Intrinsicality, Independence and Grounding

Mind, 2006

I propose an analysis of the metaphysically important distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic properties, and, in the process, provide a neglected model for the analysis of recalcitrant distinctions generally. First, I recap some difficulties with Kim's well-known (1982) proposal and its recent descendants. Then I define two independence relations among properties and state a 'quasi-logical' analysis of the distinction in terms of them. Unusually, my proposal is holistic, but I argue that it is in a certain kind of equilibrium and so probably pins down the target distinction uniquely. Finally, I suggest diagnoses of the previous failed attempts to analyse the distinction. We intuitively distinguish 'intrinsic' from 'extrinsic' properties. Roughly, any property whose instantiation by some individual is a matter of the nature of that individual alone, regardless of the nature or existence of any distinct individual, is intrinsic; all other properties are extrinsic. 1 So, for example, redness, roundness and being 3kg are intrinsic, while being one metre away, being the fattest, and being an uncle are extrinsic. This distinction is important to metaphysics in several ways. One is that it marks the difference between 'genuine' and 'mere Cambridge' changes: genuine changes are changes in intrinsic properties; mere Cambridge changes are changes only in extrinsic properties. Another is that it marks the difference between 'qualitative' and 'numerical' identity: qualitative identity is the sharing of intrinsic properties; numerical identity is the sharing of all properties, intrinsic and extrinsic alike. A third is that it marks the borders of 'modal recombination': the intrinsic properties of distinct individuals, unlike their extrinsic properties, can vary independently of one another. 2 In this paper I attempt to analyse this distinction. My proposal is 'quasi-logical': it is couched solely in terms of logical, mereological, modal, and set-theoretical notions. This renders the distinction precise

Forthcoming in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research

A number of philosophers have recently claimed that intrinsicality can be analysed in terms of the metaphysical notion of grounding. Since grounding is a hyperintensional notion, accounts of intrinsicality in terms of grounding, unlike most other accounts, promise to be able to discriminate between necessarily coextensive properties that differ in whether they are intrinsic. They therefore promise to be compatible with popular metaphysical theories that posit necessary entities and necessary connections between wholly distinct entities, on which it is plausible that there are such properties. This paper argues that this promise is illusory. It is not possible to give an analysis of intrinsicality in terms of grounding that is consistent with these theories. Given an adequate analysis should be compatible with these theories, it follows that it is not possible to analyse intrinsicality in terms of grounding.

Inquiry, 2018

This paper provides an analysis of the intrinsic/extrinsic distinction, as applied both to properties and to relations. In contrast to other accounts, the approach taken here locates the source of a property’s intrinsicality or extrinsicality in the manner in which that property is ‘logically constituted’, and thus – plausibly – in its nature or essence, rather than in e.g. its modal profile. Another respect in which the present proposal differs from many extant analyses lies in the fact that it does not seek to analyse the ‘global’ distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic properties on the basis of the ‘local’ distinction between having a property intrinsically and having it extrinsically. Instead, the latter distinction is explicated on the basis of the former.

Over the last thirty years there have been a number of attempts to analyse the distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic properties. This article discusses three leading attempts to analyse this distinction that don’t appeal to the notion of nat-uralness: the duplication analysis endorsed by G. E. Moore and David Lewis, Peter Vallentyne’s analysis in terms of contractions of possible worlds, and the analysis of Gene Witmer, William Butchard and Kelly Trogdon in terms of grounding.

Ratio, 2024

Intrinsic properties are those which cannot be had or lacked in virtue of other things. Being a square is intrinsic, in this sense, whereas being next to a square is not. But what, exactly, counts as an “other thing” in this context? As it turns out, this is a surprisingly difficult question. I provide a critical assessment of three existing proposals (in terms of identity, mereology, and ontology), before developing my own, alternative account. Along the way, we highlight ways in which this project intersects with other philosophical issues, including debates over the nature of existence, the essentiality of origins, and the truth of priority monism.

