Two Virtues of Contractarianism

philosophie.ch

Ethical naturalism, the theory claiming that natural facts and especially facts concerning human nature play a justificatory role in ethics, is not very popular amongst moral philosophers. Especially in countries where Kant's influence is large, the charge of naturalistic fallacy is often made against it. The aim of this paper is to show that this charge misses the point: every ethical theory is at a certain level based on pure facts, natural or not, and natural facts concerning human nature are particularly suited for this role. The arguments in favour of ethical naturalism rely on a concept of human nature that includes basic desires related to ends we ought to pursue, as Aristotle and the Scholastics already saw long ago.

2014

Ethical naturalism, the theory claiming that natural facts and especially facts concerning human nature play a justificatory role in ethics, is not very popular amongst moral philosophers. Especially in countries where Kant's influence is large, the charge of naturalistic fallacy is often made against it. The aim of this paper is to show that this charge misses the point: every ethical theory is at a certain level based on pure facts, natural or not, and natural facts concerning human nature are particularly suited for this role. The arguments in favour of ethical naturalism rely on a concept of human nature that includes basic desires related to ends we ought to pursue, as Aristotle and the Scholastics already saw long ago.

2009

This dissertation is a critique of synthetic ethical naturalism (SEN). SEN is a view in metaethics that comprises three key theses: first, there are moral properties and facts that are independent of the beliefs and attitudes of moral appraisers (moral realism); second, moral properties and facts are identical to (or constituted only by) natural properties and facts (ethical naturalism); and third, sentences used to assert identity or constitution relations between moral and natural properties are expressions of synthetic, a posteriori necessities. The last of these theses, which distinguishes SEN from other forms of ethical naturalism, is supported by a fourth: the semantic contents of the central moral predicates such as 'morally right' and 'morally good' are fixed in part by features external to the minds of speakers (moral semantic externalism). Chapter 1 introduces SEN and discusses the most common motivations for accepting it. The next three chapters discuss the influential "Moral Twin Earth" argument against moral semantic externalism. In Chapter 2, I defend this argument from the charge that the thought experiment upon which it depends is defective. In Chapters 3 and 4, I consider two attempts to amend SEN so as to render it immune to the Moral Twin Earth argument. I show that each of these proposed amendments amounts to an abandonment of SEN. Chapter Five explores Richard Boyd's proposal that moral goodness is a "homeostatic property cluster." If true, Boyd's hypothesis could be used to support several metaphysical, epistemological, and semantic claims made on behalf of SEN. I advance three arguments against this account of moral goodness. In the sixth chapter, I argue that moral facts are not needed in the best a posteriori explanations of our moral beliefs and moral sensibility. Because of this, those who accept a metaphysical naturalism ought to deny the existence of such facts or else accept skepticism about moral knowledge. In Chapter 7, I consider a counterargument on behalf of SEN to the effect that moral facts are needed in order to explain the predictive success of our best moral theories. I show that this argument fails

The main claim of this paper is that, contrary to the received view, Ross' doctrine of resultance does not provide a premise in favour of nonnaturalism, but rather makes possible a viable form of non-reductionist naturalism. This is argued mainly by viewing resultance as constitution, where resultant properties are constituted by those natural properties from which they result. Accordingly, resultant properties and their constitutive properties can be viewed as placed in the same ontological realm. However, to rule out reductionism, constitution is to be considered as not implying identity. Some arguments in favour of this view of constitution, above all in the moral realm, are presented in the last sections.

2016

Human beings have asked questions about the source and nature of morality for centuries.

Interdisciplinary Environmental Review (6:2) pp. 51-61, 2004

In this paper I consider a naturalistic account of what makes a character trait a virtue. After clarifying the account in some detail, I offer replies to several objections to it. I argue that although the account has promise, it also has limitations and areas in need of development that its proponents must address.

