An Autonomy-Centered Defense of Democracy

Philosophy & Public Affairs, 2017

Pettit argues that republican freedom is feasible; I argue here that it is impossible. For the people to be free from domination by the government, they must have the power to resist it. But if they have this power, they must also have the power to dominate any individual. There is thus a contradiction at the heart of Pettit's republicanism: the citizens must be powerful, but they also must not be. Individual citizens are dominated either by the state or by the people. Republicanism has traditionally emphasised the necessity of civic virtue. Although parts of Pettit's work suggest that he endorses this view, he cannot do so consistently. His conception of freedom as non-domination allows him to give at most a contingent, instrumental role to civic virtue. He must reject any stronger reliance: civic virtue must not be necessary for freedom. For if one must rely on others' virtue to keep them from restricting one's freedom, one would then be subject to another's will and so dominated. Instead, institutions must ensure that individuals are free. My critique vindicates the traditional view. The structure of the paper is as follows. I outline Pettit's republicanism, identifying some central claims (§1). I then present two cases that-if they are both instances of domination, as I argue-entail that citizens are always un-free (§2). I develop the objection by rebutting possible replies, showing that Pettit is committed to the possibility of what I term 'polyadic' domination (§ §3-4). In conclusion, I distinguish my objection from other critiques, and defend the traditional republican view that civic virtue is necessary for freedom (§5). 1. Freedom as non-domination The case for republicanism is often made by appeal to this example: Master-Slave A benevolent Master allows her Slave to do as he wants. He does so but only by her leave. This shows that non-interference is not extensionally equivalent to non-domination, and suggests that the latter is a more important form of freedom than the former. Suppose a person, A, has a choice among various options. On Pettit's account, A enjoys freedom as non-interference-liberal freedom-if her choice is unrestricted. That is, if A decided to take one of those options, she would be able to; and there is no other agent, B, who has restricted the choice, or is likely to restrict it, by removing options or attaching a penalty to any. A enjoys freedom as non-domination-republican freedom-to the extent that there is no B who has a power of interfering in her choice in a way that is not controlled by A. B's power of interference is controlled by A if it can be exercised only on terms imposed by A; that is, and in Pettit's formulation, in a direction that A has the influence to determine. 1 According to Pettit's account, liberal freedom does not entail republican freedom. Nor does republican freedom entail liberal freedom. My outline of his theory summarises the argument for and significance of these central non-entailment claims. In outlining his theory, I

European Journal of Political Research, 1993

Schumpeter argued that the norms of what he called the 'classical' theory were unrealisable within modern societies and offered what he believed to be a more realistic alternative. However, his critics accuse him of confusing 'is' with 'ought'. This paper seeks to save him from this criticism. It shows that Schumpeter's attack on the classical model rested on a correct appraisal of the constraints on individual autonomous action within modern societies. Unlike the 'competitive theory' of Downs and others, Schurnpeter's own alternative cannot be treated as a naive apologia for contemporary parliametary party democracy. He was well aware that such systems easily degenerate into oligopolies. Indeed he welcomed this development, viewing the party elections as means for moulding rather than responding to the people's will. Nevertheless, a series of procedural norms underlay his theory which are elucidated with reference to Wittgenstein's account of language.

Journal of Moral Philosophy, 2020

A widely held picture in political science emphasizes the cognitive shortcomings of us citizens. We're ignorant. We don't know much about politics. We're irrational. We bend the evidence to show our side in the best possible light. And we're malleable. We let political elites determine our political opinions. This paper is about why these shortcomings matter to democratic values. Some think that democracy's value consists entirely in its connection to equality. But the import of these shortcomings, I argue, cannot be explained in purely egalitarian terms. To explain it, we must instead think of democracy's value partly in terms of collective autonomy. Our ignorance and irrationality undermine the epistemic conditions for realizing this kind of autonomy. They stop us knowing the outcomes of our political choices. Our irrationality and malleability undermine the independence conditions for realizing such autonomy. They mean our political choices are subject to problematic kinds of interpersonal influence. Thus, at root, the import of the widely held picture is that, if accurate, it closes off this critical aspect of democracy's value.

