The Moral Reality in Realism

European Journal of Political Theory, 2016

Political realism is frequently criticised as a theoretical tradition that amounts to little more than a rationalisation of the status quo and an apology for power. This paper responds to this criticism by defending three connected claims. First, it acknowledges the moral seriousness of rationalisation, but argues that the problem is hardly particular to political realists. Second, it argues that classical International Relations realists like EH Carr and Hans Morgenthau have a profound awareness of the corrupting effects of rationalisation and see realism as an antidote to this problem. Third, it proposes that Carr and Morgenthau can help us to recognise the particular ways in which realist arguments may nonetheless rationalise existing power relations and affirm the status quo by default, if not by design.

Policy Studies Journal, 1974

Last month Worltluiew published an essay by Jolm Courtney Xlurray, S.J. thut strongly criticized the current "ambiguist" approach to problems of ethics and foreign policy and argued for a return to "the tradition of reason in moral dfairs." In this issue JVorMvieru presents eh?ended comments on Father h,lurray's article by Kenneth W. Thompson and Hans J. Morgenthau. Dr. Thompson is the author of Christian Ethics a r d the Dilemmas of Foreign Policy and PoZitical Realism and the Crisis of M70rld Politics; Dr. Morgenthau is the author of Dilernrrias of Politics and the forthcoming Thc Prrrposc of Anicrica.

It is a noticeable feature of the contemporary revival of interest in realist political thought that it has very much hesitated from exploring its implications for international political theory. This is interesting both because realism is one of the dominant intellectual traditions in international relations, but also as much of the recent debates surrounding global justice have engaged with themes that are at least germane to those of realism. This paper will therefore try and extend some of the themes of realist political thought into the realm of global justice. While there might be several areas worth exploring, the focus here shall be on the realist emphasis on making sense of politics as a sphere of activity that has internal sources of normativity which cannot be reduced to moral first principles, the relationship between politics and legitimacy, and how these pose fundamental questions for the political nature of global justice. It ends by arguing that, viewed through the realist lens, the question of the legitimacy of international institutions should take greater priority in global justice debates insofar as this is fundamental to enabling us to understand justice in political and not exclusively moral terms.

Bamberg University Press, 2015

Realism has been a central object of attention among analytical philosophers for some decades. Starting from analytical philosophy, the return of realism has spread into other contemporary philosophical traditions and given birth to new trends in current discussions, as for example in the debates about “new realism.” Discussions about realism focused on linguistic meaning, epistemology, metaphysics, theory of action and ethics. The implications for politics of discussion about realism in action theory and in ethics, however, are not much discussed. This collection includes essay which address from different and complementary points of view the issue of the social and political relevance of philosophical debates on realism.

A common trait of all realistic political theories is the rejection of a conception of political theory as applied moral philosophy and an attempt to preserve some form of distinctively political thinking. Yet the reasons for favouring such an account of political theory can vary, a point that has often been overlooked in recent discussions by realism's friends and critics alike. While a picture of realism as first-and-foremost an attempt to develop a more practical political theory which does not reduce morality to politics is often cited, in this paper we present an alternative understanding in which the motivation to embrace realism is grounded in a set of critiques of or attitudes towards moral philosophy which then feed into a series of political positions. Political realism, in this account, is driven by a set of philosophical concerns about the nature of ethics and the place of ethical thinking in our lives. We argue that this impulse is precisely what motivated Bernard Williams and Raymond Geuss to their versions of distinctively realist political thought. This is important to emphasise, we argue, as it demonstrates that realism does not set politics against ethics (a misunderstanding typically endorsed by realism's critics) but is rather an attempt to philosophise about politics without relying on understandings of morality which we have little reason to endorse.

This essay ascertains whether Cosmopolitanism is the only morally defensible theory in the study of international relations. I will argue that both Cosmopolitanism and Classical Realism whilst possessing divergent perspectives towards morality, are both morally defensible theories. Whilst Cosmopolitanism possesses a stronger moral grounding given it clear vision of universal moral coverage, Classical Realism with its invocation of prudence in political action possesses greater ease for actors to attain the envisioned moral objective.

