What is good sport: Plato's view

Acta Universitatis Palackianae Olomucensis. Gymnica, 2006

One of Plato's most common questions found in his dialogues is "What is something?" By asking this question Plato usually brought his co-speakers to the recognition that in fact they do not have a full comprehension of what something is, although they have a partial comprehension of it. The awareness of one's incomplete cognition is the first step to be made on the philosophic way to truth. As in ancient times also today Plato asks us – the modern philosophers of sport – "What is sport?" or more precisely "What is good sport?" Probably the best of Plato's answers to this question can be found in the basic concepts of his philosophy regarding his hierarchical division of the state and human soul into three parts. Since sport is derived from human being also the goodness of sport can be divided into three stages. The lowest stage of sport corresponds to the first part of the soul – the appetite soul. On this stage sport is based on the gaining...

INTERNATIONAL OLYMPIC ACADEMY 14th INTERNATIONAL SEMINAR ON OLYMPIC STUDIES FOR POSTGRADUATE STUDENTS 6 JULY – 6 AUGUST 2006 PROCEEDINGS ANCIENT OLYMPIA 002s020 10-06-09 10:42 ™ÂÏ›‰·3, 2006

“The goal of Olympism is to place sport at the service of the harmonious development of man…” From Homer’s poems it is clear that Greek people liked sport very much. Originally the single aim in Greek athletics was to win. Competitions in Olympia had been called ‘competitions for wreath’ (stefanitis agon) and not ‘competitions for money’ (chrematitis agon). But, why there was such emphasis on winning, on being the best? Sport competitions gave athletes possibility to test and show their arête, their virtues. The meaning of winning was not in defeating other competitors, but to test oneself; to uncover and recognize the truth (alethéia) and the true value of oneself. But in 5th century BC the change in attitude toward original agon become more and more obvious. From that time on, material prize was becoming the main motive for being involved in sport. Adding material prizes to sport represents, as we will see, the first blow to the original value of sport. However, some ancient Greek thinkers noticed that sport did not have meaning just in earning prizes for the best few and making the rest of polis citizens feel happy, but could have a deeper meaning for the human being itself. One of them was Plato (5th-4th century BC). He found the mission of his life was the education of men. So he touched sport many times in his dialogs and exposed its role in the education of young people. For him all education is directed to the development of virtue. The value of sport he found in development of virtue of fortitude. But for him gymnastics and music paideía create just effects of Good, but not the knowledge of Good itself. The later is the aim of philosophical education. In the activity in accordance with reason – in philosophy – Plato saw final point of Greek paideía, as the process of realization of highest human abilities. It is interesting that Plato, who was an athlete himself, didn’t go deeper into the philosophical understanding of sport. He never asked the fundamental philosophical question, question about ‘what is something?’ – also about sport. But, if we want to ‘use’ Plato’s philosophy, we must ask the question ‘what is sport?’. So, what can Plato’s philosophy tell us about what is sport and what is good sport? Probably Plato's best answer to this question can be found in the basic concepts of his philosophy regarding his hierarchical division of the state and human soul on three parts. Since the sport is derived from man also the goodness of sport can be divided in three stages. The lowest stage of sport corresponds to the first part of soul – the appetite soul. On this stage sport is based on the gaining of material goods through the prizes of the competitions. In the philosophic view, this is the lowest possible stage of goodness of sport. The second stage of sport corresponds to the second part of the soul – the emotional soul. Sport on this stage is based on the original ancient agon, which seeks fulfilment in winning and showing arête. The greatest and the most superior is the third part of the soul – the reasonable soul. According to this, sport corresponds to the third part of the soul and is the best kind. For this kind of sport it is no longer necessary to compete with another contestant but to compete and win over oneself. The goodness of sport is no more determined by physical dimensions of space and time; the seconds and meters are no more important because true good sport goes beyond these borders since it is the cognition and improvement of self that is the most important and even essential thing. As Plato clearly shows us, it is not worth being active in sport if the aim of it is beyond us. It is not worth to do sport just to earn money and forget about improving yourself. Beside that not all people have the capabilities to earn money from sport. But everyone can benefit from sport if he takes it in the original ancient meaning: to test myself, to learn something about myself and not only to become better in sport, but to fulfill my potentials as a human being as well: to become better man. This is true and lasting reward which sport can give to everyone of us. And that is the way to make goal of Olympism (“…to place sport at the service of the harmonious development of man…”) real.

