Autonomy Here and Now

Chi.-Kent L. Rev., 1993

CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW requirement that a "fully adequate" system of basic liberties be protected and given priority over (that is, never sacrificed to) social goods such as prosperity, efficiency, and a high level of culture. 3 This requirement, which Rawls refers to as his "first principle of justice," does not prescribe liberty in the abstract, but rather requires respect for a select list of basic liberties derived from the bill of rights tradition. 4 This list includes freedom of conscience, association, to engage in political activity, and from arbitrary arrest. 5 Rawls defends his proposed principles of justice by arguing that they are central parts of fair terms of social cooperation for mutual advantage between free and equal persons. In the "original position" rational representatives of the members of society are asked to choose principles of justice. 6 The veil of ignorance deprives these representatives of information about themselves and their temporal and social positions, thus assuring that they will choose principles that are impartial or fair in spite of the fact that they choose from self-interested reasons. Since the veil of ignorance deprives them of much knowledge relevant to the choice and specification of liberties and rights, the basic liberties that they choose must be rather abstract. They will not be very clear about the exact scope of these liberties and rights until they reach the constitutional stage-where they will create a 3. POLITICAL LIBERALISM, supra note 1, at 291; see also JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971) [hereinafter A THEORY OF JUSTICE]. 4. A Theory of Justice gives the following formulation of the principles of justice: First: each person is to have an equal right to the most extensive basic liberty compatible with a similar liberty for others. Second: social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they are both (a) reasonably expected to be to everyone's advantage, and (b) attached to positions and offices open to all. A THEORY OF JUSTICE, supra note 3, at 60. The first part of the second principle is often referred to as the "difference principle," and the second part as the "equal opportunity principle." Although Rawls continues to refer to the first of these as his "first principle of justice," in Political Liberalism it is preceded by another principle concerned with basic needs: the first principle covering the equal basic rights and liberties may easily be preceded by a lexically prior principle requiring that citizens' basic needs be met, at least insofar as their being met is necessary for citizens to understand and to be able fruitfully to exercise those rights and liberties. POLITICAL LIBERALISM, supra note 1, at 7; see also id. at 228. With the introduction of a basic needs principle, Rawls has four normative principles, with each item having lexical priority over the items beneath it: A. The basic needs principle; B. The basic liberties and rights principle; C. The equal opportunity principle; D. The difference principle. For purposes of this paper, I will continue to refer to the liberties and rights principle as the "first principle." 5. See infra Section II for Rawls's complete list. 6. A THEORY OF JUSTICE, supra note 3, at 17-22.

DEFENDOLOGIJA, 2016

John Rawls’s concept of political liberalism provides new arguments in defi ningpolitical concept of justice. The issues of social inequality and distribution of goods insociety are put aside and in the political focus are the citizens who are in favor of differentphilosophical, moral and religious universal doctrines. The central issue which the conceptof political liberalism seeks to resolve is how is it possible for a society made up ofpluralism of different confronting universal doctrines to be well-ordered and stable. Thepaper focuses on essential elements of political liberalism whose aim is to regulate theplural coexistence of universal doctrines.

There are several things which I hope the reader will take away from this thesis. The first is that I believe contemporary political philosophy gravely misinterprets Rawls. Discussions are too concentrated on the theories contained in A Theory of Justice. However, as demonstrated in chapters two and three, there are criticisms we can level at his thinking which prove fatal. One of the most damaging is that Rawls repeats current liberal views without sufficient justification. If we look more deeply into Rawls’ views we find that at critical points of his construction key foundations are missing. Therefore, we also come to realise that the early Rawls cannot answer the charge of cultural subjectivity. It is essential to all discussions of Rawls that this fact be taken into account. The later Rawls rejects the universalist claims of his earlier theory and thus also rejects its precepts. He states that the justice as fairness of his earlier self was culturally subjective and admits that it is, in fact, only to be applicable to Western societies. Not only that, but justice as fairness, within our Western societies, is not to be taken as any more valid than any other rationally cohesive philosophy. He ultimately fails in his aim of finding a universal theory.

