Daoism: a study guide

2014

ISSN 2157-9679 (print) 2157-9687 (online) SINO-PLATONIC PAPERS is an occasional series dedicated to making available to specialists and the interested public the results of research that, because of its unconventional or controversial nature, might otherwise go unpublished. The editor-in-chief actively encourages younger, not yet well established, scholars and independent authors to submit manuscripts for consideration. Contributions in any of the major scholarly languages of the world, including romanized modern standard Mandarin (MSM) and Japanese, are acceptable. In special circumstances, papers written in one of the Sinitic topolects (fangyan) may be considered for publication. Although the chief focus of Sino-Platonic Papers is on the intercultural relations of China with other peoples, challenging and creative studies on a wide variety of philological subjects will be entertained. This series is not the place for safe, sober, and stodgy presentations. Sino-Platonic Papers pref...

Dao: A Journal of Comparative Philosophy, 2023

This article departs from a mereological conceptualization of the Daoist metaphysical system in the Daodejing 道德經. I discuss what parthood status applies to dao 道. Whereas it is quite intuitive that you 有-the region of concrete objects-has parthood relationships and compositions (entities made from parts), the other, undifferentiated region, dao, poses a considerable problem. This problem can be characterized in the following way: (a) dao cannot be characterized as a particular composition, which entails that it does not include parts. However, (b) dao underpins compositions in you, which entails that it contains compositions or at least parts that make compositions in you. This generates a problem of how compositions are possible with an undifferentiated ontological foundation. I focus on one possible approach to this problem-mereological nihilism, according to which no composition is possible. Assuming nihilism entails dao composed of mereological simples-fundamental entities, which are not parts.

The Chinese character dao 道 (path, road, or Way) is comprised of a head (首) and a pair of feet (辶). It is no coincidence that in his introduction to the book under review, the editor David Chai makes a point of challenging the common assumption that the head controls foot movement (and everything else)-a metaphor for the Cartesian assumption that true knowledge can be derived through reason alone, and that material, mundane experiences, like walking, have no bearing on our understanding of reality. The Chinese graph and what for traditional Western metaphysics is a counter-intuitive image of "mindless," walking feet leading the sovereign mind, aptly capture not only the main enterprise of phenomenology at its most basic (drawing from experience to understand and analyze the data of experience), but also the main orientation of this volume. The book is comprised of twelve chapters split into four parts. Parts One, Two, and Three are arranged in a chronological order roughly following the development of the phenomenological movement. Accordingly, we find comparative studies with a particular focus on Hegel, Brentano, and Nietzsche in Part One; on Buber and Jaspers, with references to Husserl and Merleau-Ponty in Part Two; and on Heidegger, Gadamer, and Merleau-Ponty in Part Three. Part Four contains one contribution which centers on climate change and Heidegger. Chapter 1, "Daoism and Hegel: On Painting the Invisible Spirit: To Color or Not?" by David Chai, focuses on the spiritual dimension of color and monochrome in Western and Chinese painting. Chai takes a Daoist (Zhuangzian) perspective to read

Where can I find a man who has forgotten words, so I can have a word with him?" (Zhuangzi, Watson 2003: 141) Why another article on logos and dao 道? Is it not the case that enough scholars have looked into the similarities between the term logos and the notion of dao? Although it may seem so, I will argue that when another perspective is employed, logos and dao might fruitfully be compared on a different level than most of these comparisons do. In this paper I will argue first that in many instances, the approach of some of the scholars who have compared logos and dao has been one-sided and has mostly consisted in comparisons of these two key notions that have sought to portray both notions as denoting some kind of metaphysical principle underlying the processes that make up our world. Second, I will then provide an alternative to this approach to logos, and consequently to dao, using Heidegger's interpretations of logos. I then show that the Daoists' intentions for the term dao compare well with Heidegger's views, and argue that such a non-metaphysical interpretation is much closer to both Heidegger and Daoism. I end by arguing that reinterpretations of classical notions such as offered here can provide a valuable resource to comparative philosophy, in the sense that Heidegger's way of reading Heraclitus, and Heidegger's work in general, offer a viable alternative approach to comparative thinking that does not succumb to the metaphysical inclinations inherent in so much of the Western tradition, and as such could coalesce with the largely non-metaphysical tradition of classical Chinese thought and provide avenues for further comparisons.

Journal of Chinese Philosophy, 2016

Recent years have seen an increased turning to the "wisdom of the East" when addressing issues on the environment. The risk of misappropriating its tenets in order to make them conform to the Western system is extremely high however. This paper will lay bare the early texts of Daoism so as to disprove claims that Nature is mystical, antithetical to technology, and subservient to human consciousness. It shall argue that Nature not only arises from a nonanthropocentric source in Dao but that this arising takes place across three levels of reality: Dao's mystery, the cosmogony of the One-and-Many, and the fourfold comprised of Dao, Heaven, Earth, and man. The result is a vision of Nature no longer bound to a singular actuality but one whose presence is felt across an endless range of possibilities as the substantive realization of Dao.

Routledge Encyclopaedia of Philosophy, 2024

Daoist philosophy can be thought of as articulating a lived understanding of the dao: the 'way' of the Cosmos (天道 tian dao), or the 'great way' (⼤道 da dao). The key philosophical concepts can be found in two representative texts of early Daoist thought: the Lao Zi and the Zhuang Zi. The approach that is distinctive of Daoist philosophy can be understood as emerging from a radical shift of perspective: from the limited humanist standpoint (⼈道 rendao) to the unlimited 'perspective' of the Cosmos itself. We could describe this as 'naturalistic', provided the natural is not defined in opposition to the spiritual: in the ancient Chinese worldview, spiritual phenomena are intrinsic to the natural world, not transcendent. This Cosmic shift in perspective has two aspects. First, there is an attempt to overcome the boundaries of our limited human standpoint by cultivating ever-expanding and inclusive perspectives. Second, there arises from this an inversion of values: what appears to be important from a human perspective becomes trivial in comparison with the all-encompassing Cosmos. This attempt to overcome the limitations of the human, in order to allow us to live from the 'perspective' of the unlimited realm of the Cosmos, results in paradoxes. This is in part because a perspective is situated at a limited point of view within the Cosmos, while the Cosmos in its entirety cannot be situated in such a position. Daoist paradoxes also arise out of the limitations of language, whose function is primarily pragmatic. We can describe the phenomena that we observe, their characteristics and particular origins; but when we attempt to express our understanding of the Cosmos as a whole, or its origins, we stretch language beyond its pragmatic conditions of meaningfulness. Further paradoxes arise as the Daoists attempt to respond to the humanist theories of government with their own understanding of social flourishing derived by observing the way in which a quasi-personified Nature 'governs' the myriad natural phenomena: ruling without ruling, and even governing an empire without acting.

2007

Philosophy Compass

This paper introduces the concept of nothingness as used in classical Daoist philosophy, building upon contemporary scholarship by offering a uniquely phenomenological reading of the term. It will be argued that the Chinese word wu bears upon two planes of reality concurrently: as ontological nothingness and as ontic nonbeing. Presenting wu in this dyadic manner is essential if we wish to avoid equating it with Dao itself, as many have been wont to do; rather, wu is the mystery that perpetually veils Dao while serving as the root and counter-balance to being, and yet, Dao also imbues things with wu to the extant that their physical makeup and usefulness, or lack thereof, can be traced back to their source in Dao. This does not only mean that Daoist cosmogony and metaphysics are inherently informed by nothingness/ nonbeing instead of being/beings but that it works to unground all moral and epistemological norms in play, a feat no other school of thought in ancient China could accomplish.

Teaching Philosophy, 2015