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Some remarks on (weakly) weak modal logics

1981, Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic

Abstract

The weakest modal logics have not come in for much attention from logicians or philosophers principally, it seems, because they are supposedly incapable of supporting interpretations of much philosophical succulence. But from the point of view of general semantic theory they deserve more attention than they get, for it is only by a study of weak modal logics that we come to appreciate many of the limitations of the now standard semantical methods. A multitude of examples bears this out. In the theory of firstorder definability in modal logic valuable insights would have been lost had we restricted our attention to extensions of S4. The McKinsey formula M o , DOp-> ODp, is characterized by a first-order condition on transitive binary relations, but KM 0 is not defined by any first-order condition. Similarly, looking to logics weaker than K reveals limitations of first-order definability which would otherwise go unnoticed. Here it is that we see that while D, Dp-> Op, and G, ODp-» DOp, are definable in a first-order language with a single binary predicate, neither is definable in a first-order language with a single ternary or n-ary (n>3) predicate (see [3]). Furthermore, weak modal logics preserve philosophically significant distinctions which are lost in stronger logics. If a proposed interpretation requires even so obvious a distinction as that between Con, ~1D1, and D, Dp-> Op, or that between D\ D(Dp-> Op), and £>*, DDp-> DOp, then a logic weaker even than K is required. These two facts are not unrelated. Taken together they amount to this: formulas like D and G are first-order definable only if we restrict ourselves to a first-order language so crude that it cannot *Partially supported by National Research Council Grants A4085 and A4523.