The Journal of Political Philosophy, 2006

WHAT sort of liberal is Rawls? What sort of liberal is a philosopher who makes the citizen (and not the individual) the subject of his political liberalism; who starts from a normative-political definition of the citizen as a moral person with moral powers; who makes overlapping consensus (and not the balance of interests) his theory’s central regulative ideal; who makes reasonableness (rather than strategic rationality) the principle that is to guide discussion among free and equal citizens; and who has such a patently constitutive-civic conception of primary goods? Add to this that Rawls declares his theory of the good society compatible with the tradition of classical republicanism and thinks it capable of answering Marx’s four major criticisms of liberalism.1 Truly, Rawls is not an easy thinker to situate as a philosopher of liberty: it is difficult to decide whether his theory is best interpreted in terms of the republican tradition or in terms of the liberal tradition; there is a good deal of republicanism in his doctrine, but also a good deal of liberalism. The aim of this article is to help determine which tradition affords the best interpretation of Rawls, above all the later Rawls: the author of Political Liberalism and Justice as Fairness: A Restatement. I presuppose throughout the article a certain familiarity with Rawls’ thought on the part of the reader.

To be a liberal is, among other things, to grant basic liberties some degree of priority over other aspects of justice. But why do basic liberties warrant this special treatment? For Rawls, the answer has to do with the allegedly special connection between these freedoms and the 'two moral powers' of reasonableness and rationality. Basic freedoms are said to be preconditions for the development and exercise of these powers and are held to warrant priority over other justice-relevant values for that reason. In the first half of the article I mount an internal critique of this Rawlsian line, arguing that it is flawed in two main ways. First, it overestimates the contribution of basic freedom to moral personality. Second, it underestimates the contribution of non-liberty resources (such as basic material necessities, but also opportunities for culture, education, leisure, and social contribution) to moral personality. In the second half of the article I repair these flaws (thus putting liberty in its proper place, if you like). The result is a new, intriguingly radical version of justice as fairness, one with surprising—yet plausible—implications for economic and gender justice.

2015

Analysis, 1972

Rawls' book is a comprehensive and systematic presentation of a particular ideal of social life. The aim of the book is to analyze this ideal in a way that allows us to see clearly how it differs from prominent alternatives and on what grounds it may be preferred to them. In carrying out this analysis Rawls presents and draws upon not only a theory of distributive justice and a theory of political rights, but also a theory of value, a theory of obligation and a theory of moral psychology. Contemporary political philosophy has already been altered by Rawls' book, but the leading ideas of his theory are in a number of respects familiar ones. They are familiar within the philosophical community since they have been set forth by Rawls in a series of important and influential articles over the course of the last fifteen years.' Rawls has altered and clarified important points in his argument since these articles first appeared, and the book presents a large amount of new material, but the main thrust of Rawls' theory can be seen in these shorter works. The idea of Rawls' book will also seem familiar to many who have not read his articles, for the ideal of social life he describes is one that lies at the heart of liberal political theory, and the principles and policies which this ideal supports are, in general, ones that liberals have traditionally supported. Finally, the central analytical device in Rawls' argument is a variant of the familiar idea of a social contract. Such a contract is perhaps most often thought of in connection with accounts of the origins of political authority. While Rawls does give an account of political obligation (one which does not require actual consent) his use of the idea of accepting institutions in an initial contractual situation is not confined to this purpose but serves more broadly as the basis for critical appraisal of economic, t Associate Professor of Philosophy, Princeton University. A.B. Princeton University, 1962; Ph.D. Harvard University, 1968. 1 Rawls' basic thesis about justice was set forth in Justice as Fairness, 67 PHm. REv. 164 (1958). This article has been widely reprinted, e.g. in PH-nosoPnT, PoL.iucs AND SOCrTy: SECOND SERIEs 132 (P. Laslett & W. Runciman eds. 1962) and in Jus-c. AND SocIAL POLICY 80 (F. Olafson ed. 1961). His ideas on liberty were developed in

Can members of democratic societies reach agreement about a political conception of justice despite the fact that our religious and secular views are mutually incompatible? What shall we make of this doctrinal pluralism? Do we have reasons to expect our fellow citizens to do their share in bringing about and maintaining a just democracy? These questions are central to John Rawls's political liberalism. The answers citizens give to these questions shape their attitudes to liberal democracy and politics in general. Schaub reconstructs Rawls's ambitious project of reconciliation with liberal democracy, subjects it to comprehensive criticism, and reveals its Hegelian roots.