Awareness and abstraction are graded dimensions

Cognitive Psychology, 1990

Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 1984

Selected Proceedings of the 2011 Second Language Research Forum: , 2011

Cognitive Neuropsychology, 2018

Minds and Machines, 1998

Explicitness has usually been approached from two points of view, labelled by Kirsh the structural and the process view, that hold opposite assumptions to determine when information is explicit. In this paper, we offer an intermediate view that retains intuitions from both of them. We establish three conditions for explicit information that preserve a structural requirement, and a notion of explicitness as a continuous dimension. A problem with the former accounts was their disconnection with psychological work on the issue. We review studies by Karmiloff-Smith, and Shanks and St. John to show that the proposed conditions have psychological grounds. Finally, we examine the problem of explicit rules in connectionist systems in the light of our framework.

Psychological science, 2001

Why do people sometimes seem to know things but fail to act appropriately on the basis of this knowledge? Such dissociations between knowledge and action often occur in infants and children, and in adults following brain damage. These dissociations have supported inferences about the organization of cognitive processes (e.g., separable knowledge and action systems) and their development (e.g., knowledge systems develop before action systems). The current study tested the basis for knowledge-action dissociations in a card-sorting task in which children typically correctly answer questions about sorting rules while sorting cards incorrectly. When questions and sorting measures were more closely equated for the amount of conflict that needed to be resolved for a correct response, children showed no systematic dissociation between knowledge and action. The results challenge standard interpretations of knowledge-action dissociations and support an alternative account based on graded know...

1992

Reber and Lewis (1977) exposed subjects to a subset of letter strings generated from a synthetic grammar, then asked them to reorder scrambled letters to generate new grammatical strings. The distribution of the frequency of the bigrams composing their solutions correlated better with the frequency of the bigrams composing the full set of strings generated by the grammar than with the frequency of the bigrams composing the subset of strings displayed in the study phase. In his recent overview on implicit learning, Reber (1989) develops this eiperimental result into one of the main supports for his contention that studying grammatical letter strings gives access to the abstract structure of the grammar. However, this result can be accounted for by a set of biases inherent to the Reber and Lewis procedure. In the present experiment, a group of subjects learned from a list of the bigrams making up the study strings, a condition which precludes the abstraction of any high-level rules. The pattern of correlations outlined above also emerged in this condition, thus lending support to our re-interpretation. The notion of implicit learning originates from the field of artificial grammar learning, as explored over the last twenty years by Reber and his associates (e.g. Reber, 1967; Reber, Allen, & Regan, 1985; see Reber, 1989, for a review). In a typical experiment, subjects are first exposed to a set of letter strings generated from a synthetic grammar that defines authorized letters and the permissible transitions between them. Subjects are given no informa-Requests for reprints should be sent to P.

The use of the concept 'the unconscious' and the collapse of spacial metaphors into literal reality has made accurate theorizing a challenge. However, the phenomena of non-awareness or partial awareness is crucial to psychoanalytic investigations. As such, a model of dissociation (and its conceptual partner association) that articulates the mechanisms of its process may advance our theorizing significantly. Dissociation, as a process rather than a structural content, clearly covers the phenomena of unconsciousness without the use of spatial metaphors. In order to accurately accomplish this task the relationship between subjective experience (phenomenal consciousness), awareness and cognitive notations (first and second-order judgements) will be explored more fully.

Idolen van de psycholoog (Idols of the psychologist) (Linschoten, 1964) surely changed the landscape in Dutch psychology. Flat as the Dutch landscape may be (taken literally) it turned the virtual one of psychology into a landscape with hills and dales – if not upside down. It had a remarkable impact – more than any impact score could ever have indicated. It shifted the interest of younger psychologists from a psychology that used and accepted much of the implicit knowledge of the psychologist to a psychology that tried to avoid any of the implicit knowledge in favour of explicit, and preferably, quantitative knowledge. It became the way of thinking for most academic psychologists. It paralleled movements with the same aims in the Anglo-Saxon world that expressed suspicion about the possibilities of founding knowledge on experience in favor of a technical, observable form of knowledge. In the Anglo-Saxon world it is difficult to point to one book that one can say is the book that changed it all. In the Dutch case Linschoten’s Idols serves as the token of change. Writing the biography of Johannes Linschoten leads us to ever more and new questions. One of them has to do with the present paper. Or better, a cluster of them; that is, we seek answers to questions regarding the history of the way psychologists (and once in a while philosophers) saw psychology as a science (and practice) using the implicit knowledge of its practitioners, and those who considered psychology as a science that used or had to use explicit knowledge. Especially interesting for us is the question that refers to the interaction between those favoring implicit and those favoring explicit knowledge in the period before and during the alleged change of view of Johannes Linschoten in the 1950s and early 1960s of the 20th century. That is, not so much the interaction between persons (those in favor vs. those against phenomenology) as the interaction between the ideas, for instance in one person.

1996

The main idea of this paper is to try to improve the understanding of the concept of " dissociated " and " dissociation " , concept that we have been using since recent years for all the technics of the explicitation interview, when we create and move new ego to seek changes of perspective and decenterings in order to acquire new information and to help in detailling further the explicitation of the lived action. My goal is to show that every reflexive consciousness is based on the creation of new divisions, which are positively as new discriminations, new distinctions of a whole. The only divisions that destructively separate a whole are the material ones (when we cut a board, we have two boards), not the reflexive splits. These splits can be understood by considering them as part of the fundamental structure of consciousness: the intentional structure, composed of three basic elements: 1 / an egoic pole which aims, 2 / an act implementing the target, 3 / the pole which is aimed. The rest of this presentation of the intentional structure is to show that it is not ready-made for adults, but has been built by steps in childhood. This aspect was studied by the brilliant work of Piaget, not as part of a psychology of the child, but as a genetic epistemology, which, I believe, has pursued a transcendental program aimed towards the conditions of the possibilities of knowledge. Once settled these points, it is possible to act the intentional structure, and in particular to show that not only we can constantly change of act and of specified object, which seems natural, but even so, we can vary upon the ego who aims. One of the challenges is to clarify the distinction between personal identity and multiplicity of egoic poles. The dissociation techniques vary the ego by splits which do not touch the personal identity. From there, I will illustrate the practical possibilities of these ideas with examples of technics which call for or create different ego.

Journal of Psychophysiology, 2010

The objective of the present study was to evaluate patterns of implicit processing in a task where the acquisition of explicit and implicit knowledge occurs simultaneously. The number reduction task (NRT) was used as having two levels of organization, overt and covert, where the covert level of processing is associated with implicit associative and implicit procedural learning. One aim was

Memory & cognition, 2003