A Brief Discussion on 'Prāpti'

Hōrin, 2022

SGEM Vienna ART Conference , 2018

In this work the terms prapatti and tawakkul are considered as similar ones in sense and value in the Vaiṣṇava and Sufi religious and philosophical traditions. Both terms mean the condition of self-surrender to God which lead the devotees to the spiritual realization in the scope of the particular tradition. The doctrine of prapatti take a special place in Vaiṣṇavism. It origins arise at least from Pāñcarātra saṃhitās and religious poetry of the Āḻvārs (aprox. 6-10 th cent.). It is regarded as the alternative path to achieve the salvation of soul (mokṣa) which is the main goal of Indian philosophy along with bhakti, jñāna and karma yoga. The same concept can be found in Sufism. Tawakkul is one of the main stages (maqām) on the Sufi Mystical Path. Same as prapatti it expresses the special condition of a full self-surrender and trust in the will of God. It is the fundamental principle of Sufism. This work is dedicated to the comparative study of the mentioned terms and it is aimed to highlight the differences and similarities in their understanding and interpretation inside the traditions. The requirements and prescriptions to the practices of prapatti and tawakkul are also reviewed.

Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde Sudasiens und Archiv für indische Philosophie, 1978

"TK. In the Buddhist Tibetan Canon, Bstan-ḥgyur, there are two small metrical treatises (Tōhuku 3836 and 4553; Catalogue and Index of the Tibetan Tripiṭaka, Peking Edition, 5236 and 5467) under the title Rten-ciṅ-ḥbrel-bar-ḥbyuṅ- baḥi-sñiṅ-poḥi tshig-leḥur-byas-pa. Both are basically identical and are translations of a Sanskrit work. The title of this work is indicated in both treatises after the Tibetan title: Pratītyasamutpādahṛdayakārikā. The colophons of both treatises attribute this work to Nāgārjuna. Both translations contain seven kārikās each; their basic theme is the pratītyasamutpāda doctrine."

Journal of Indian and Buddhist Studies, 1994

Ācārya Kundakunda’s (circa 1st century BCE) Pravacanasāra is among the most popular Jaina Scriptures that are studied with great reverence by the ascetics as well as the laymen. Consciousness manifests in form of cognition (upayoga) – pure-cognition (śuddhopayoga), auspicious-cognition (śubhopayoga) and inauspicious-cognition (aśubhopayoga). Pure-cognition represents conduct without-attachment (vītarāga cāritra). Perfect knowledge or omniscience (kevalajñāna) is the fruit of pure-cognition (śuddhopayoga). The soul engaged in pure-cognition (śuddhopayoga) enjoys supreme happiness engendered by the soul itself; this happiness is beyond the five senses – atīndriya – unparalleled, infinite, and imperishable. Omniscience (kevalajñāna) is real happiness; there is no difference between knowledge and happiness. Delusion (moha), the contrary and ignorant view of the soul about substances, is the cause of misery. The soul with attachment (rāga) toward the external objects makes bonds with karmas and the soul without attachment toward the external objects frees itself from the bonds of karmas. The stainless soul knows the reality of substances, renounces external and internal attachments (parigraha) and does not indulge in the objects-of-the-senses.

Austrian Academy of Sciences Press, 2020

Journal of Indian Philosophy, 1990

"The word pratibhā is a very important one. It expresses some fundamental concepts. We start mentioning three of them, which have been analyzed in some valuable works. Other meanings, equally fundamental, will come to light when we study what Bhartṛhari teaches about pratibhā."

Journal of Indian Philosophy, 2005

2021

Classical Sāṁ khya has usually been interpreted as an intellectualist school. Its presumed method for the attainment of liberation is essentially characterized by rational inquiry into reality, which involves the intellectual understanding of the distinction between two principles: the conscious and the material. Some have argued that this liberating process is not only theoretical, but that it entails yogic practice, or that it is the natural outcome of existential forces that tend toward freedom. However, recent studies in Sāṁ khya involving detailed analysis of an anonymous commentary of the Sāṃkhyakārikā, the Yuktidīpikā, suggest a more complex picture. The external functions of the five vital winds (prāṇas) in relation to the sources of action (karmayonis) and dispositions of being (bhāvas) seem to play an important role in the liberating path. In this paper, I review the relation between bhāvas, karmayonis, and the five prāṇas by considering the social, moral, and interpersonal aspects of the five vital winds as described in the Yuktidīpikā. It will be shown how the external functions of prāṇa are related to the moral cultivation of vitality, leading to the enactment and manifestation of dispositions of being (bhāvas) that bring about the realization of oneself as a knower in the ethical engagement with others. It is this unique way of understanding prāṇa in the Yuk-tidīpikā that makes the Sāṁ khya path for liberation something more than a theoretical cognitive method or a spontaneous and predetermined realization of one's self.