International Relations (IR) scholars are, generally, not good at engaging with different approaches, theories, and perspectives. We tend to brand ourselves, and others, with marks of methodological allegiance and intellectual loyalty. While such labeling can be extremely useful for ordering ideas, recording intellectual debts, and making nuanced distinctions between underlying assumptions, we seem compelled to take this further. We associate, often passionately, with particular positions and principles, and stake out a territory, to fortify and defend, with those who are compatibly aligned and similarly insigniaed. Of course, within the boundaries that we thereby establish, we quibble among ourselves, bicker about definitions and degrees, and even subdivide our turf. On good days, this discussion and debate results in clearer concepts, a more rigorous model, or a more compelling account of the world that we study. Yet, deliberation is inward-looking, spoken in our own vernacular, and, usually, respects internally agreed rules and parameters in a way that creates self-imposed conceptual constraints. We hesitate to venture further afield. Interaction across theoretical divides is best characterized by the extremes of either mutual indifference or something akin to trench warfare -and, when it is the latter, putting one's head above the parapet is risky. We form a well-disciplined field of self-regulating camps, neatly arranged 'isms', and easily identifiable targets. Unfortunately, what we gain in organization, we lose in understanding.

Marthe Sotong Ethics in International Relations, 2014

The effects of globalization have increased States ethical obligations and the willing to stop people suffering and atrocities. In that sense, Shapcott, M. (2011, p.197) defines ethics as the evaluative study of what actors ought to do. Indeed, it can be said that the international actors should take moral responsibilities towards their own citizens first and then towards other states, even if there is no clear agreement about the attitude to be adopted by states. In this perspective, this essay will focus on the definitions of the role of ethics in International Relations by different theories, mainly realism, liberalism, cosmopolitanism and pluralist ethics. Then, it will criticize the fact that ethics in International Relations should be (but it is not always the case), a roadmap for international actors constraining them to have relationships based on the respect of norms, values and moral principles.

Political Theory, 42:3 (2014)

What, if anything, can realism say about the normative conditions of political legitimacy? Must a realist political theory accept that the ability to successfully employ coercive power in order to ensure compliance is equivalent to the right to rule, or can it incorporate normative criteria for legitimacy but without collapsing into a form of moralism? While critics argue that realism fails to adequately differentiate itself from moralism or that it cannot coherently appeal to normative values so as to distinguish might from right, this paper seeks to help develop a realist account of legitimacy by showing how it can successfully and stably occupy this position between moralism and Realpolitik. Through this discussion, however, the paper also argues that political rule necessitates the use of coercive power which is (at best) imperfectly legitimated, and that this blurs the distinction between politics and successful domination which lies at the heart of many recent accounts of political realism. In at least this sense, realism retains important and underacknowledged affinities to Realpolitik.

European Journal of International Relations, 2004

The present article argues that the discipline of international relations is bound to repeat its rounds of debates about realism as long as the underlying dynamic intrinsic to the realist tradition is not understood. Whereas present debates tend to criticize contemporary realists for going astray (an unhappy conjuncture, as it were), this article claims that there exists a systematic theoretical problem with the way realist theorizing has developed within international relations, and consisting of two fundamental dilemmas. The first or ‘identity dilemma’, the choice between distinctiveness and determinacy, results from the characteristics of the central concept ‘power’ — realists either keep a distinct and single micro–macro link through concepts of power/influence which provides indeterminate explanations or they improve their explanations, but must do so by relaxing their assumptions, thereby losing distinctiveness. The second or ‘conservative dilemma’, the choice between tradition and justification, results from the fact that realism is a form of practical knowledge, which needs some form of justification other than the recourse to mere tradition. Hence, realists either update the practical knowledge of a shared diplomatic culture while losing scientific credibility or, reaching for logical persuasiveness, cast their maxims in a scientific mould which distorts the realist tradition. Realism in international relations is fated to return to these dilemmas until it abandons its own identity as derived from the ‘first debate’ between realism and idealism. By doing so, however, it would be free to join a series of metatheoretical and theoretical research avenues which it has so far left to other schools of thought.