Sport, Ethics and Philosophy, 2010

It is arguable that some of the most profound and perennial issues and problems of philosophy concerning the nature of human agency, the role of reason and knowledge in such agency and the moral status and place of responsibility in human action and conduct receive their sharpest definition in Plato's specific discussion in the Republic of the human value of physical activities. From this viewpoint alone, Plato's exploration of this issue might be considered a locus classicus in the philosophy of sport. Indeed, it is in this place that Plato offers a highly distinctive account of the value of physical education in terms of its vital contribution to the development of a part of the soul that he characterises in terms of 'spirit', 'energy' and/or 'initiative'. Drawing on more recent work in ethics and philosophy of action, this paper sets out to revisit and evaluate Plato's argument. While concluding that Plato's case ultimately flounders on fundamental uncertainty regarding the logical role of spirit in the explanation of agency, the paper concludes that there is much to be learned-in the philosophy of sport and elsewhere-from the instructive failures of Plato's argument. Zusammenfassung Man kann darüber streiten, ob einige der tiefsten und zeitlosen Fragen und Probleme der Philosophie, die die Natur menschlicher Handlung, die Rolle der Vernunft und des Wissens in solchen Handlungen sowie den moralischen Status und Ort der Verantwortung für menschliches Handeln und Verhalten betreffen, am besten in der entsprechenden Erörterung über den menschlichen Wert sportlicher Betätigung in Platons Republik definiert werden. Folgt man indes dieser Sichtweise, dann könnte Platons Exploration dieser Frage als ein locus classicus der Philosophie des Sports gelten. Und tatsächlich offenbart diese Stelle in Platons Werk eine klare Beschreibung des Wertes der Leibeserziehung in Bezug auf ihren bedeutenden Beitrag zur Entwicklung der Seelenteile, die er mit Begriffen wie '' Geist'', '' Tatkraft'' und/oder '' Entschlossenheit'' charakterisiert. Im Hinblick auf neuere Arbeiten im Bereich der Handlungsphilosophie, Ethik und Philosophie der Tat kommt dieser Artikel zu einer Ü berarbeitung und Neubewertung von Platons Schlussfolgerungen. Trotz des Fazits, dass Platons Fall letztlich aufgrund grundlegender Unsicherheiten hinsichtlich der logischen Stellung des Geistes in der Erklärung von Handlungen ins Schwimmen gerät, kommt dieser Aufsatz zu dem Schluss, dass die Sportphilosophie und andere Disziplinen eine Menge von den instruktiven Schwächen in Platons Argumentation lernen können.

JPS, 2007

The reassuring belief that “sport builds character” is firmly entrenched in popular opinion despite repeated examples of athlete misbehavior and widespread disagreement over just what character is and how it can be measured. Scholarly claims that sport can and should be a form of moral education are usually greeted with skepticism by philosophers and physical educators alike. Such proposals have a long and venerable pedigree, however, one that might originate with a foundational document of western philosophy: Plato’s Republic. In our modern quest to understand how sport might contribute to moral education, of children in particular, and to design and implement athletic programs that do in fact “build character,” it seems worthwhile to look back at what Plato thought on the subject. In Plato’s Republic sport serves the educational objectives of personal virtue, intellectual achievement, and political harmony. But to understand and perhaps apply Plato’s insight today, we must revisit our conceptual dichotomies of mind versus body, academics versus athletics, and individual versus community. Plato’s historical reality and his ideal city might seem impossibly distant from today’s concerns. But understanding the contrasts as well as the similarities might enlighten our efforts to fulfill the hollow promise that sport may function as moral education.

Xlinguae, 2022

Already the Homeric period meant a high social status for successful athletes. However, it was exclusive; it excluded those whose time was needed to work for a living. Democratization in Athens and the militarization of sport in other fields had brought the spread of sport to the wider classes. Xenophanes became the first critic of the sport as a philosopher. Sophists, in turn, emphasized the importance of educational training for life, including sports education. Although the character of the historical Socrates is problematic, it is generally believed that Socrates left behind the legend of a physically immensely disposed, resilient man. Plato consolidated the role of sport through his role in social philosophy. Specifically, he spoke of the importance of the virtue ἀνδρεία. Although Aristotle characterizes kalokagathia and defined the role of sport within virtues, he was critical in its evaluation. He refused to practice sports if it led to a deterioration of the body. Partly archaic, especially classical Greek philosophy provided a theoretical rationale for recognizing sport as a meaningful activity, but also its critique.

