Differentiating Disobedients

Roczniki Filozoficzne, 2016

Res Publica

Standard accounts of civil disobedience include nonviolence as a necessary condition. Here I argue that such accounts are mistaken and that civil disobedience can include violence in many aspects, primarily excepting violence directed at other persons. I base this argument on a novel understanding of civil disobedience: the special persuasive force of the practice comes from its combination of condemnation of a political practice with an expressed commitment to the political. The commitment to the political is a commitment to engaging with others as co-members in the political project of living together, and so to treating others as persons to be persuaded. I show how such an understanding of civil disobedience is superior to the Rawlsian strain of thought, which focuses on fidelity to law. Rawls was concerned with civil disobedience solely in the context of overriding political obligation. The project of characterizing a contestatory political practice that can be distinguished and used in a wider variety of contexts than Rawls is concerned with, including under illegitimate regimes, beyond the nation-state, or on behalf of anarchism, requires a different understanding of civil disobedience.

Abstract: The article defends the forms of civil disobedience currently practised by environmental protesters. It reviews the justifications of civil disobedience by Dworkin, Rawls and Singer, and finds them more or less wanting. A new and more extensive justification is provided on the basis of our duties to prevent harm befalling future generations.

Uncivil Disobedience: Theological Perspectives (David Gides ed., Fortress Press), 2023

In pluralist societies, we are bound to disagree about matters of shared concern. Such disagreement bears danger: for we easily take offense and, reasonably or not, we often perceive disagreement with our views as a denigration of what we stand for, and, by extension, of our person. Hence the ubiquitous calls for civility-for restraining our conduct and speech in such a way as to display proper respect toward those with whom we disagree. In Forbearance: A Theological Ethic for a Disagreeable Church, James Calvin Davis extols the "virtues of civility," including humility, patience, trust, and, most fundamentally, forbearance, which he defines as "the active commitment to maintain Christian community through disagreement." 1 From a secular perspective, civility is the glue that keeps us bound together across different faiths and despite our disagreements. It is for this reason an essential virtue of democratic citizenship-a disposition to value and foster because it is conducive to social stability-even though it can never fully defuse the dangers coiled in the fact of disagreement. Civility demands abiding by shared social norms of reciprocity and respect-rules such as greeting etiquette and formalities of language that the society deems essential in the practice of disagreement. Civility also demands law-abidance in the interest of social stability. Lawbreaking, no matter its motivation, risks destabilizing society in multiple ways. Lawbreaking may involve violating other people's rights, which the law is set up to protect. Even when disobedients act in pursuit of justice, their actions can destabilize society because it is illegal and appears antidemocratic: in disobeying the law, agents place themselves above it; they substitute their own judgment to that of the majority and thereby express a kind of arrogance and contempt for

Israel Law Review, 2002

Following Rawls' footsteps 4 , the philosophical literature commonly distinguishes between civil disobedience and conscientious objection. Theoreticians have not attained unanimity on all the details of this distinction; however, for the purposes of this discussion we shall present the distinction in a general manner, which will enable us to proceed with the argument below. Civil disobedience-"is an act contrary to law done for political reasons, with the aim of directly bringing about a Damages", as the argument attacked by Gans in this section does not establish our position-it rather defends it from the point of view of the person refusing to serve himself. Likewise, we shall not deal with the justification for the war into which Israel has been drawn in recent years or with Gans's erroneous understanding of our argument in that regard. These important issues (on which we do have an opinion) diverge from the main objective of this article, namely, to present the distinctions relating to conscientious objection itself.

Danish Yearbook of Philosophy, 2018

The article argues that civil disobedience must be perceived as an action with progressive and political significance, thus reflecting, from a Kantian perspective, the recognizable paradox between morality and law, as expressed in Kant's moral and political writings. Hence, this article firstly analyzes on which grounds Kant claims rebellion to be unjust. Secondly, it examines how and if people, from a Kantian point of view, can defend themselves against an unjust sovereignty. On this basis, it argues that 'civil disobedience' can be juxtaposed with the Kantian idea of 'freedom of the pen,' thus having the same function as a political corrective. However, two questions are still to be answered, namely if civil disobedience must be punished, and if civil disobedience as a political corrective can be justified? By considering civil disobedience primarily as political agency, both questions are answered in the affirmative.

2021

Ratio Juris, 2002

In Taking Rights Seriously Dworkin claimed that people had strong rights to disobey the law so that the government would be wrong to punish anyone who exercised them. This claim raises fundamental questions about the source of obligation and the limits of legitimacy. These questions of political theory have been given surprisingly little attention by him or his critics. I examine whether strong rights make any sense and conclude that his political theory cannot even generate the minimal prima facie obligation necessary to justify coercion, and hence, law. My solution is to interpret justice in the same way as law. Dworkin resists what I call Justice as Integrity because of concerns about ethical relativism. By considering his more recent works on objectivity and moral truth, I attempt to show that Dworkin's aversion to Moral Constructivism is based on an undue fear of the uncertainty of social practices and an undue faith in the certainty of empirical observation. By reconstructing the interpretive derivations of justice I offer a method to make the idea of obligation, strong rights, and hence, law as integrity, more viable. proposed, they make them more viable.