Śaṅkara and Bhāskara on Vaiśeṣika

Journal of the International Association of Buddhist Studies, pp. 107-137, 2015

the cOncePtiOn Of atOMS aS exiSting in SubhaguPta 109 3. aggregates of atoms are not real entities in themselves, i.e. new ontological realities different from the atoms that compose them. Much to the contrary, he aims to prove that atoms are that truly existing unitary entity and, precisely because of this, arise as aggregated ('dus pa, which corresponds to both the Sanskrit terms *sañcita or *saṅghata/samhata). 11 11 hattori (1968: 89) distinguishes between sañcita and saṅghata and maintains that diṅnaga (in AP kk. 1-5) and Vasubandhu (in Vims k. 11 and vrtti) divide realists into three groups according to their theories on the object-supports (alambana) of cognitions. the first group maintains that the object of a cognition is a dravya, i.e., an individual atom or an avayavin, the second group maintains that it is the aggregate (sañcita) of atoms, and the third maintains that it is the gathering (saṅghata) of atoms. he then adds that the second group is reported by Kuiji to be the Vaibhasikas. Subhagupta likely does not distinguish between sañcita atoms and saṅghata atoms in baSK. he certainly refutes arguments against the aggregates of atoms, 'dus pa, in AP, and atoms, as aggregated, samhata, in Vims. Moreover, as we will see, he states that there is only one way to understand 'dus pa, which is single atoms that arise in aggregation. in this sense, here, i shall briefly discuss the use of the term 'dus pa (as well as sañcita and saṅghata) in those works that Subhagupta had in mind: AP, Vims, Pramanavarttika (PV) and Pramanasamuccaya (PS). in AP 1-2 and APV, diṅnaga mentions two theses regarding an external object as the object-support (dmigs pa) of a sense perception: atoms, because they are its cause, and aggregates of them (de 'dus pa), because the cognition arises as endowed with their appearance. after discussing and refuting these two alternatives, in AP 3 and APV, he introduces another position by some masters upholding the view of atoms as being the cause of a cognition that appears with the image of their aggregates ('dus pa). the tibetan translation in both cases is 'dus pa and it is impossible, based only on those two works, to determine if diṅnaga distinguishes between sañcita and saṅghata in those two theses. in Vims 11 and vrtti, Vasubandhu lists three possibilities for an external ayatana to be the object of sense perceptions: (i) one, like the part-possessor (avayavin) admitted by the Vaisesikas; (ii) many atoms; or (iii) those atoms, as aggregated (samhata). Subsequently, while discussing the third thesis and referring to the Vaibhasikas from Kasmīr, he uses saṅghata to allude to the view on the aggregates of atoms according to the latter school. therefore, Vasubandhu mentions only the possibility of saṅghata/samhata atoms, and not sañcita. the corresponding tibetan translation for that is -once again -'dus pa. Kapstein (2001: 186) introduces these three theses as follows: (1) the whole as a simple part-possessing form; (2) the mere sum of atomic parts; and (3) a unified collection of atomic parts. in PV Pratyaksa 195 (to which, as we will see, Subhagupta appears to be alluding) dharmakīrti mentions sañcita; the tibetan translation in that case is bsags. in PS 1.15b and PSV ad 1.4cd, diṅnaga likely uses, respectively, the terms cita (perhaps only for metrical reasons) and sañcita. the tibetan corresponding for sañcita (in PSV ad 1.4cd) are 'dus pa in the translation of Vasudhararaksita and Seng rgyal (hattori 1968: 178) and bsags pa in the translation of Kanakavarman and dad pa'i shes rab (hattori 1968: 179). the tibetan corresponding for cita (in PS 1.15b) is bsags pa (hattori 1968: 188, 189). i shall give preference to sañcita as corresponding to 'dus pa in the passages of baSK referred to in the present article.

The paper tries to compare Vaiseshika philosophy with modern science and find out some similarities and contrasts between the two.

A brief discussion of Vaisesika Darshana by Sage Kanada.

Journal of Indian Philosophy, 2022

As Buddhist externalists, both Saṅghabhadra and Śubhagupta claim the existence of an external object on the basis of atomism. In this paper, I will show the interrelationship between Saṅghabhadra’s and Śubhagupta’s atomic theories. Regarding the ontological status of the aggregation of atoms, both of them agree on a Vaibhāṣika principle that the aggregation of atoms, as a real substance, can serve as an object-support of cognition. Based on this principle, their similarities can be further explicated from three aspects. Regarding epistemology, Śubhagupta differs from Saṅghabhadra on the cognitive process of the awareness of something blue. For Saṅghabhadra, a gross object is grasped by non-conceptual sensory consciousness because it is a real entity aggregated by atoms. Through the function of vitarka of sensory consciousness, an object with its essential nature, i.e., the colour blue, is distinguished from other entities. Then, it is known as the notion ‘blue’, which is a mere provisional existence, through the conceptual thought of mental consciousness. However, for Śubhagupta, a coarse object such as something blue is only a mental error of conceptual construction.