Acta Universitatis Palackianae Olomucensis. Gymnica, 2009

It is not surprising to claim that athletic competition and Socratic philosophy both aim at virtue, human excellence, or aretē. But a closer look reveals that their similarities run much deeper than that. In this paper I argue that athletic competition and Socratic philosophy, as demonstrated in Plato’s early dialogues, are ideally akin. To support this thesis, I offer five points of comparison. First, both agōn and elenchos are fundamentally knowledge-seeking activities aimed at the acquisition of truth and understanding. Second, both are characterized by questions that seek understanding of moral concepts on personal, general, and ideal levels. Third, both activities require an admission of fallibility and risk of failure, which motivates the desire to learn, train, and succeed. Fourth, both require the active testing of oneself. And finally, both include an obligation to challenge others.

In the Panathenaic Games, there was a torch race for teams of ephebes that started from the altars of Eros and Prometheus at Plato’s Academy and finished on the Acropolis at the altar of Athena, goddess of wisdom. It was competitive, yes, but it was also sacred, aimed at a noble goal. To win, you needed to cooperate with your teammates and keep the delicate flame alive as you ran up the hill. Likewise, Plato’s philosophy combines competition and cooperation in pursuit of the goal of wisdom. On one level, agonism in Plato is explicit: he taught in a gymnasium and featured gymnastic training in his educational theory. On another level, it is mimetic: Socratic dialogue resembles intellectual wrestling. On a third level, it is metaphorical: the athlete’s struggle illustrates the struggle to be morally good. And at its highest level, it is divine: the human soul is a chariot that races toward heaven. This volume explores agonism in Plato on all of these levels, inviting the reader—as Plato does—to engage in the megas agōn of life. Once in the contest, as Plato’s Socrates says, we’re allowed no excuses.

Athletics, Gymnastics, and Agon in Plato, 2020

In the Panathenaic Games, there was a torch race for teams of ephebes that started from the altars of Eros and Prometheus at Plato’s Academy and finished on the Acropolis at the altar of Athena, goddess of wisdom. It was competitive, yes, but it was also sacred, aimed at a noble goal. To win, you needed to cooperate with your teammates and keep the delicate flame alive as you ran up the hill. Likewise, Plato’s philosophy combines competition and cooperation in pursuit of the goal of wisdom. On one level, agonism in Plato is explicit: he taught in a gymnasium and featured gymnastic training in his educational theory. On another level, it is mimetic: Socratic dialogue resembles intellectual wrestling. On a third level, it is metaphorical: the athlete’s struggle illustrates the struggle to be morally good. And at its highest level, it is divine: the human soul is a chariot that races toward heaven. This volume explores agonism in Plato on all of these levels, inviting the reader—as Plato does—to engage in the megas agōn of life. Once in the contest, as Plato’s Socrates says, we’re allowed no excuses.

JPS, 2006

In his seminal work, Homo Ludens, Johan Huizinga argues persuasively that sport is a form of play. This view is widely accepted among sport philosophers today, as evidenced by the use of terms such as ‘nonserious,’ ‘autotelic,’ and ‘gratuitous’ to describe the subject of our study. At the same time this play-paradigm seems at odds with the modern world, which takes sports very seriously, puts them in the service of deliberate ends, and views them (or competition at least) as essential for human thriving. Indeed our modern use of sport seems to better resemble ancient Greece, where athletic contest (agōn) served specific political and educational goals. Huizinga claims that the ancient Hellenes simply became unaware of their contests’ autotelic character (5: 30–31); my own concern is that we moderns are becoming unaware of–or indifferent to–sport’s contemporary ends.1 Insofar as we still value the social and educational potential of sport in the modern world, we can benefit from a study of its corresponding function in the ancient world. What my own study of these phenomena reveals is that sport’s social and educational benefits derive not from its playful character, but from its philosophical origins as a knowledge-seeking activity.