Emotional theory of rationality

Frontiers in Integrative NEuroscience, 2019

In recent decades, the existence of a close relationship between emotional phenomena and rational processes has certainly been established, yet there is still no unified definition or effective model to describe them. To advance our understanding of the mechanisms governing the behavior of living beings, we must integrate multiple theories, experiments, and models from both fields. In this article we propose a new theoretical framework that allows integrating and understanding the emotion-cognition duality, from a functional point of view. Based on evolutionary principles, our reasoning adds to the definition and understanding of emotion, justifying its origin, explaining its mission and dynamics, and linking it to higher cognitive processes, mainly with attention, cognition, decision-making, and consciousness. According to our theory, emotions are the mechanism for brain function optimization, aside from the contingency and stimuli prioritization system. As a result of this approach, we have developed a dynamic systems-level model capable of providing plausible explanations for certain psychological and behavioral phenomena and establishing a new framework for the scientific definition of some fundamental psychological terms.

2005

The status of emotion research in psychology has wavered somewhat over the history of the subject. Whilst there was great interest in the area during the early years of modern psychology, the topic went into decline during most of the twentieth century, and it is only in the last decade or two that the area has become mainstream again. This book contains an interesting snapshot of emotion research at the beginning of the 21st century. In particular it is concerned with the relationship between emotionality and rationality.

2017

The decision-making process has been analyzed in several disciplines (economics, social sciences, humanities, etc.) with the aim of creating models to help decision-makers in strategy formulation. The Organizational theory takes into account both the decision-making process of individuals and groups of a company. Numerous models have been built, which include a wide range of psychological, environmental, hierarchical factors, all of which only account the notion of rationality. In time, such concept has come to be considered pragmatically unrealistic and unachievable. Emotions have recently acquired an increasingly significant position (in the academic and economic society) as important component of the decision making-process. From this point of view neuroscience, the new branch of medical sciences could play a key role in studying individual decision-making processes. This article suggests that thanks to neuroscience it is possible to overcome current limitations in economics studies, for individual's choices, which are exclusively based on the rational component.

2000

In the decision-making and rationality research field, Rational Decision Theory (RDT) has always been the main framework, thanks to the elegance and complexity of its mathematical tools. Unfortunately, the formal refinement of the theory is not accompanied by a satisfying predictive accuracy, thus there is a big gap between what is predicted by the theory and the behavior of real subjects. Here we propose a new foundation of the RDT, which has to be based on a cognitive architecture for reason-based agents, acting on the basis of their beliefs in order to achieve their goals. In this perspective, the decision process is a cognitive evaluation of conflicting goals, based on different beliefs and values, but also on emotions and desires. We refer to a cognitive analysis of emotions and we integrate them in this more general RDT.

Mind & Society, 2006

In the decision-making and rationality research field, Rational Decision Theory (RDT) has always been the main framework, thanks to the elegance and complexity of its mathematical tools. Unfortunately, the formal refinement of the theory is not accompanied by a satisfying predictive accuracy, thus there is a big gap between what is predicted by the theory and the behavior of real subjects. Here we propose a new foundation of the RDT, which has to be based on a cognitive architecture for reason-based agents, acting on the basis of their beliefs in order to achieve their goals. In this perspective, the decision process is a cognitive evaluation of conflicting goals, based on different beliefs and values, but also on emotions and desires. We refer to a cognitive analysis of emotions and we integrate them in this more general RDT.

Journal of Economic Psychology, 2005

Herbert Simon has warned us that an explanatory account of human rationality must identify the significance of emotions for choice behavior. Customarily emphasizing the cognitive dimensions of decision making, relatively few researchers have paid close attention to specifying the complex ways in which emotion may shape human thinking and decisions. Accordingly, this paper is an attempt to follow Simon's suggestion and specify how emotions can enter into the theory of bounded rationality. To accomplish our task, we capitalize on Rom Harr e's work on causal powers, from which we propose a strategy to study the significance of emotion in decision-making processes. In an attempt to elaborate on an explanation of behavior by mechanism, we discuss a version of bounded rationality recently put forward by Gigerenzer, Todd, and the ABC Research Group [Simple Heuristics that Make us Smart, Oxford University Press, New York, 1999] and Gigerenzer and Selten [Bounded Rationality: The Adaptive Toolbox, MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, 2001, pp. 1-12], the so-called adaptive toolbox of fast and frugal heuristics. Coupled with insights from evolutionary psychology and neuroscience, this version of bounded rationality gives us a better grasp of the functional role of emotions within the human decision machinery.

Consistent with what seems to be common parlance, philosophers like Amélie O. Rorty and Jesse J. Prinz have argued that emotions are not, strictly speaking, rational in-themselves. I argue that emotions can be understood not only as being rational in-themselves, i.e., intrinsically rational, strictly speaking, but also as being instrumentally rational, epistemically rational, and evaluatively rational. I begin with a discussion of what it means for emotions to be rational or irrational in-themselves, which includes the derivation of a criterion for the ontological rationality of emotions (CORe): For emotion or any emotion-type there exists some normative standard, given by what emotion is or what an emotion-type is, against which our emotional responses can be judged or evaluated, in light of the fact that our emotions manifest our rationality. I then distinguish what it means for emotions to be rational in-themselves from what it means for emotions to be instrumentally rational, epistemically rational, and evaluatively rational. Finally, I bring my argument to a close by providing a sketch of an account of what emotions are—emotions as superordinate inference rules—that fulfills the CORe, and I conclude with a brief discussion of the implications of this account of emotions on claims of knowledge, and how we understand the rationality of infants, some people with disabilities, and emotional animals.

Interdisciplinary Description of Complex Systems Scientific Journal, 2009

Decision making is traditionally viewed as a rational process where reason calculates the best way to achieve the goal. Investigations from different areas of cognitive science have shown that human decisions and actions are much more influenced by intuition and emotional responses then it was previously thought. In this paper I examine the role of emotion in decision making, particularly Damasio's hypothesis of somatic markers and Green's dual process theory of moral judgment. I conclude the paper with the discussion of the threat that deliberation and conscious rationality is an illusion.

Anyone whose interests he in real-life decision processes is bound to note the oft times disturbing role that emotions play in such processes, particularly in the areas of assessment of information and long-range planning. Instead of simply dismissing emotions as noisome, irrational agents in the decision making process, one needs to obtain an understanding of their nature and how they influence the decision making process in order to acquire better control of them. This paper proposes a model of emotions based primarily on the following assumptions: (1) The whole set of emotions forms a system that is evolutionally developed and generically programmed -a system that serves the purpose of making decisions that are appropriate to the kinds of environments that can be characterized as primitive and wild. The non-emotional, more analytical decision system is a product of a much later period in evolution which, along with other higher cognitive-analytical functions, developed primarily to supplement, but not to replace, the emotion system by covering its shortcomings. Thus, even though these two systems are often in conflict, the cognitive decision system does not operate without the help of the emotion system; without desires, loves, and hates there hardly would be utilities. (3) The first assumption gives rise to the possibility of studying the emotion system as a purposeful, rational decision system in its own right.

2001

Emotions and rationality often are seen as polar opposites. In this seminar, we draw on literature from both economics and psychology to understand whether this view is warranted. As suggested by the title of this seminar announcement, our working hypothesis is that emotions are indeed rational in a sense that will be made precise. The seminar will be conducted in English.