Synthese, 2015

It is shown that counterpart theory and the duplication account of intrinsicality-two key pieces of the Lewisian package-are incompatible. In particular, the duplication account yields the result that certain intuitively extrinsic modal properties are intrinsic. Along the way I consider a potentially more general worry concerning certain existential closures of internal relations. One conclusion is that, unless the Lewisian provides an adequate alternative to the duplication account, the reductive nature of their total theory is in jeopardy. 1 The duplication account Lewis attempts to reduce intrinsicality to (at least for him) more fundamental notions. The account he provides, which I shall call the duplication account (DA for short), states that DA. A property is intrinsic iff it never differs among duplicates. Lewis gives two separate accounts of duplication, thereby yielding two separate formulations of DA. According to the first [Lewis, 1986, pp. 61-62], two things are duplicates just in case they share their perfectly natural properties, and their parts can be put into one-one correspondence so that corresponding parts share the same perfectly natural properties and stand in the same perfectly natural relations (to the things and their parts only). Call this account Perfect (since it relies on the sharing of perfectly natural properties). According to the second [Langton and Lewis, 1998], two things are duplicates just in case they share their basic intrinsic properties, where a property is basic intrinsic just in case it is neither disjunctive nor the negation of a disjunctive property, and it is independent of accompaniment, i.e. it can be: (i) had by a lonely thing; (ii) lacked by a lonely thing; (iii) had by an accompanied thing; (iv) lacked by an accompanied thing. A thing (i.e. possible individual, not transworld sum) is lonely just in case it exists without any contingent, wholly distinct worldmate and it is accompanied otherwise, and two things are wholly distinct just in case they share no common part. Finally, a property is disjunctive if it is not natural but is expressible by a disjunction (of conjunctions) of natural properties. One may prefer a characterization involving the less contentious notion of comparative naturalness, according to which a property is disjunctive if it is expressible by a disjunction (of conjunctions) of properties, each sufficiently more natural than the disjunction (where what counts as sufficient is left unclear). Call this second account Disjunctive (since it relies on disjunctiveness). A number of objections to DA apply only to Disjunctive. For instance, Dan Marshall and Josh Parsons [Marshall and Parsons, 2001] argue that the intuitively extrinsic property being such that there is a cube is, according to Disjunctive, intrinsic. In response, Langton and Lewis say:

A sentence or statement or proposition that ascribes intrinsic properties to something is entirely about that thing … A thing has its intrinsic properties in virtue of the way that thing itself, and nothing else, is … The intrinsic properties of something depend only on that thing … If something has an intrinsic property, then so does any perfect duplicate of that thing … (Lewis 1983a, p. 197) I once offered a definition that was meant to capture the notion expressed by the intuitive descriptions in this quote from Lewis.¹ The basic idea is that F is an intrinsic property of an item x just in case x's having F consists entirely in x'sha v-ing certain internal properties, where an internal property is one whose instan-tiation does not consist in one's relation to any distinct items (items other than oneself and one's proper parts). I still think that this relational analysis is largely correct, and here I wish to provide additional support for it and defend it against some objections that have been raised. In the process I aim to make the account somewhat more precise, especially by contrasting it with a grounding approach to defining the intrinsic/extrinsic distinction.

Philosophical Studies, 2016

Various tests have been proposed as helps to identify intrinsic properties. This paper compares three prominent tests (we call them Perfect Duplication, Real Change, and Lonely) and shows that they fail to pass adequate verdicts on a set of three properties. The paper examines whether improved versions of the tests can reduce or remove these negative outcomes. We reach the sceptical conclusion that whereas some of the tests must be discarded as inadequate because they don't yield definite results, the remaining tests depend for their application on the details of fundamental particle physics so much so that they cannot be relied upon. Keywords Intrinsic Á Extrinsic Á Relational Á Properties Á Entanglement Á Nonseparability Properties have often been held to fall in neat categories: they are necessary or contingent, essential or accidental, primary or secondary, dispositional or categorical, intrinsic or extrinsic, such or so. This is the broad picture. But the devil is in the usual spot. The detail that is the topic of this paper concerns the category of intrinsic properties, and the problem it discusses is how to distinguish properties that are intrinsic from those that are not. Very roughly, an intrinsic property is a property that 'really belongs' to the item having it. This characterization, however, isn't particularly helpful. Does the property of being the queen of the UK 'really belong' to Elisabeth II? Is being the Evening Star a property that 'really belongs' to the Morning Star? That is not so clear. In the literature, therefore, a number of explicitly

Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 2009

An intrinsic property is roughly a property things have in virtue of how they are, as opposed to how they are related to things outside of them. This paper argues that it is not possible to give a definition of 'intrinsic' that involves only logical, modal and mereological notions, and does not depend on any special assumptions about either properties or possible worlds.

Possession of any actual physical property depends on the ambient conditions for its bearers, irrespective of one’s particular theory of dispositions. If ‘self-sufficiency’ makes a property intrinsic, then, because of this dependence, things in the actual world cannot have an intrinsic physical resemblance to one another or to things in other possible worlds. Criteria for the self-sufficiency of intrinsic properties based on, or implying indifference to both ‘loneliness’ and ‘accompaniment’ entail that no self-sufficient property can require its bearers to be extended in space or time, yet all physical properties of concrete objects do require this. These outcomes undermine the vindication of physicalism claimed by neo-Humeans for their metaphysical project. For physical properties dependent on ambient conditions cannot supervene on intrinsic properties independent of ambient conditions: when ambient conditions change we get a change in the former without a change in the latter.