Democracy and the need for autonomy, 2019

Democracy is a system to keep different groups and interests in balance. External changes like climate change, wars, mass immigration and changes in trade policies can influence the balance. That is why it is important to see democracy as a process. However, we have to be alert, a process is never completed. When changing the rules of the process we have to be alert that the citizens of democratic countries still have the perception that they are heard and have control over their own destiny. In this paper some elements are described that can influence this perception of being in control.

Philosophy & Public Affairs, 2022

What makes democracy valuable? One traditional answer holds that participating in democratic self-government amounts to a kind of autonomy: it enables citizens to be the authors of their political affairs. Many contemporary philosophers, however, are skeptical. We are autonomous, they argue, when important features of our lives are up to us, but in a democracy we merely have a say in a process of collective choice. In this paper, we defend the possibility of democratic autonomy, by advancing a conception of it which is impervious to this objection. At the core of our account is the idea of joint authorship. You are a joint author of something when that thing expresses your joint intentions. Democracy may not make any one of us sole author of our political affairs, but it can make us their joint authors. It is in such joint authorship, we claim, that the intrinsic value of democratic self-government consists.

2017

According to neo-republicans, democracy is morally justified because it is among the prerequisites for freedom as non-domination. The claim that democracy secures freedom as non-domination needs to explain why democratic procedures contribute to non-domination and for whom democracy secures non-domination. This requires an account of why domination is countered by democratic procedures and an account of to whom domination is countered by access to democratic procedures. Neo-republican theory of democracy is based on a detailed discussion of the former but a scant discussion of the latter. We address this lacuna by interpreting the two most influential principles of inclusion, the all-subjected principle and the all-affected principle, in light of neo-republican commitments. The preliminary conclusion is that both principles are able to capture relations of domination between the democratic state and the people controlled by it in the relevant sense. Yet, the state has virtually unlimited powers to control residents, but only limited powers to interfere in the lives of non-residents. Republican aspirations are therefore more in tune with the all-subjected principle according to which only residents in the territory of the state should be granted rights to political participation.

Philinq - philosophical inquiries (Vol. 2, No. 2, 2014)

Philip Pettit outlines a particular version of the republican theory that provides a concrete model of democracy, tracing the history of traditional and contemporary republicanism. Thus, although the starting point of this book deals with a broad historical reconstruction of the principal ideals of the republican concept, its purpose is essentially philosophical, since Pettit aims to provide a particular interpretation of freedom, justice and legitimacy, which shows a definite model of democracy.

Republicanism is, first and foremost, a theory of political liberty. According to the republican theory, an agent is free if and only if he has a status equal to that of any other citizen; furthermore, this status must effectively protect him from domination by other citizens or by the State, i.e. from arbitrary interference with his choices. The greatest obstacle to liberty, according to the republican view, is not interference but, rather, domination, for the latter implies the individual's being in an unacceptable state of vulnerability vis-à-vis another individual, a group of individuals, or a political organization (Pettit and Braithwaite 1990; Pettit 1997a, b, c). The fundamental difference between domination and interference stems from their logical independence: interference can occur without involving the domination of an individual by another agent; conversely, domination can occur even in the absence of interference, as an individual is considered to be dominated just to the extent that he is compelled, for structural reasons, to obey someone else (Lazzeri 2001).

Contemporary Political Theory

Republicans understand freedom as the guaranteed protection against any arbitrary use of coercive power. This freedom is exercised within a political community, and the concept of arbitrariness is defined with reference to the actual ideas of its citizens about what is in their shared interests. According to many current defenders of the republican model, this form of freedom is understood in strictly negative terms representing an absence of domination. I argue that this assumption is misguided. First, it is internally inconsistent. The central republican focal point of arbitrariness is a necessarily socially-constructed ideal that only exists as the creation of the citizens themselves. Secondly, republican freedom operates in two distinct realms or spheres. There is freedom under a law that is required to uphold the collective good as reflected in society’s norms, and there is freedom within that very system of norms. The threats to freedom from within each sphere are different and must be addressed accordingly. The negative approach, however, conflates the two and emphasises only the dangers faced under the law. This exposes citizens – especially those from marginalised social groups – to domination in the second realm from oppressive social norms. Only by clearly recognising the nature of both kinds of threats can a comprehensive republican freedom be formulated