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1991, Fordham Law Review
for affording me the opportunity to speak on the juxtaposition of public policymaking and the public interest. These engagements and the ensuing responses helped me refine my thinking on these topics. I also wish to thank my colleagues Ron Collins and Peter Kahn for criticism and comments, and the students in my Law and Public Policy class, particularly Susan Engelman and Michele Reifsnyder Danilowicz, for their research and their opinions. Of course, all the mistakes are mine.
2014
Reviewed by Catherine Albiston I. Introduction Public Interest Lawyering results from a decade-long effort by Alan K. Chen and Scott Cummings, two former public interest lawyers. The authors go beyond poverty practice and social justice litigation to evaluate public interest lawyering as a field of scholarly inquiry. Their book maps a mature field of study built on normative and empirical scholarship about the legal profession's relationship to the public interest and social change. This volume will be a tremendous resource for those who teach and write in this area for years to come. There is so much to admire it is difficult to know where to begin. Addressing all of the book's virtues would be an impossible task. Instead, I focus on three things the authors do especially well: defining public interest law, evaluating the pro bono contributions of the private bar, and canvassing the rich empirical research in the field. These particular virtues distinguish the book from its predecessors and contribute to its worth as a research tool and teaching resource. I close with thoughts evoked by the book about modes of public interest lawyering into the future. II. Three Virtues of This Volume A. Care in Defining Public Interest law The book opens by taking on the most difficult question in the field: defining public interest lawyering (5-32), a task that as often as not provokes heated debate about the practical and normative boundaries of the field. 1 1.
The public interest law movement is at the end of its first generation - part of a broader changing of the guard in the legal profession. Although its roots date back to the turn of the twentieth century, public interest law’s institutionalization began in earnest in the 1960s and 1970s with the establishment of the federal legal services program and the launch of the Ford Foundation’s public interest law initiative. Both of these projects transformed the field, creating new opportunities for the wave of entering law students aligned with the social movements of the day and committed to using their legal training to “speak law to power.” Looking back, the founding liberal wing of the movement failed to achieve its most ambitious goals, and questions remain about how much of this failure can be blamed on the limits of liberal legalism versus the power of its opposition. As the movement pivots from vanguard to new guard, there has been a resurgence of scholarly interest in charting th...
Fordham Urb. LJ, 2009
To that end, we draw on two bodies of work: research on law and social change, and research on social philanthropy. The first literature offers a detailed empirical and theoretical picture of how lawyers mobilize law to change institutional rules and redistribute power. 4 In its empirical dimension, this research explores the ideals and practices of public interest lawyers and how their strategies are informed by where they work-non-profit public interest organizations, large firm pro bono programs, plaintiff-side law firms, and law school clinics. 5 In its theoretical dimension, this literature draws on the sociology of law and social movements to explore the interplay between legal proceedings and political mobilization. A second body of work, which focuses on strategic philanthropy, holds important insights for how public interest organizations and pro bono programs can most effectively direct their social reform efforts. We draw a number of lessons from this research. The first is that litigation, although a necessary strategy of social change, is never sufficient; it cannot effectively work in isolation from other mobilization efforts. Second, money matters: how public interest law is financed affects the kinds of cases that can be pursued and their likely social impact. A deeper understanding of financial constraints and opportunities in different practice contexts is therefore critical to effective reform. A third key insight is the importance of systematic evaluation. Only through more reflective assessments of the impact of litigation can we realize its full potential in pursuit of social justice. Any discussion of these issues confronts a threshold definitional issue: what constitutes public interest litigation. The concept of the "public interest" is contested at the level of both theory and practice. 6 Commentators differ over whether there are widely shared criteria for assessing the public's interest as well as whether any particular case meets the definition. 7
California Law Review, 2003
This Essay concerns laws and doctrines, some very recent, that undermine the capacity of progressive public-interest lawyers to bring cases. It asks a simple-sounding question: how just is the adversary system if one side is not adequately represented in it? And it defends a simple-sounding answer: It is not just at all. As we shall see, however, neither the question nor the answer is quite as simple as it sounds. Like most issues implicating distributive justice, the question of who has access to lawyers and who does not has become a political football. Political partisans do not care about impartial justice. They care about rewarding their friends and defeating their enemies, and that means ensuring that their enemies receive as little money as possible, including money to pay for legal advocacy. Advocacy, after all, might be used to turn the tables. In the last few years, a disturbing pattern of legal attacks on publicinterest lawyers has emerged, targeting every one of the principal sources of support for progressive public-interest law: the Legal Services Corporation ("LSC"), state Interest on Lawyers Trust Account ("IOLTA")
The origins of this symposium date back to 1982, the year I graduated from law school. While working (for Vanderbilt University's Institute for Public Policy Studies) on a project concerning religious liberty and private education, an epic policy blunder by the Reagan Administration piqued my interest in government lawyers. By claiming that "as a matter of law" racist schools were entitled to tax breaks, the Administration was slammed by the press, the Congress, and, ultimately, the Supreme Court for listening to its lawyers. 1 In studying this controversy, an offhand comment by Michael Deaver, Reagan's Deputy Chief of Staff, transformed my life. For Deaver, One of the reasons we got into this mess was that the only people Ronald Reagan had talked to about the issue were lawyers. So far as [he was] concerned, lawyers are not real 'people,' they live in their own world.. .. [T]he guman and perceptual side of this was not considered and wouldn't be by the lawyers.
Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, 1992
2011
By Jackie Dugard and Malcolm Langford
2019
Can current law society policy-making structures effectively assess and advance the public interest? This article considers whether law societies can fulfill their mandate to regulate in the public interest when benchers make policy decisions in hard cases, using the Canadian law societies’ response to Trinity Western University’s (“TWU”) attempt to open a law school as a case study. In our view, the TWU case highlights the structural obstacles that can impede the law societies’ accomplishment of their public interest mandate. We conclude that current law society decision-making structures create significant challenges and suggest several changes that could enhance the public interest decision-making of the law societies.
William and Mary Law Review, 2009
Am. UL Rev., 2010
The United States Supreme Court considered seventeen cases raising issues related to the role of attorneys and the practice of law during the 2009 Term. This body of cases represents a substantial departure from dockets in recent history, where typically the Court took up less than a handful of cases involving regulation of the legal profession. While some might consider the increased number of cases addressing the law of lawyering a mere coincidence, this article contends that something more is occurring. The Court's decision to devote so much of its limited time to these matters is noteworthy not only for the individual issues resolved, but also for the cases' existence, indeed dominance, on the docket. This article is the first to present a comprehensive overview of the Supreme Court's newest lawyering cases. Broadly speaking, the cases fall into two categories: access to sound lawyering and protection from bad lawyering. The first group of cases addresses access to legal advice, questioning First Amendment protection of attorney advice and advertising, the application of fee-shifting statutes to encourage legal representation for meritorious cases, and the availability of an immediate appeal to preserve attorney-client privilege in the face of a court order to disclose protected materials. The second group of cases involves harms caused by lawyers. These cases include prosecutorial misconduct and ineffective assistance of counsel claims where a criminal defense attorney lacks the requisite experience, offers insufficient mitigation evidence during sentencing, delivers a poor closing argument, gives faulty advice, misses an essential filing deadline, or fails to request a limiting instruction. Part I of this article examines the cases individually and highlights the ways each case presents critical issues related to the practice of law and the regulation of lawyers. Part II turns to a collective reading of the cases, reflecting on the Court's heightened interest in affairs of the legal profession, and suggesting insights that might be drawn by viewing these cases as part of a larger picture, rather than standing alone. Though the full measure of these cases' impact on professional responsibility jurisprudence will be realized only with the passing of time, this article offers three preliminary observations. First, when read together, the cases reveal a troubling pattern of limits on access to legal advice as well as harms caused by bad lawyering. Second, the cases offer fundamental lessons for those involved in future regulation of the legal profession. Third, the cases illustrate the importance of constitutional considerations to the field of lawyer ethics.
The Yale Law Journal, 1970
Our society seems to be possessed of a sudden anal retentive compulsion to scrub clean our skies, our rivers, and our streets-perhaps because our souls have become ineradicably sullied with the stains of racism and poverty. Environmental crusaders might well pause and ponder the underlying concern expressed by the Chorus in T. S. Eliot's Murder in the Cathedral: Clean the air! clean the skyl wash the windl take the stone from the stone, take the skin from the arm, take the muscle from the bone, and wash them. Wash the stone, wash the bone, wash the brain, wash the soul, wash them wash themil
In the ancient Greek city states people have participated in decision making known as direct democracy. The expansion of population over time made this mode of direct decision making impossible and so representative democracy was born. It evolved to have the separation of powers; legislative, executive and judicial. The separation of powers of the State enables the judiciary keeps the executive and administrative functions in check. The courts however, have restricted the right to intervene to those persons whose interests were directly affected rather than allow busy bodies wanting fame and fan fare waste the time of court. Thus while decisions of the executive and measures taken by the administration affect the rights of individuals on matters such as land acquisition, licencing, issuing of permits, taxation, and the nationalization of industries, only those affected and not the public could petition court. The present Constitution is a step in facilitating direct democracy. The g...
Jurnal Hukum & Pasar Modal, 2016
It is not inconceivable that among those who have entered into public offices are a few advocates who actually have a strong motivation to substantiate good government under the rule of law from within, as a continuance of their (previous) struggle to achieve that aspiration from the outside. No one can deny that the intellectual capacity possessed by advocates could be very useful to undertake certain specific state's tasks. Many advocates holding public offices can still preserve or even increase their professional orientation to serve for the best of public interest and protect their integrity.
William Mary Law Review, 2009
Canada-United States Law Journal, 1983
Fordham Law Review, 2009
and the Legal Profession and the Fordham Law Review. A special thanks to the David Berg Foundation, without which this event would not have been possible.
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