Leibniz, Spinoza and an Alleged Dilemma for Rationalists

Metaphysical Grounding: Understanding the Structure of Reality, edited by Fabrice Correia and Benjamin Schnieder, 2012

"Spinoza is the rationalist philosopher par excellence, making every conceivable emancipatory claim for reason in delineating the connection of reason to freedom and power. Spinoza develops a philosophy which affirms the emancipatory function of reason. This kind of philosophy has been challenged in recent times by postmodernist modes of thought. Whereas Spinoza affirms knowledge as power in a positive sense, the likes of Michel Foucault argue a knowledge/power nexus that savours more of an Hobbesian ceaseless conflict. Foucault’s equation of all forms of knowledge with the endless exercise of a power, the effects of which may be discursively placed but whose authority cannot be subject to rational criticism, explicitly denies the emancipatory function that Spinoza assigned to reason. Free of such rational critique, discourse inspired by Foucault lacks political and ethical import. Not surprisingly, Foucault’s work has proved itself to be compatible with a wide range of political platforms, spanning the spectrum from New Left to New Right. This political ambivalence directly follows from the loss of an ethical position owing to the denial of rational critique. The distinguishing characteristic of ‘the Left’ in both politics and ethics has been the commitment not just to challenge existing power structures in favour of the poor, the marginalized and the suppressed but to associate this challenge with a commitment to distinguish truth from ideological mystification and obfuscation. In connecting his rational philosophy with democratic politics, Spinoza is a ‘Left’ thinker in this grand tradition. This thesis highlights the ‘radical’ aspects of Spinoza’s rationalist philosophy, finding inspiration in his God-Nature relation, his democratic politics and his commitment to free rational thinking as subversive of all forms of coercive or state-sanctioned religious doctrine. The book argues that Spinoza makes it possible to resist the postmodernist drift by affirming the possibility of separating truth from illusion, reason from rhetoric. In this manner, philosophy can retain its emancipatory function and engage the political, social and economic issues of the day in a critical and emancipatory sense. In delineating the terms of freedom, knowledge and power and in showing their connection to each other, Spinoza offers a means of resisting the relativising tendencies of contemporary theory and, indeed, the way that this relativism in ethics serves existing power and entrenches the forces of political conservatism. The truth, for Spinoza, is the product not of consensus-belief but of rational critique which subjects existing norms and values to question. Not the least of Spinoza’s achievements is to have shown how such rational critique – the very stuff of philosophy – is no longer an elitist concern leading to the philosopher-ruler but has the potential to emancipate all humankind, since knowledge is key to an active relation to the world." This book has now been published and is available for purchase.

"Roczniki Filozoficzne" , 2017

The subject of this article is Leibnizian interpretation of the principle of reason. Although the German philosopher called it principium grande of his philosophy, we do not find its systematic exposition in Leibniz’s works. The main aim of my paper is to present a short exposition of the principle. The article consists of three parts: in the first I present systematic exposition of the principle of reason with particular emphasis on explication of terms “principle” and “reason,” in the second, I show the origins of the principle, finally, in the third part, I discuss in detail three forms of it: the principle of sufficient reason, the principle of determining reason and the principle of rendering reason. I accept two main theses: firstly, a proper interpretation of this principle requires taking into account the whole context of Leibnizian philosophy, i.e. one cannot limit oneself (as it is usually happens among researchers) to only one discipline, e.g. logic. Secondly, the ultimate metho­do­logical and heuristical foundation of the principle of reason is Leibnizian metaphysics, especially natural theology.

The Cambridge Critical Guide to Spinoza's Ethics, Yitzhak Melamed, ed. Cambridge, 2017

