to realize the idea of Government of the people, by the people and for the people as the normative meaning of democracy. Not just as an arena to express the freedom of the people in electing their leaders, elections are also a mechanism to appreciate the performance of leaders. Through elections, voters are able to assess whether the elected government and or elected representative institutions will be deserved to be re-elected or even need to be replaced due to their lack of capacity to execute the mandate of the people. No wonder if elections occupy a central position in a democratic order. Unfortunately, in many consolidating democracies elections are often hijacked and used as instruments of personal and/or group interests. One of the phenomena that is often considered to plow democracy is the existence of dynastic politics or kinship network. If the former pure political dynasty depended particularly on the status of nobility and politics, then the recent political dynasty plays over the arena of democracy. It proved that the dynasty was able to fight in any political weather. Political dynasty actors will continue to play in any political system because their glue is access to state resources. Dynasties can live in both authoritarian and democratic systems (Muhtadi, 2013). Many political dynasties and kinship networks in Indonesia use the election to rule, as is the case in Banten and South Sulawesi. The facts above show that the political network of kinship will not be destroyed only because of legal regulation. Sociological and historical factors become important, especially since there will be other networks ready to replace the dynastic outcast. One thing that can guarantee a fair competition in politics (or business) is if the bureaucracy that guards the political selection process (or economy) is professional, transparent and accountable (Vishnu, 2013). Pablo Querubin (2011: 2) defines the political dynasty as' a form of long elite mastery when a family or some monopolizes political power. Instead, he linked political dynasties in the Philippines in the framework of democracy, and so he criticized the policy of job restrictions that still had a gap for the political dynasty to remain in power. Querubin also attributed the continuity of political dynasties in the Philippines to the effects of incumbency. Various politically motivated killings in the Philippines witness how the political dynasty used various means to perpetuate its power by utilizing the existence of elections. Family descendants of politicians generally believe that public office is a birthright and is inherited (Tuazon, 2013). But in many countries, the political dynasty is legalized through the election process.

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