What in general terms does it mean to naturalise morality? The two principal philosophical objections to the general project of naturalizing morality are (i) Moore's " open question " argument and (ii) Hume's " is/ought " argument. Provide an exposition of both of these arguments. Is either argument compelling? Defend your answer. To naturalise morality is to base human morals on a naturally occurring phenomena, to either come to the conclusion that morals don't exist or that they do and have a foundation in the physical world, and can be explained by science. Hume and Moore both make attempts at discrediting the naturalisation of morality by describing the arguments for it as normative. The arguments are accused of using inductive reasoning and pre-existing human instincts, which both philosophers believe to be flawed. Neither argument stands to explain normativity, but suggests that its need to be explained is not sufficed by naturalising morality. In this way, Hume and Moore seem to commit ad hominem, they do not suggest an explanation for normativity, but also the arguments they make can be considered a form of normative rationality. The paradox this creates exposes some illegitimacy in their criticisms, and makes the arguments far less compelling. Naturalising morality is the explanation of morality, or human values, with the use of natural sciences, where every element of our existence, and our thoughts, occur due to natural phenomenon. The term " naturalism " is somewhat ambiguous, in so far as it can be interpreted in one of two ways, methodological naturalism and metaphysical naturalism. To methodologically naturalise morality is to suggest that morality is explainable with natural sciences. To metaphysically naturalise morality is to suggest that morality does not consist of supernatural properties, and that religion is disregarded where Darwinism is assumed. These two claims of naturalism can be simultaneous in certain circumstances; however, any particular philosopher can choose just one type leading to different conclusions. Possibly the most important requirement of the claim that morality is natural, may be proving morality doesn't exist through special or unnatural phenomena. This theory can end in two circumstances, one being the belief that there is no true value, meaning or indeed, morality, due to the fact that science can only explain neurological mechanisms that suggest morality is arbitrary. This theory is naturalistic nihilism, a result of metaphysical naturalism, whereby the philosophy theorises the impossibilities of certain phenomena, also known as the eliminativist position. The other belief is that natural science can attribute morality to an evolutionary and psychological benefit, which serves as an objective good to the human species, a result of methodological naturalism. To justify either it is required to prove that naturalising morality, or more generally morality itself, is robustly normative (Vogelstein, 2012, p. 1083). Vogelstein refers to this endeavour as the Normativity Thesis, where for naturalising morality, or indeed accepting morality itself, one must prove it's existence is necessary and reasonable, and be compelling in doing so. This endeavour has objections and arguments in favour of it, but to narrow the scope of this analysis, the principle arguments against the naturalisation of morality will be focused upon. A1668863 Timothy Whiffen PHIL2032

2020

The Projectability Challenge states that a metaethical view must explain how ordinary agents can, on the basis of moral experience and reflection, accurately and justifiably apply moral concepts to novel situations. In this paper, we argue for two primary claims. First, paradigm nonnaturalism can satisfactorily answer the projectability challenge. Second, it is unclear whether there is a version of moral naturalism that can satisfactorily answer the challenge. The conclusion we draw is that there is an important respect in which nonnaturalism holds an advantage over its most prominent naturalist rivals. The conclusion is interesting if only because it is widely assumed that naturalism has an easier time handling thorny problems in moral epistemology. We argue that there is at least one such problem of which this assumption is not true.

Discussion of various naturalistic conceptions of moral value and non-naturalistic conceptions, including discussions of supervenience, moral explanation, Aristotle, Hume, and some contemporary thinkers.

2021

Metaethics has long explored the question of how ethical thought and discourse fit into reality as a whole. The question is particularly pressing for those theorists who accept that there are ethical facts (that is, facts that make ethical statements and judgments true). Among these broadly realist theorists, reductive naturalists claim that ethical facts are of essentially the same kind as the facts of paradigmatic natural sciences like contemporary physics and biology. On the other hand, extreme non-naturalists, like G.E. Moore, claim that ethical facts are entirely primitive sui generis facts, radically different in kind from all other facts whatsoever. It is argued that these are both extreme positions, and that there should be a range of intermediate positions in between these two extremes. In fact, many pre-modern philosophers – including most ancient and medieval thinkers – adopted such an intermediate position. But the kind of intermediate position is no longer a live option for us today, since it is conflicts with what we have learnt from contemporary natural science. Nonetheless, a range of intermediate positions are possible, and it is argued that these intermediate positions are prima facie promising and deserve careful consideration from contemporary metaethicists.