Are There any Successful Philosophical Arguments?

Faith and Philosophy, Vol. 24, No. 4, 2007

Final version in Faith and Philosophy http://philpapers.org/rec/TOGEEA In his recent book on the problem of evil, Peter van Inwagen argues that both the global and local arguments from evil are failures. In this paper, we engage van Inwagen's book at two main points. First, we consider his understanding of what it takes for a philosophical argument to succeed. We argue that while his criterion for success is interesting and helpful, there is good reason to think it is too stringent. Second, we consider his responses to the global and local arguments from evil. We argue that although van Inwagen may have adequately responded to each of these arguments, his discussion points us to a third argument from evil to which he has yet to provide a response.

Philosophical Studies

Peter van Inwagen proposes a criterion of philosophical success. He takes it to support an extremely pessimistic view about philosophy. He thinks that all philosophical arguments for substantive conclusions fail, including the argument from evil. I'm more optimistic on both counts. I'll identify problems with van Inwagen's criterion and propose an alternative. I'll then explore the differing implications of our criteria. On my view, philosophical arguments can succeed and the argument from evil isn't obviously a failure.

Informal Logic, 2010

Studies in Philosophy and Education, 1992

Philosophical argument exists within one of the most durable and exacting discourse communities in the history of thought. It draws from patterns of reasoning that have been developed and refined over centuries and through the efforts of many of the most creative and productive intelligences in intellectual history. An argument pattern that has persisted and been proved useful in such philosophical dialogue is, prima facie, of enormous strength. To employ such a argument is to enter the dialogue at a most profound foundational level, and thus address the most central issues available to philosophers. Such arguments include paradoxes, transcendental arguments, antimonies and self-refutations. The task for a philosopher using such root argumentation is to apply it in ways that inform the current level of discussion in a novel, insightful and telling way. The best employment of such root arguments does more than speak to the abstract philosophical dialogue; it, in addition, points inquiry in a direction that is seen to have profound consequences for a wide range of the most central modes of thought across the disciplines, addressing concerns that resonate throughout human inquiry and understanding. But whatever the power of such arguments, as philosophical arguments, they exist within characteristic discourse frames, engage with issues in particular ways and, therefore, as I shall hope to show, have characteristic limitations.

Animal Rights, 2011

Here we turn to some important distinctions that everyone needs to know. These distinctions can become very technical and academic if one wishes to go that way, but the basic issues are relatively easy to understand. This chapter starts with the key distinction between...

Argumentation, 2008

This book is written for upper-level undergraduate students who have completed at least one course in logic, critical thinking or argumentation. Although the title suggests that the book provides a comprehensive theory, Vorobej deals primarily with the notion of argument, with the cogency of arguments and with how to develop a charitable reading of an argument and display it in a diagram. The book is not about argument schemes, argumentation indicators, dialogue, rhetoric or logical form. Nor is the book about argument evaluation. Norms are being discussed, but from the perspective of reconstructing arguments from a text. Part one of the book is called macrostructure and deals with arguments in canonical form (where they have a conclusion and a set of premises), with the cogency of arguments and with the analysis of so-called normal arguments. Part two is about the microstructure of arguments, i.e. with the more detailed patterns of evidential support. The book contains four hundred exercises with which students can examine the notions and definitions that the book introduces. Still, the book is not merely a textbook, but can also be considered as a scholarly contribution to the study of argumentation. The first part, on the macrostructure of arguments, has three chapters. The first chapter is about the notion of an argument. Vorobej makes it clear that he conceives of an argument as an attempt by an author to convince an audience to do or believe something by an appeal to reasons or evidence. The audience he refers to is the intentional audience, i.e. the persons that the author himself has in mind in his attempt at rational persuasion. The aim of constructing the macrostructure of an argument is ''to provide a perspicuous representation … of that argument's macrostructure as it is conceived by its author'', giving in that way ''primacy to

2020

In this article, a new, idealizing-hermeneutic methodological approach to developing a theory of philosophical arguments is presented and carried out. The basis for this is a theory of ideal philosophical theory types developed from the analysis of historical examples. According to this theory, the following ideal types of theory exist in philosophy: 1. descriptive-nomological, 2. idealizing-hermeneutic, 3. technical-constructive, 4. ontic-practical. These types of theories are characterized in particular by what their basic types of theses are. The main task of this article is then to determine the types of arguments that are suitable for justifying these types of theses. Surprisingly, practical arguments play a key role here.

Informal Logic, 2014

Introduction by Christopher W. Tindale Argumentation Library, Volume 21. Dordrecht: Springer, 2012. Pp. xxi, 1-355. Hardcover US$149. Softcover US$24.95.

Philo, 1999

In this chapter, I will be considering the argument from reason. The argument, as we shall see, takes a number of forms, but in all instances it attempts to show that the necessary conditions of logical and mathematical reasoning, which undergird the natural sciences as a human activity, require the rejection of all broadly materialist worldviews. I will begin by examining the nature of the argument, identifying the central characteristics of a materialist worldview. In so doing, I will examine the general problem of materialism, and how the argument from reason points to a single aspect of a broader problem. Second, I will examine the argument's history, including the famous Lewis-Anscombe controversy. In so doing, I will indicate how the argument from reason can surmount Anscombe's objections. I will also explain the transcendental structure of the argument. Third, I will examine three subarguments: the argument from intentionality, the argument from mental causation, and the argument from the psychological relevance of logical laws, showing how these demonstrate serious and unsolved diffi culties for materialism. Finally, I will examine some popular objections and show that these objections do not refute the argument.