Cosmopolitan Justice and Equalizing Opportunities

Ethic@: an International Journal for Moral Philosophy, 2011

Global Justice is a fascinating and powerful work about what can and ought to be done to achieve a better future for our species. Built on a Rawlsian styled thought experiment and supported by empirical reporting, the book presents a "basic framework of governing the world's inhabitants" (p. 50).Brock invites her readers to imagine a situation in which delegates from the peoples of the world meet to agree on principles of international justice but are impartial because they remain ignorant of their initial social position and interests. That is, they operate behind a "veil of ignorance" that induces impartiality. Global Justice extends the Rawlsian framework to the entire global community in innovative ways and applies it to important policy questions. Brock advocates a trans-boundary, trans-cultural moral concern for others (referred to as "global cosmopolitanism") against a more traditional notion that our moral obligations are primarily to those in our own group, community, or country (referred to as "liberal nationalism"). As in Rawls's Justice as Fairness, there are two sorts of implications reached from the impartial reasoning within the original position: one concerns rights and liberties, the other concerns the distribution of economic welfare. In this review I will touch upon three aspects of her analysis: distributive justice, rights and liberties, and the role of nationalism in moral theorizing about global justice.

The Journal of Ethics, 2005

Cosmopolitanism, argue its advocates, offers a philosophy of public governance suited to the global conditions of the twenty first century, Archibugi 2004). But, as John Maynard Keynes once remarked, what is necessary or appropriate is insufficient in itself to bring about a better world. Cosmopolitanism, despite its appeal, cannot be accepted uncritically.

Economics and Philosophy, 2017

This paper develops a novel competition criterion for evaluating institutional schemes. Roughly, this criterion says that one institutional scheme is normatively superior to another to the extent that the former would engender more widespread political competition than the latter. I show that this criterion should be endorsed by both global egalitarians and their statist rivals, as it follows from their common commitment to the moral equality of all persons. I illustrate the normative import of the competition criterion by exploring its potential implications for the scope of egalitarian principles of distributive justice. In particular, I highlight the challenges it raises for global egalitarians’ efforts to justify extending the scope of egalitarian justice beyond the state.

Cosmopolitanism has become one of the main topics of political philosophy. This paper focuses on its conception as a theory of international distributive justice: cosmopolitan egalitarianism. The aim of this study is twofold: (a) to overview the conceptions of cosmopolitanism that stem from egalitarian premises and; (b) to consider if this conception was able to displace Rawls's theory is the paradigmatic theory of distributive justice. To do so, I will focus on Thomas Pogge and Peter Singer's proposals on ending global poverty and consider some of the practical and theoretical challenges to egalitarian cosmopolitanism. Finally, I will assess if such approaches have managed to set a new starting point for theorists of distributive justice.

In Deen Chatterjee (ed 2012) Encyclopedia of Global Justice, 2012

M. Sellers & S. Kirste (eds.), Encyclopedia of the Philosophy of Law and Social Philosophy, 2020

in: Lukas Meyer (ed.), Legitimacy, Justice and Public International Law, Cambrdige University Press 2009, pp. 207-231.

In this paper I take a closer look at the controversy between cosmopolitans and the proponents of a political conception of justice. I will defend a political conception of justice, though I suggest some revisions. A cosmopolitan approach is often connected with monism, i.e., the claim that the same sort of normative principles should apply to institutions and to individual choices. A political conception of justice presupposes dualism, namely a separation between the principles of justice guiding the design of institutions and the moral principles applying to individual choices. In section 2 of the paper I discuss Thomas Pogge’s cosmopolitan position and try to show that Pogge shifts from a dualistic account of justice to a monistic account when it comes to the problem of world poverty; therefore Pogge’s treatment of world poverty is vulnerable to the objections which he himself raised against monism. Moreover, in section 3, I argue that Pogge’s exclusive focus on negative duties is implausible and creates excessively heavy burdens on the side of better-off individuals. In section 4 I argue that there is no need to consider the nation-state as a hindrance to the realization of a more global justice. I end with some suggestions as to how a political conception of justice can be modified to meet some of the criticisms cosmopolitans have rightly raised.

Ethics & Global Politics, 2012

This essay criticizes a prominent strand of theorizing about global justice, Rawlsian global constructivism. It argues that the constructivist method employed by cosmopolitan and social liberal theorists cannot grapple with the complexities of interdependence, deep pluralism, and socio-cultural diversity that arise in the global context. These flaws impugn the persuasiveness and plausibility of the substantive conclusions reached by Rawlsian global constructivists and highlight serious epistemological problems in their approach. This critique also sheds light on some broader problems with ideal theory in the global context, showing how it leads to distortions in our thinking about justice and again raising doubts about the epistemological and normative conclusions of global constructivist approaches.

Prolegomena, 2010

Cosmopolitans hold that our duties of distributive justice to others do not stop at borders. Darrel Moellendorf is among those who defend the view that principles of distributive justice are applicable beyond borders. He suggests as a principle of international justice the global difference principle, which allows inequalities in the distribution of wealth and resources only if they are to the greatest advantage of the least advantaged individuals. In this paper, I try to indicate that Moellendorf's argument for the global difference principle is far from sustaining it. Instead, I argue for a minimum floor principle of distributive justice on the basis of the idea that each person ought to have an equal standard of living with respect to the fulfillment of their basic interests. I also propose the principle of contribution backed up by the principle of fair equality of opportunity, aiming to equalize background conditions of a competition for socially favored positions, as the basic principles of a complete account of global distributive justice. KEY WORDS: Cosmopolitanism, the difference principle, distributive justice, fair equality of opportunity, Moellendorf.