Memory and reflection

This paper advances the claim that skilful reflection is a master virtue in that skilful reflection shapes and corrects the other epistemic and intellectual virtues. We make the case that skilful reflection does this with both competence-based epistemic virtues and character-based intellectual virtues. In making the case that skilful reflection is a master virtue, we identify the roots of ideas central to our thesis in Confucian philosophy. In particular, we discuss the Confucian conception of reflection, as well as different levels of epistemic virtue. Next we set out the Dual Process Hypothesis of Reflection, which provides an explanation of the workings of reflection in relation to Type 1 and Type 2 cognitive processes. In particular, we flag how repetition of Type 2 processes may eventually shape Type 1 processes and produce what we call downstream reflection. We distinguish competence-based epistemic virtues from character-based intellectual virtues. We also explain how our metacognition account of reflection, drawing on a Confucian conception of reflection and the Dual Process Hypothesis of Reflection, explains skilful reflection as a master virtue. Finally we outline an application of our metacognition account of reflection to a current debate in epistemology.

Confucian education is often associated with rote-memorisation that is characterised by sheer repetition of facts with no or little understanding of the content learnt. But does Confucian education necessarily promote rote-memorisation? What does Confucius himself have to say about education? This article aims to answer the above questions by examining Confucius’ concept of si (thinking) based on a textual study of the Analects. It is argued that Confucius’ concept of si primarily involves an active inquiry into issues that concern one’s everyday life, promotes inferential thinking, and facilitates self-examination. Far from advocating rote-memorisation, Confucius highlights the need for us to take ownership of our own learning, engage in higher order thinking, and reflectively apply the lessons learnt in our lives.

We argue that skilful reflection makes a positive epistemic contribution to epistemic standings. We begin by setting out the dialectical context of our discussion of skilful reflection. In particular the significance of reflection for Sosa's account of knowledge and the charges laid against philosophers' use of reflection by Kornblith. In order to advance our thesis while being responsive to the dialectic we develop an account of skilful reflection. We do so by hypothesising that reflection involves both Type 1 and Type 2 processes, while remaining neutral to the charge that reflection simpliciter doesn't make a positive epistemic contribution. Drawing on our dual process hypothesis of reflection, we then outline how reflection can be skilful. Having provided an account of skilful reflection and having made the case that skilful reflection can make a positive contribution to our epistemic standings, we make the case for a Confucian based account of skilful reflection as an epistemic virtue. On this account, a central feature of such a character trait is that reflection is informed by both retrospective and perspective considerations. We next briefly assess how skilful reflection can make an epistemic contribution in a number of different domains. We return to Sosa's account of knowledge and show the role that our account of reflection as an epistemic virtue can play. More specifically, we show how both our account of skilful reflection based on the dual process theory and the Confucian based account of the epistemic virtue of reflectiveness can significantly develop Sosa's account of knowledge.

Religion, Brain & Behavior, 2011

Erkenntnis, 2020

Hilary Kornblith argues that many traditional philosophical accounts involve problematic views of reflection (understood as second-order mental states). According to Kornblith, reflection does not add reliability, which makes it unfit to underlie a separate form of knowledge. We show that a broader understanding of reflection, encompassing Type 2 processes, working memory, and episodic long-term memory, can provide philosophy with elucidating input that a restricted view misses. We further argue that reflection in fact often does add reliability, through generalizability, flexibility, and creativity that is helpful in newly encountered situations, even if the restricted sense of both reflection and knowledge is accepted. And so, a division of knowledge into one reflexive (animal) form and one reflective form remains a plausible, and possibly fruitful, option.

2018

I discuss reflection as a means to achieve true belief and avoid error. I argue in the first section how can this be treated as a separate problem. In the second section, I discuss Sosa’s Virtue Epistemology approach to the epistemic value of reflection. In the third, I raise problems for this view and argue that, if ignorance possess epistemic value, it is an interesting form of dealing with these difficulties.

In this paper, I will be arguing for a view of knowledge as a true belief that manifests a competent (epistemic) agency. Beyond a mere juxtaposition of performing skills, epistemic competent agency requires an integration of faculties at a personal level that is sufficient to evaluate the agent's epistemic risk in particular situations. I will propose that, in order to meet this requirement, agency must scale to a personal level where the agent's engagement in epistemic situations manifests a competent endorsement of her beliefs. This view can deal with the predicaments of Virtue Epistemology in a naturalistic atmosphere by changing the emphasis from representation to agency, and by considering knowledge as an expression of achievement. This interpretation faces two related problems: first, the issue of self-knowledge in agency, and second, the problem of the integration of competencies from the personal standpoint of a unified agent. In this paper, I will only be dealing with the second problem.

Many scholars note that the Analects, and Confucian philosophy more generally, hold a conception of knowing that more closely approximates ‘knowing-how’ than ‘knowing that’. However, I argue that this description is not sufficiently sensitive to the concerns of the early Confucians and their focus on self-cultivation. I propose that a particular conception of knowing—knowing to act in the moment—is better suited to capturing the Analects’ emphasis on exemplary lives in actual contexts. These investigations might also contribute to discussions on know-how in epistemology in western philosophy.

Dao Companion to the Philosophy of Mencius, 2023

This chapter examines Mencius’s views on knowledge and how they might contribute to contemporary debates in epistemology. For this purpose, I focus on three features that I take to be characteristic (although not exhaustive) of Mencian epistemology: first, Mencius’s views on knowing things; second, the role that wisdom or intellectual virtue plays in acquiring knowledge; and third, Mencius’s views on “knowing-to”, a kind of knowledge conceptually distinct from knowing-that and knowing-how. I argue that the views we find in the Mencius on these matters are relevant to contemporary debates on the nature of objectual knowledge, on the role of intellectual virtue in knowing, and on the relation between know-how and intelligent action.

TRANS/FORM/AÇÃO- v. 44 (2021): Edição Especial - Dossier “Ernest Sosa” , 2021

FORGETTING IN "MEMORY AND REFLECTION": OMISSIONS, ACTIONS, AND ASYMMETRY. A critical comment to "Memory and reflection", by Chienkuo Mi, in Trans/Form/Ação: Unesp journal of philosophy, vol. 44, Special issue in honor of Ernest Sosa, p. 151-168, 2021.