13. Daoism as Critical Theory

Comparative Philosophy: An International Journal of Constructive Engagement of Distinct Approaches toward World Philosophy

Classical philosophical Daoism as it is expressed in the Dao-De-Jing and the Zhuang-Zi is often interpreted as lacking a capacity for critique and resistance. Since these capacities are taken to be central components of Enlightenment reason and action, it would follow that Daoism is incompatible with Enlightenment. This interpretation is being refuted by way of developing a constructive dialogue between the enlightenment traditions of critical theory and recent philosophy of action from a Daoist perspective. Daoism's normative naturalism does neither rest on a primitivist call for a return to the past, nor does it suggest future-directed activism. By way of reconstructing its descriptive, explanatory and emancipatory dimensions, it is shown that Daoism constitutes an alternative form of critical theory. In contrast to future-directed purposive action or blind rule-following, Daoism's key normative concept of "wu-wei" emphasizes effortless non-calculative responsiveness in the present. Drawing on recent insights in the philosophy of action, a reconstruction of wu-wei allows to conceive of a promising form of emancipatory agency.

Co-authored with Xun Liu, in David A. Palmer and Xun Liu, eds. Daoism in the Twentieth Century: Between Eternity and Modernity. Berkeley: University of California Press, pp. 1-22., 2012

For the mainstream of Chinese reformers, modernizers and revolutionaries, as well as for many Western scholars of China, the twentieth century was long seen as the twilight of Chinese religion in general and of its chief institutionalized indigenous form, Daoism, in particular. Dismissed as a crude assortment of superstitions, whatever remained of Daoism after the effects of modernization could only be the exotic remnants of an archaic Chinese past. And yet, as we begin a new century, and secularist ideologies are reevaluated and their utopian promises put into doubt, Daoism appears to be playing an increasingly significant role in a variety of social and cultural developments: as structuring much of the revival of popular religion in contemporary rural China; as providing a trove of symbols, concepts, and practices for the elaboration of new intellectual discourses and cultural movements aiming to revitalize Chinese tradition or to synthesize it with modernity; and as supplying many ingredients to the palette of spiritual and therapeutic resources popular in the West under the rubrics of “alternative medicine” and “Oriental spirituality”.

This essay is part of my series exploring the validity of the existence of “Classical Daoism” or Daojia 道家, “(Early) Daoism.” “Wuwei” is commonly taken to be a Daoist concept. My treatment of Wuwei differs from Edward Slingerland’s metaphorical interpretation of the term and focuses less on the psychological perspective that discerns notions of purposeless or effortlessness in wuwei and more on the wisdom of restraint and non-interference.

The Primitivist (responsible for chapters 8-11 of the heterogeneous Zhuangzi) has largely been interpreted as just another exponent of the philosophy of the Laozi or Daodejing. This is a shame, because the Primitivist is an idiosyncratic thinker whose theories do not simply reiterate those found in the Laozi. In this essay, I argue that even though the Primitivist embraced some of the values of the Laozi's brand of Daoism, (e.g. simplicity, harmony with nature, being rid of knowledge, etc.) he would have censured its prescriptions; he had little faith that order could be achieved through an emphasis on minimalism, by doing nothing, or by advocating a change (or reversal) in values. Instead, the Primitivist suggests that the only way to curb the massive disorder of the late Warring States period was to purge the world of its root causes-namely, of all the artifice that kept the masses in competitive, violent strife-and suppress their reappearance. Without such a purge, the masses would be helpless to lead a natural, instinctual, pre-reflective mode of existence. By advocating such a strategy, the Primitivist seems to have membership in what must be a very exclusive group: he is a Daoist who thinks the world can only be brought into order by doing something-indeed, doing a whole lot of unpleasant, nasty things. I thus situate the Primitivist within the trend toward authoritarianism that characterized the period in which he wrote (3rd century BCE).

