Does Apriority Involve Necessity?
Siraprapa Chavanayarn2010, Prajñā Vihāra: Journal of Philosophy and Religion
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Abstract
Much has been discussed concerning apriority and its relation to the concept of necessity. Many philosophers have conventionally supposed that a proposition is known a priori only if it is necessarily true. According to Kant, for instance, the first philosopher who systematically discussed apriority, “necessity” is one of the criteria of a priori knowledge. Kant (1958) maintains that all a priori knowledge is necessarily true. Thus, from this conventional thought, many philosophers claim that apriority involves necessity, and rejecting the concept of necessity unavoidably affects the status of apriority. That is, if all a priori propositions need to be necessarily true, and we can prove that there is no necessarily true proposition, we are forced to conclude that there are no a priori propositions. However, this paper aims to propose that apriority does not involve necessity since all a priori propositions need not be necessarily true. The paper has been separated into three parts. Firstly, I will discuss the problem of necessity and its effect on the status of apriority. Secondly, I will argue that apriority does not involve necessity by considering the two following questions: (A) is there a necessary a posteriori proposition? And (B) is there a contingent a priori proposition? Thirdly, I will scrutinize the possible objections and try to defend my argument which will involve some further considerations about a priori justification.
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I critically assess Stephen Yablo's claim that ''cassinis are ovals'' is an a posteriori conceptual necessity. One does not know it simply by mastering the relevant concepts but by substantial empirical scrutiny. Yablo represents narrow content by ''would have turned out''-conditionals. An epistemic reading of such conditionals does not bear Yablo's claim. Two metaphysically laden readings are considered. In one reading, Yablo's conditionals test under what circumstances concepts remain the same while their extensions diverge. As an alternative, I develop a more literal metaphysical interpretation: Yablo's conditionals draw on scenarios which are qualitatively identical to some original situation. None of these interpretations sustains Yablo's core thesis. Keywords Conceptual necessity Á Analyticity Á Metaphysical necessity Á Narrow content Á A priori Á Conditionals Á Counterfactuals Á Modal rationalism Á 2D-semantics 1 ''Cassinis are ovals'' as a posteriori conceptual necessity The once venerable connection of necessity, analyticity, and aprioricity has lost much of its appeal. Recently, Stephen Yablo has attacked one of the last traditional dogmas: Conceptual necessities are knowable a priori. He provides an a posteriori conceptual necessity: CAO: ''Cassinis are ovals'' Yablo characterizes ''oval'':
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