Foreknowledge and Necessity

Philosophy of the Social Sciences, 2010

Philosophical Studies, 2004

DISCUSSION-''THE GUISE OF A REASON'' The articles collected in David Velleman's The Possibility of Practical Reason are a snapshot-or rather a filmstrip of part of a philosophical endeavour beginning with his first book, Practical Reflection, and continuing through many a paper produced since including many written after those collected here. The unity of theme and content across both the papers and the book is quite impressive; many of the articles involve attempts to develop, or better articulate, distinctions drawn and arguments made in the book. There is a single, large project here and having some of these articles collected together in a book gives us a chance to assess how this project is going-or at least how things were going on this particular filmstrip. I find myself convinced by many of the arguments deployed and attracted by the philosophical intuitions that lie behind the project. And I find the intricate way many of the pieces fit together satisfyingly neat, indeed elegant. However, I will stick to convention and focus here on the places where I am still puzzled about how it is all supposed to fit together. A fundamental philosophical motivation driving the project is an attempt to show how our conception of agency could be compatible with ''our conception of how the world works more generally''-a conception according to which events are caused by other events or just happen randomly. 1 This is a conception of the world shaped by naturalistic conceptions of explanation in which causation is understood as consisting in ''relations among events and states of affairs'' (130). 2 I will call this the ''causal conception'' for short. Compatibility is shown by combining an analysis of the notion of agency, and other related notions, with an hypothetical model of how such agency could be instantiated or ''realized in the world, as we otherwise understand it'' (129). I will start by focussing on his account of

Dialogue, 1980

Religious Studies Review, 2007

Philosophy in Review, 2010

dialectica, 2011

There is a growing realization of the need to promote a constructive dialogue between science and religion both in the scientific and the religious community. Accommodationism based on the concept of nonoverlapping magisteria (NOMA) is arguably the dominant trend in the effort to achieve this goal. Yet despite the fact that accommodationism has many supporters, it has so far failed to promote a productive engagement between science and religion. The article argues that such engagement requires a critical re-examination of the principal tenets, self-evident truths, and intuitions by both the scientific and the religious community. It further argues that despite isolated efforts seeking to promote such re-examination in both domains, neither the scientific nor the religious establishment shows much willingness to pursue this course. Rather they prefer to follow a conservative agenda and impose limits on reason that are designed to protect the status quo.

Ars Disputandi, 2004

Philo, 1999

In this chapter, I will be considering the argument from reason. The argument, as we shall see, takes a number of forms, but in all instances it attempts to show that the necessary conditions of logical and mathematical reasoning, which undergird the natural sciences as a human activity, require the rejection of all broadly materialist worldviews. I will begin by examining the nature of the argument, identifying the central characteristics of a materialist worldview. In so doing, I will examine the general problem of materialism, and how the argument from reason points to a single aspect of a broader problem. Second, I will examine the argument's history, including the famous Lewis-Anscombe controversy. In so doing, I will indicate how the argument from reason can surmount Anscombe's objections. I will also explain the transcendental structure of the argument. Third, I will examine three subarguments: the argument from intentionality, the argument from mental causation, and the argument from the psychological relevance of logical laws, showing how these demonstrate serious and unsolved diffi culties for materialism. Finally, I will examine some popular objections and show that these objections do not refute the argument.