Intermediation Spread, Bank Supervision, and Financial Stability

2009

This Working Paper should not be reported as representing the views of the IMF. The views expressed in this Working Paper are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily represent those of the IMF or IMF policy. Working Papers describe research in progress by the author(s) and are published to elicit comments and to further debate. We study a simple general equilibrium model in which investment in a risky technology is subject to moral hazard and banks can extract market power rents. We show that more bank competition results in lower economy-wide risk, lower bank capital ratios, more efficient production plans and Pareto-ranked real allocations. Perfect competition supports a second best allocation and optimal levels of bank risk and capitalization. These results are at variance with those obtained by a large literature that has studied a similar environment in partial equilibrium. Importantly, they are empirically relevant, and demonstrate the need of general equilibrium modeling to design financial policies aimed at attaining socially optimal levels of systemic risk in the economy.

1999

into operational costs, financial taxation, market power, and loan quality. Although the average spread did not change between the preliberalization and postliberalization periods, its composition did, with market power being significantly reduced and the responsiveness to loan quality increased. Colombia's progress in reducing operational costs and financial taxation and improving loan quality will determine whether it can narrow the spread. [JEL E43, G21, L13] A key variable in the financial system is the spread between lending and deposit interest rates. When it is too large, it is generally regarded as a considerable impediment to the expansion and development of financial intermediation, as it discourages potential savers with low returns on deposits and limits financing for potential borrowers, thus reducing feasible investment opportunities and therefore the growth potential of the economy.

This paper studies the effect of financial repression and contract enforcement on entrepreneurship and economic development. We construct and solve a general equilibrium model with heterogeneous agents, occupational choice and two financial frictions: intermediation costs and financial contract enforcement. Occupational choice and firm size are determined endogenously, and depend on agent type (wealth and ability) and credit market frictions. The model shows that differences across countries in intermediation costs and enforcement generate differences in occupational choice, firm size, credit, output and inequality. Counterfactual experiments are performed for Latin American, European, transition and high growth Asian countries. We use empirical estimates of each country's financial frictions, and United States values for all other parameters. The results allow us to isolate the quantitative effect of these financial frictions in explaining the performance gap between each count...

Social Science Research Network, 2010

This Working Paper should not be reported as representing the views of the IMF. The views expressed in this Working Paper are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily represent those of the IMF or IMF policy. Working Papers describe research in progress by the author(s) and are published to elicit comments and to further debate. We study a simple general equilibrium model in which investment in a risky technology is subject to moral hazard and banks can extract market power rents. We show that more bank competition results in lower economy-wide risk, lower bank capital ratios, more efficient production plans and Pareto-ranked real allocations. Perfect competition supports a second best allocation and optimal levels of bank risk and capitalization. These results are at variance with those obtained by a large literature that has studied a similar environment in partial equilibrium. Importantly, they are empirically relevant, and demonstrate the need of general equilibrium modeling to design financial policies aimed at attaining socially optimal levels of systemic risk in the economy.

This paper documents large cross-country variation in the relationship between bank competition and bank stability and explores market, regulatory and institutional features that can explain this variation. We show that an increase in competition will have a larger impact on banks' fragility in countries with stricter activity restrictions, lower systemic fragility, better developed stock exchanges, more generous deposit insurance and more effective systems of credit information sharing. The effects are economically large and thus have important repercussions for the current regulatory reform debate.

Journal of Financial Services Research, 2008

Under the traditional "competition-fragility" view, more bank competition erodes market power, decreases profit margins, and results in reduced franchise value that encourages bank risk taking. Under the alternative "competition-stability" view, more market power in the loan market may result in higher bank risk as the higher interest rates charged to loan customers make it harder to repay loans, and exacerbate moral hazard and adverse selection problems. The two strands of the literature need not necessarily yield opposing predictions regarding the effects of competition and market power on stability in banking. Even if market power in the loan market results in riskier loan portfolios, the overall risks of banks need not increase if banks protect their franchise values by increasing their equity capital or engaging in other risk-mitigating techniques. We test these theories by regressing measures of loan risk, bank risk, and bank equity capital on several measures of market power, as well as indicators of the business environment, using data for 8,235 banks in 23 developed nations. Our results suggest that-consistent with the traditional "competition-fragility" view-banks with a higher degree of market power also have less overall risk exposure. The data also provides some support for one element of the "competitionstability" view-that market power increases loan portfolio risk. We show that this risk may be offset in part by higher equity capital ratios.

International Economics and Economic Policy, 2004

In developing countries and countries in transition, a lack of finance is regarded as a major reason for the underperformance of the SME sector. The financial sector does not channel funds efficiently from savers to the most efficient investment. In a general equilibrium endogenous growth model, we explain the underperformance of the SME sector by interbank market frictions. High information costs in the interbank market lead to a high loan/deposit spread and hence to a low growth equilibrium. The solution to this problem is twofold. First, central bank policy could reduce interbank information problems by providing effective bank supervision. Second, if the central bank is expected not to have sufficient monitoring capabilities, reputation and reserves, opening up the interbank market to international banks can substitute for insufficient central bank activities.