Sophia, 2024

Vasubandhu’s arguments against atomism in Viṃśikā stanzas 12-13 are not strong enough to disprove that atoms are simple partless substances. However, if we take the special composition question into consideration, Viṃśikā stanza 13ab can be regarded as an objection to so-called ‘series-style answers’, which results in an undesirable conclusion for the opponents, i.e., the Vaibhāṣikas. A step back to a simple bonding answer is not a good choice for the Vaibhāṣikas in responding to this objection because the simple bonding answer leads to other difficulties and because some notions in Vaibhāṣika atomic theory entail multigrade relations in the material aggregates of atoms. Hence, the objection to series-style answers still makes sense in the refutation of Buddhist atomism through the claim that atoms are not proper parts of a material aggregate.

Journal of Dharma Studies, 2019

The representation of a rose varies considerably across philosophical, religious, and scientific schools of thought. While many would suggest that a rose exists objectively, as a physical object in geometric space reducible to fundamental particles such as atoms or quarks, others propose that a rose is an emergent whole that exists meaningfully when experienced subjectively for its sweet fragrance and red hue, its soft petals and thorny stem. Some might even maintain that a rose is "consciousness-only," having no existence apart from conscious perception. Thus, we find a spectrum of realist to idealist perspectives. Even in Dharma studies, with a common basis in Indian thought, the Vaiśeṣikas, Vaibhāṣikas, and the vijñaptimātra doctrine of the Yogācārin-Vijñānavādins entertain diverging perspectives. On one hand, the Vaiśeṣikas, a school of Vedic philosophy, propounded a theory of reality in the form of indivisible, eternal atoms, a metaphysical approach counter to the doctrine of not-self (anātman) in Buddhism. The Vaibhāṣikas, a school of early Buddhist atomism, on the other hand, denied the existence of a true self or eternal soul (ātman) as substratum for reality but maintained their own theory of atomism. For the Vaibhāṣikas, the flow of consciousness may be segmented into discrete moments, yet unlike many of their Buddhist contemporaries from other schools, they asserted that all cognizable phenomena are truly existent insofar as they consist of physically irreducible atoms. Among their objectors were the Yogācārin-Vijñānavādins who proposed the theory of consciousness-only (vijñaptimātra), rejecting the independent existence of indivisible atoms and discrete moments of time. This paper introduces the dialectic that formed between these schools through Vasubandhu's fourth century C.E. text Twenty Verses on Consciousness-Only (Viṃśikāvijñaptimātratāsiddhi). While the gulf between the realist and idealist positions may seem, at times, irreconcilable, we integrate findings from the field of physics, particularly quantum mechanics (and several philosophical interpretations thereof) within the realm of modern science as a possible bridge between these otherwise seemingly disparate systems of Dharma.

Foundations of Science for Sustainable Future: Principles and Innovations, 2024

The majority of Old Uyghur texts consist of religious works that were translated from languages such as Sogdian, Tocharian, Chinese, Tibetan, and Sanskrit, often related to Buddhism. These Buddhism-themed texts contain views on the foundation of the formation of the macro- and micro-cosmos or the smallest building block of matter, the atom. Most of these views are associated with the ancient Indian schools of thought. Particularly significant are the views on atom theory from the Vaiśeṣika school, which accepts atomism, and the Vaibhāṣika school of Hīnayāna Buddhism. In addition, it is possible to find the views of the Mādhyamika and Yogācāra schools, which are associated with Mahāyāna Buddhism and opposed to the atomic material theory, in these texts. The views of these schools in Old Uyghur texts are often presented within a religious framework. In this context, there are some terms related to atoms in Old Uyghur, such as par(a)manu, ärtiŋü inčgä, kog, kıčmık. These terms are interpreted in accordance with the Old Uyghur texts. Therefore, in texts that embrace an atomist approach, these terms carry the meaning of “atom, very small particle,” whereas in texts that reject atomism, they express the meaning of “dust, very small particle.” Consequently, the meanings of Old Uyghur words or terms are also subject to variation based on the religious sects and schools they are associated with.

The molecule was composed of atoms, and the atom was nowhere large enough even to be spoken of as extraordinary small. It was so small, such a tiny, early, transitional mass, a coagulation of the unsubstantial, of the non-yetsubstantial and yet substance-like, of energy, that it was scarcely possible to think of it as material, but rather as mean and borderline between material and immaterial.

arXiv:0712.0764, 2007

This note contrasts the Greek and Indian conceptions of the atom. It is shown that these conceptions are quite different in spirit.

Oliver Hellmann / Benedikt Strobel (Hrsg.) Rezeptionen der Vorsokratiker von der Antike bis in die Gegenwart: Akten der 22. Tagung der Karl und Gertrud Abel-Stiftung vom 29. bis 30. Juni 2018 in Trier, 2022