Journal of Indian Philosophy, 1986

proposed two mutually opposed interpretations of Dign~ga's classification ofpratyak.sdbhdsa. 1 I shall proceed to propose yet a third interpretation which contains elements from both Wayman and Hattori, and can, therefore, be considered as a compromise between the two scholars. In the second part of this paper I shall try to deal with the philosophical considerations which led Dign~ga to attribute all er~,,,s to the mind, and no errors whatsoever to the senses.

This dissertation examines the theory of perceptual cognition laid out by the 7th century Buddhist scholar, Dharmakīrti, in his magnum opus, the Pramāṇavārttika. Like most theories of perception, both ancient and modern, the sensory cognition of ordinary objects is a topic of primary concern. Unlike other theorists, however, Dharmakīrti advances a technical definition of “perception” as a cognition which is both nonconceptual and non-erroneous. Dharmakīrti’s definition of perception is thereby deliberately inclusive of three additional types of “perceptual” cognition, in addition to veridical sensory awareness: the nonconceptual mental apprehension of an immediately-preceding cognition (“mental perception”), the vivid appearance of soteriologically efficacious objects of contemplative practice (“yogic perception”), and the sheer unmediated presence of the contents of cognition—whatever these might be—to the cognizing mind (“reflexive awareness”). Through the logical examination of what it means to be aware of an object, Dharmakīrti demonstrates that the awareness of an object is just the awareness of a phenomenal form or cognitive image produced by that object. Pursuing this analysis further, however, Dharmakīrti argues that the very notion of an object of cognition that exists “externally” or outside the mind is incoherent. Additionally, Dharmakīrti maintains that the phenomenological structure of subject and object—that is, the “first-personal” sense of one’s own cognitions as pertaining to oneself (“for-me-ness”), together with the inseparably concomitant sense that the objects of cognition exist “out there” in an extramental world—is strictly a form of cognitive error. Therefore, because ordinary sensory cognition is inherently structured by this subject-object duality, ordinary sensory cognition must in the final analysis be understood as erroneous. According to Dharmakīrti, in other words, ultimately only the nondual “luminosity” of reflexive awareness is genuinely perceptual, because only reflexive awareness is undistorted by nature. In this way, Dharmakīrti’s epistemology provides a theoretical foundation for the advanced nondual contemplative practices of Indian and Tibetan Buddhism, particularly Mahāmudrā and rDzogs chen.

JOURNAL OF INDIAN AND BUDDHIST STUDIES (INDOGAKU BUKKYOGAKU KENKYU), 1992

Journal of Indian and Tibetan Studies, 2018

In his Prajñāpāramitopadeśa (PPU) Ratnākaraśānti claims that all dharmas are mere cognition in nature (vijñānamātrasvabhāvāh .). This view is based on his theory of illumination (prakāśa, shining forth). He regards the illumination/appearance of all dharmas as possible only when illumination is accepted as their nature (prakāśamānānām. dharmān .ā m ...ātmabhūtah. prakāśah .). Only something luminous in nature can shine forth. An object, if it did not have the nature of being luminous, could not shine forth (sa ced atadrūpo na tarhi prakāśate). Thus, for him, luminous dharmas, which have the very nature of cognition, are precisely cognition in nature. Whereas Ratnākaraśānti regards illumination as cognition in nature, Bhāt. t. a Mīmām. sakas regard it as an additional property produced in a cognized object (vis. ayasya grāhyasya dharmah .) as a result of a cognizing action (jñānakārya). Naiyāyikas, etc., regard it as nothing more than the occurrence of cognition (jñānasyotpattih .). They need no separate category called illumination. When a cognition of blue arises, blue appears to the mind. Another theorist, whom Ratnākaraśānti designates merely as aparah. (another), claims that a non-luminous object is illuminated by a luminous cognition (arthah. punar atadrūpo jñānavaśāt prakāśate).