Economic Journal of Emerging Markets, 2021

Purpose ─ This paper investigates the effect of commercial bank regulations, namely the price, product, and geographic regulations, on the intermediation function of commercial banks in Nigeria. Methods ─ Using secondary data from 1986 to 2017 from the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) and the World Bank, this study employs the Autoregressive Distributive Lag (ARDL) model and Granger causality framework. Findings ─ This paper provides evidence of a long-run relationship between commercial bank regulation and intermediation function represented by private sector credit to RGDP (regional gross domestic product). It also finds that commercial banks' regulation index through price, product, and geographic regulation has a positive relationship with intermediation function. Furthermore, the long-run relationship between commercial bank regulation and intermediation function described by private sector credit to RGDP is affirmed. Implication ─ The Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) needs to relax the product regulation to allow commercial banks to engage in various conventionally non-banking activities. Originality ─ The paper contributes to the literature by ascertaining the commercial banks' intermediation function to Nigeria's economic growth and development.

The Pakistan Development Review, 2006

2017

This study investigates the effect of bank competition, bank size, diversification and capitalization on risk taking behavior of commercial banks using panel data from Zambia. In addition, the study investigates the effect of capitalization and bank size on the bank competition-stability nexus. The empirical analysis is performed in two stages. In the first stage, time varying bank-specific Lerner Index is estimated. Then this measure of market power as well as other control variables are regressed on measures of bank soundness such as credit risk and overall stability (Z-Score and ZROE). Using a quarterly panel data of Zambian Banks covering the period Q1 2005 to Q4 2016, in general results from the study show that there is a positive relationship between market power and bank stability. In particular, results show that an increase in market power reduces a banks credit risk while it increases overall bank stability. These results are consistent with the ‘concentration-stability’ h...

SSRN Electronic Journal, 2000

We examine the international transmission of liquidity and capital shocks from multinational bank-holding companies to their subsidiaries. Our findings are consistent with the studies that document the negative impact of parent bank fragility on subsidiaries' lending. We further find that foreign bank lending is determined by different factors in developing economies and in developed countries. Moreover, the reduction in lending is stronger for those subsidiaries that are dependent on the interbank market. Finally, we find that market discipline plays a less important role in developing economies during the recent crisis. Instead, liquidity needs determine the change in deposits.

2021

This paper examines bank concentration, competition, and financial stability nexus across five emerging countries (Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda, Rwanda & Burundi) within the East African Community (EAC). The methodological approach applied provides a critical and original contribution to the existing literature by testing the various theories explaining the relationships between bank concentration, competition, and stability. A two-step system Generalised Methods of Moments (GMM), is employed on a sample of 149 banks with 1,805 annual observations over the period 2001–2018. The findings reveal that high concentration and low competition lead to more financial stability and less probability of bank default risk. In addition, a non-linear relationship between competition and stability is not observed, revealing that greater competition undermines bank stability and makes banks more vulnerable to default risk. The findings thus lend to support the concentration-stability hypothesis that gre...

Cogent economics & finance, 2022

Expanding access to financial services holds the promise to help reduce poverty and foster economic development. However, little is still known about the determinants of the outreach of financial systems across countries. Our study is the first attempt to employ a large panel of countries, several indicators of financial inclusion and a comprehensive set of bank competition measures to study the role of banking system structure as a determinant of crosscountry variability in financial outreach for households. We use panel data from 83 countries over a 10-year period to estimate models with both country and time fixed effects. We find that greater banking industry concentration is associated with more access to deposit accounts and loans, provided that the market power of banks is limited. We find evidence that countries in which regulations allow banks to engage in a broader scope of activities are also characterized by greater financial inclusion. Our results are robust to changes in sample, data, and estimation strategy and suggest that the degree of competition is an important aspect of inclusive financial sectors.

Eastern Economic Journal, 2016

We would like to thank reviewers for their insightful comments on the paper, as these comments led us to improve it. We took into consideration all reviewers comments and addressed them in the paper. Detailed responses to reviewers are given below: Point 1: Reviewers' comments: "In the introduction the authors should state more clearly the contribution(s) to the existing literature. In this regard, they should shortly explain what exactly they mean by direct and indirect effects and how they are able to discriminate between the two. They mention that they use a very large panel compared to other studies. However, this fact alone might not necessarily deliver "more robust empirical results than those so far existing in the literature". Response to reviewers The authors improved the introduction and the literature review to highlight the existence of the current literature and the main contribution of our paper. Moreover, we explained in the paper and highlighted the difference between the direct and indirect channel and how each channel act (page 4).