Unified Semantics of Singular Terms

2009

In this introduction I start by presenting and examining the main positions on the current debate concerning the semantic analysis of sentences containing definite descriptions. As is known, the debate in question has started off with Russell’s proposal (Russell 1905), which has been initially criticized by both Strawson (1950) and Donnellan (1966). Nowadays, waters are divided on this issue: some philosophers, representing the so-called univocality approach (Kripke 1977, Neale 1990), defend Russell’s original analysis, according to which all definite descriptions are

2004

Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 1998

Many philosophers of language have held that a truthconditional semantic account can explain the data motivating the distinction between referential and attributive uses of definite descriptions, but I believe this is a mistake. I argue that these data also motivate what I call "dual-aspect" uses as a distinct but closely related type. After establishing that an account of the distinction must also explain dual-aspect uses, I argue that the truth-conditional Semantic Model of the distinction cannot. Thus, the Semantic Model cannot explain the data for which it is developed and so fails as an account of the referential/attributive distinction.

Pacific philosophical quarterly, 2005

2007

Abstract Sentences with more than one quantifier often exhibit ambiguities. For example,'Every miner went to a meeting'has two readings depending on whether we take there to be one meeting that every miner went to or (possibly) different meetings corresponding to each miner. This paper discusses the theory that such ambiguities are directly akin to quantifier scope ambiguities in logic.

2007

ABSTRACT: The purpose of this essay is to advance and defend a theory on the notion of logical form as a representation of the structure of the meanings of natural language sentences. Central to this defense is an examination of Russell’s 1905 theory of descriptions. Following an investigation of the different ways in which this theory has been applied (for instance, in metaphysics, epistemology, philosophy of mind, and philosophical psychology), it is argued that there is a modified application of this theory that can be defended as a substantive contribution to a general theory on the semantics of natural language. This general theory proposes that linguistic meaning be treated as determined by grammatical form on the supposition that the syntactic compositionality inherent in the forms of sentences involving descriptive phrases is systematically commensurate with the compositionality inherent in the structures associated with their meanings. The result is a theory of descriptions which, while largely abandoning the view that natural language grammatical form is misleading, remains consonant with the general spirit of the Russellian program by proposing to build structure into the language of logic as a way of rendering perspicuous our knowledge of the logical forms of natural language sentences. Following recent developments in linguistics, it is argued that semantic interpretation applies at an abstract level of analysis that linguists call “Logical Form.” A systematic procedure is then articulated for transforming the sentences of natural language into structures that facilitate a direct mapping onto the formulas of a logical grammar. This grammar consists of a non-standard second-order logic with restricted quantifiers, lambda abstracts for complex predicates, and nominalized predicates. In the process of applying this logical grammar to natural language, an inter-linguistic, comparative approach is adopted that looks to other natural languages such as Chinese. It is shown, for instance, how the system here developed yields logical forms for sentences in Chinese involving intensional contexts. Such sentences reveal interesting idiosyncrasies in connection with the semantics of predication and identity, and this forces us to rethink many of our assumptions about the relationship between grammatical form and logical form.

1990

JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected]. . Oxford University Press and Mind Association are collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Mind. The proper statement and assessment of Russell's theory depends on one's semantic presuppositions. A semantic framework is provided, and Russell's theory formulated in terms of it. Referential uses of descriptions raise familiar problems for the theory, to which there are, at the most general level of abstraction, two possible Russellian responses. Both are considered, and both found wanting. The paper ends with a brief consideration of what the correct positive theory of definite descriptions might be, if it is not the Russellian theory.

1995

Cognitive semantics relates linguistic expressions to conceptual structures. The purpose of this paper is to present a framework for such a cognitive structure. As a preparation, Putnam's argument against intensional semantics as a theory of meaning is presented. Some of the main tenets of cognitive semantics as it has developed during the last years are outlined. The notion of a conceptual space is proposed as a central tool for representing semantic information. It is outlined how conceptual spaces can be used as a basis for a formal cognitive semantics.The model is then applied to some problems in lexical semantics, such as the effect of varying contrast classes.

Białostockie Archiwum Językowe, 2015

The standard view in natural language semantics is that quantifiers denote relations between sets. Psychological research, however, has shown that quantified statements often convey finer-grained information that is not encoded in their set-theoretic definitions. We investigate the relationship between these meaning aspects on the basis of two experiments.

Mind, 2000

For readability, Russell's notation is replaced by a more modern variation throughout the paper. Iotas replace inverted iotas. Capital roman letters for specific predicates (with numerical superscripts indicating degree when they are not unary) often replace Russell's lower case Greek letters for propositional functions. Dot notation is eliminated in favor of parentheses and brackets. Parentheses around description operators and those around their atomic arguments are dropped, so that B(4x)(Fx) becomes B4xFx. Subscripts on biconditional signs are replaced by the appropriate quantifiers. On the other hand, the modern convention of allowing only letters from the end of the alphabet to serve as individual variables is flouted. Further changes in Russell's notation will be discussed subsequently.

Journal of Philosophy, 2009

'Modality: Metaphysics, Logi and Epistemology' (eds. B. Hale, A. Hoffman0, OUP, pp. 65-80