The Southern Journal of Philosophy, 1986

The principle of sufficient reason (P S R) is probably the most important but the least understood of Leibniz's principles. References t o the principle in Leibniz's work tend to be ambiguous, and commentators have, as a result, differed regarding its interpretation and its role in Leibniz's thought. A proper understanding of the PSR is essential to a proper comprehension of the roles of and connections between Leibniz's logic and metaphysics. Leibniz sometimes gives the impression that the principle is a purely logical one, derived from or identified with the principle that all truth is analytic (i.e. explicitly or 'virtually'reducible to first truths or identities). At other times, he gives the impression that it is a metaphysical principle: For example, in the letters to Clarke and elsewhere, Leibniz formulates the PSR as the principle that God does nothing without a reason.1 The PSR is also used as a principle of (efficient) causation: that nothing can exist, nor event occur, nor state of affairs obtain, without a cause. In fact, as we shall see, the logical and metaphysical interpretations all involve legitimate formulation of the principle. Nevertheless, Leibniz treats the PSR a s a single principle, and it is important to see how, despite the diverse formulations, he can d o so. To that end, I will show how God and the system of pre-established harmony play central roles in the unification of the PSR. During this century, reflecting the prominence of logic in contemporary philosophy, logical formulations of Leibniz's PSR, under which it is part of his definition of truth as containment of the predicate concept in the subject concept, have come to the forefront of discussion. Indeed it is accepted by many commentators as the primary or "deep" version of the principle. For some commentators (e.g. Couturat2 and Russell3)), this focus resulted in an attempt to reduce what they take to Lois Frankef(Ph. D. Universiry of Cal$urnia, Berkeley. 1980)has written on Descarfes, Leibniz, and Anne Conuay. and is currenr1.v researching [he evolurivn of the concepr of causarion in the sevenreenlh and eighreenrh cenruries. 31 This is not to deny that there are a number of passages, especially in Leibniz's later writing, which suggested that for contingent truths, the deductioncannever becompleted. Nevertheless, he still holds that each contingent truth has a deductiveprocess converging to an identity. 32 NE IV xvii 3: G v 457/RB 475 33 See Benson Mates, "Leibniz on the Phaedo", Akren des [I. Infernationalen Leibniz-j4 See also, Of the Radical Originarion of Things: G vii 302/ L 486 3) New System of Nature 14: G iv 484/ W I 14f 36 Specimen Dynamicum: G M vi 242/ W I3 I 37 Specimen Dynamicum: GM vi 242/ W 132 38 On Nature Ilself3: G iv 505/ L 499 39 G iv 5231 L 496 40G iv 518/L 493

HUMBLING THE RATIONAL: A HUMEAN CRITIQUE OF LEIBNIZ'S PRINCIPLE OF SUFFICIENT REASON, 2018

"Why is there something rather than nothing?" asked 17th-century polymath and philosopher G.W. Leibniz. Indeed, it is this query which still looms over metaphysics today. To Leibniz, the fact that every effect has a cause led to his commitment to what philosophers refer to as the principle of sufficient reason. However, does every derivative genuinely derive from some derivation? If not, what ramifications would this error have on the Leibnizian project? This piece will begin with an explication concerning some main instances in the Leibnizian corpus, where Leibniz gives argumentative support for the principle of sufficient reason. Next, this article will enter the perspective of 18th-century philosopher David Hume, who by denying the sturdiness of causal relations, assisted in jeopardizing this backbone of Leibnizian thought. Lastly, this essay will close with support for Hume's account of causality over Leibniz's, by drawing the reader to consider the problems uncovered by Hume, and their impact on Leibnizian metaphysics, via discrediting the principle of sufficient reason.

BJHP

Can one be an early modern rationalist and still have room for the subjective character of human experience? At least prima facie , rationalism and subjectiv-ity seem to confl ict. On the one hand, there is rationalism's commitment to the complete intelligibility of being, clearly expressed in Spinoza's adherence to the Principle of Suffi cient Reason. On the other, there is our subjective experience of the world, which many view as unique and irreducible. But a rationalist metaphysical enquiry sub specie aeternitatis such as the one pursued by Spinoza appears to exclude such a seemingly arbitrary privileging of a particular finite perspective. In this paper, I argue that we may be too quick in reading Spinoza's Ethics as simply attempting to develop such " a view from nowhere. " Instead, we should try to conceive of Spinoza's project as a dynamic interplay between rationalist and empiricist elements, where subjective experience supplements conceptual analysis, rather than being excluded by it.

Oxford Handbook of Spinoza

This chapter investigates Spinoza's commitment to the Principle of Sufficient Reason (the PSR) and its role in his system. What sorts of things does Spinoza think require a cause or explanation? What counts, for him, as a cause or explanation? The PSR is often associated with doctrines such as necessitarianism, the Principle of the Identity of Indiscernibles, the Principle of Plenitude, and the existence of God. Some commentators have alleged that Spinoza's commitment to the PSR leads him to accept all of these doctrines. This paper examines each of these doctrines as they pertain to Spinoza's commitment to the PSR and his metaphysics more generally.

The main thesis of Michael Della Rocca's outstanding Spinoza book (Della Rocca 2008a) is that at the very center of Spinoza's philosophy stands the Principle of Sufficient Reason (PSR): the stipulation that everything must be explainable or, in other words, the rejection of any brute facts. Della Rocca rightly ascribes to Spinoza a strong version of the PSR. it is not only that the actual existence and features of all things must be explicable, but even nonexistence-as well as the absence of any feature of any thing-demands an explanation. Della Rocca does not stop here, however. He feeds his PSR monster with some more powerful steroids and suggests that Spinoza advocates what he terms "the twofold use of the PSR." It is not only that everything must be explained and made intelligible, but it must ultimately be explained in terms of explicability or intelligibility itself. Thrs twofold use of the PSR is the key to the entire book. Della Rocca's strategy throughout the book is to argue that any key feature of Spinoza's system-be it causality, inherence, essence, consciousness, existence, rejection of teleology, goodness or political right-must be explained, and ultimately it must be explained in terms of intelligibility.