Philosophy Compass

This paper introduces the concept of nothingness as used in classical Daoist philosophy, building upon contemporary scholarship by offering a uniquely phenomenological reading of the term. It will be argued that the Chinese word wu bears upon two planes of reality concurrently: as ontological nothingness and as ontic nonbeing. Presenting wu in this dyadic manner is essential if we wish to avoid equating it with Dao itself, as many have been wont to do; rather, wu is the mystery that perpetually veils Dao while serving as the root and counter-balance to being, and yet, Dao also imbues things with wu to the extant that their physical makeup and usefulness, or lack thereof, can be traced back to their source in Dao. This does not only mean that Daoist cosmogony and metaphysics are inherently informed by nothingness/ nonbeing instead of being/beings but that it works to unground all moral and epistemological norms in play, a feat no other school of thought in ancient China could accomplish.

Nearly all philosophical inquiry is rooted in contingency. From ontology and theories of God to politics and ethics, dealing with, explaining, planning for, or even following contingency is a consistent theme. In the background of their recent works, Michael Sandel, Hartmut Rosa, John Gray, and Richard Rorty all see contingency and autonomy in a seesaw relationship: more of one correspondingly results in less of the other. Daoist philosophical reflections provide a different take on contingency. We can still have an experience of "self" and of making choices without positing any notion of autonomy outside of contingency.

Philosophy East and West , 2023

A discussion of questions addressed to "Daoism and Environmental Philosophy" (2000), particularly concerning "anarchistic" elements in early Daoist sources and their contemporary practical, ecological, and participatory democratic potential. The article is available online at: https://muse.jhu.edu/pub/5/article/903375

By presenting Cao Wenyi (1039-1119), a female Daoist in the Song dynasty, and Kundao Academy 坤道學院, a training center for female Daoists in contemporary China, this essay challenges Max Weber's description of Daoism. This analysis criticizes two aspects of Weber's basic position on Daoism, namely, his claims that it is irrational and egoistical. The essay argues that Weber's account of "magical and irrational" features in Daoism is due to a deep-seated philosophical framework that fails to appreciate Daoism's relational rationality, which takes one part in relation to many other parts, as shown in Cao's work. Weber's inadequate treatment of Daoism leads him not only to ignore or dismiss the roles of female Daoists in Chinese society but also to describe Daoism as egoistical and lacking in social functions. The investigation of Kundao Academy reveals a living reality in which female Daoists have a deep and immediate commitment and goal to serve the community. The study of past and present female Daoist voices invites us to rethink the very notions of man/male/masculinity and woman/female/femininity and offers a path for investigating relationships between the hegemonic power of social structures and female subjective agency through the interface of classical texts and contemporary contexts.

International Communication of Chinese Culture, 2016

The rise of modern science in the Western world produced not only a number of social and technical improvements but also a view of the world as a godless mechanism and thus of human life as devoid of ultimate metaphysical meaning. Some modern Western thinkers worried that this rational scientific view of the world, which presupposes 'metaphysical nihilism', or the view that there are no metaphysically grounded values, would also lead to an existential kind of nihilism that rejects human life, action, morality and social values in general as meaningless. Their attempts at preserving the former condition while preventing the emergence of the latter, however, have been criticized as being founded on questionable metaphysical and even religious foundations, and thus for being inconsistent with the modern scientific outlook. Richard Dawkins's argument that engagement in the scientific activity of seeking truth suffices to establish meaning in life is generally not regarded as convincing, largely because the 'truths' of modern science fail to provide anything resembling existential meaning. Apparently, Western culture seems to suffer from some kind of metaphysical yearning in its post-metaphysical scientific world. This paper seeks an inspiration for a solution in early Daoist philosophical writings, most notably the Laozi and the Zhuangzi, and their call for creative self-forgetting and constantly active interpretation. Their treatment of topics such as human life, death and activity uncovers an intriguing worldview consistent with 'metaphysical nihilism' and yet inherently meaningful and life affirming.

The Routledge Companion to Virtue Ethics, 2015

There has been an impressive revival of virtue ethics in the West, as a challenge to ethics of duty and consequentialism that have been dominating modern dis- courses of ethics. Many attempts have thus been made to explore the potential of virtue ethics in Asian traditions, including Hinduism, Buddhism, and, most prominently, Confucianism. However, little attention has been paid to the virtue ethics potential in Chinese Daoism. This chapter on Daoist virtue ethics thus cannot but be experimental. While the Daodejing and the Zhuangzi are the two greatest and yet quite different classics in philosophical Daoism, this chapter will draw on the latter only.